The struggle to redefine the relationship between 'knowledge'
and 'action' in the academy: some reflections on action research.
John
Elliott, Centre for Applied Research in Education, School of Education and
Professional Development, University of East Anglia
Action
research and the theory-practice relationship
'Action-research
might be defined as 'the Study of a social situation with a view to
improving the quality of action within it' (Elliott 1991 p 69).
This
definition appeared in my book 'Action Research for Educational Change' (1991)
and is widely cited in books and papers on action research. Rather than feeling pleased about this,
I find myself annoyed and irritated.
Why? Because I feel that
the authors neglect my attempts to redefine the relationship between theory and
practice in terms of the idea of action research. At times they appear to be using my definition to place a
tight boundary between action research aimed at the improvement of practice and
research aimed at the construction of theory. The drawing of such a tight boundary is often based on the
assumption that the practical knowledge which stems from action research is
non-theoretical in character because its value is entirely instrumental to the
task of improving practice as a means to an end. Such an assumption implies that the pursuit of practical
knowledge through action research is for the sake of practical goals that can
be defined independently and in advance of the action research process, whereas
research aimed at the construction of theory is the pursuit of knowledge for
its own sake. Conceived in such
instrumental terms, practical knowledge has no value in itself, and is set
against theoretical knowledge regarded by those who pursue it as valuable in
itself. My own work was being selectively appropriated to legitimate a
conception of action research which privileged practice over theory, whereas I
had seen it as an attempt to redefine the relationship between theory and
practice in a way which dissolved the dualism.
In the late
'90s, I directed a study of action research carried out in the context of
post-graduate courses for teachers within the UK, and discovered that it was
predominantly conceived inside academic institutions as the production of
instrumental knowledge aimed at underpinning improvements in practice in
schools and other educational organisations (see Elliott, MacLure & Sarland
1996).
One obstacle
to dissolving the dualism between theory and practice is the idea of a 'theory'
as a generalisable representation of events and occurrences. From such a standpoint, theory
generation implies a large-scale study of samples and the exclusion of
small-scale studies of particular events and situations. Hence my definition of action research
as 'the study of a social situation with a view to improving the quality of
action within it'
will be read as an account of a form of small-scale research carried out in
particular settings, such as a single classroom or a school, with a view to
generating a highly particularised and therefore non-theoretical representation
of action.
Earlier in my
book 'Action Research for Educational Change', I defined action research in
similar terms to the above, but said rather more about the relationship between
its practical aim and the production of knowledge.
The
fundamental aim of action research is to improve practice rather than to
produce knowledge. The production
and utilisation of knowledge is subordinate to, and conditioned by, this
fundamental aim (p.49).
As I shall
explain more fully later, I was trying to signify the primacy of the
practical standpoint
as a context for knowledge generation.
I was saying that in the process of action research, knowledge is
produced and used in the process of improving practice. It is constituted by the intention of
an agent to change a situation, an intention that is continuously modified in
the course of action as the agent's knowledge of the situation develops. I certainly did not wish to imply that
the production and use of knowledge is simply a means to the realisation of a
practical intention that can be formed independently and prior to it. Or that this kind of knowledge would
have no value in itself and lack any theoretical significance. However, I see now that my words can be
read in a way that implies a privileging of practice over theory. Just as to privilege theory over practice implies the
exclusion of the practical standpoint, so to privilege practice over theory
excludes the theoretical standpoint.
Action
research that privileges practice over theory does not dissolve the
theory-practice dualism by linking theory to practice. It simply excludes the theoretical
standpoint. In doing so, it is
shaped by the same assumptions which shape forms of educational research that
privilege theory over practice; namely, that 'theory' consists of generalisable
representations of events, and is generated by activities that in themselves
are dissociated from the practical intentions of human agents. In failing to challenge these assumptions,
much of what counts as action research in the field of education fails to
dissolve the dualism between theory and practice. It simply sets up a tension inside the academy with those
forms of educational research that privilege 'theory'. Educational action research is pitted
against educational science, and as such confined to a lowly status in the
academic hierarchy of knowledge as a minor 'sub-discipline' in the field of
educational research.
The shared
assumptions outlined above positively shape the conduct of educational science
whereas they negatively shape the conduct of educational action research. They effectively exclude action
research from the domain of public knowledge and confine it to the domain of
private knowledge. In terms of
these assumptions, public knowledge is defined from a standpoint which
privileges theory over practices.
From this standpoint, what counts as public knowledge is determined by
considerations concerning the validity and truth of theoretical propositions
rather than considerations concerning their practical usefulness. The latter may be important to address
but they are extrinsic to the activities of knowledge production. In the UK, educational researchers are
being asked to address the relevance of their research to potential users
before they design it, and to play a more active role in disseminating their
findings to the public. Although
researchers may regard such considerations as important they are viewed as quite
distinct from methodological considerations about the conduct of the research
itself.
What counts
as public knowledge generally determines what gets published. Academics who wish to support action
research with teachers and other professional practitioners (eg nurses and
social workers) tend in the main to publish accounts of the research process
and methodology. The knowledge
outcomes are often not deemed to be of sufficient status to report and find
acceptance in prestigious academic publications. Academic action researchers tend to find themselves marginal
players in the educational research establishment. Most of them go along with this. They compensate by identifying with communities of
practitioners and may acquire the status of 'big fish' in the small action
research pool inside the academy, but they leave the domain of educational
research essentially intact and unchallenged.
Currently the
most influential challenge to this domain inside the academy is stemming from
the ideas of poststructuralist thinkers like Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard and
Foucault (see Belsey 2002). From
the perspective of poststructuralist educational researchers, such as Stronach
and MacLure (1997), inasmuch as the idea of action research privileges practice
over theory it is trapped in the patterns of dualistic thinking that
characterise the western tradition of enlightenment thought established by the
philosophy of Descartes. For
example, MacLure (1995) has applied the poststructuralist methodology of
'deconstruction' to the texts created by action researchers in the field of
education. I will now examine the
poststructuralist challenge to enlightenment thinking with a view to asking
what its implications are for the theory-practice problem and the idea of
action research as a resolution of this problem.
The
poststructuralist challenge and the theory-practice relationship
It is often
assumed that theorising is a mental activity and action a physical
activity. In this mind-body
dualism resides the problem of theory and practice. From a theoretical standpoint the 'self' is a thinking
subject that construes the world as an object of contemplation rather than an
object of change. Descartes'
'Cogito ergo sum' (see 1968) established 'the self' as a substance whose essence
is thinking and therefore the primacy of the theoretical over the practical
standpoint. From the standpoint of
the 'Cogito', reasons for action have their source outside the context of the
practical affairs of everyday life in the contemplative knowledge of the
'thinking subject'. Such knowledge
can therefore be applied to practice but not derived from it. The 'Cogito' has defined the
relationship between theory and practice in the western enlightenment tradition
and shaped the process of knowledge production within the academy. In doing so it challenged traditional
authority on matters of belief and constituted a declaration of
independence. As the Scottish
philosopher John Macmurray (1957 pp.75) explained, if to think is my essential
nature then 'I have the right and the duty to think for myself, and to refuse
to accept any authority other than my own reason as a guarantor of truth.' This
logic was radically challenged by Macmurray himself as well as by the
poststructuralist and postmodern thinkers on the European continent during the
latter half of the 20th Century.
Poststructuralist
thinkers elaborated on the work of Saussure (1916, trans 1974) and brought the
idea of the substantial self whose essence is thinking into question, and along
with it the idea of reason as a guarantor of truth. According to Saussure, 'meanings' such as theories about the
world do not originate from a 'thinking self'. The latter is a product of the meanings individuals learn
from their culture, and that originate in its symbolic systems or
discourses. The words and other
symbols that make up a language do not refer to meanings that exist outside the
language itself. They neither
represent an objective order of things in the world or the ideas of a thinker
that exists independently of their use within the culture. Meaning resides in the sign, not beyond
it. It is differential rather than
referential (see Belsey, 2002, p.10) in the sense that it is culturally
differentiated and has no existence beyond the words and symbols that signify
it.
Poststructuralist
thought deconstructed a conception of theoretical knowledge in terms of a
thinking subject, construed as the 'essential self', contemplating
independently existing objects in the external world. If the thinking subject is the effect of learning the trajectories
of meaning embedded in the symbolic systems of the culture, then it does not
exist as an unconditioned consciousness.
The subject is decentered as the origin of thought. It thinks only what it is permitted to
think within the culture it is conditioned by. The world it 'knows' is therefore a culturally
differentiated one rather than an objective world that exists independently of
the knower. One cannot even talk
intelligibly of the decentered subject possessing personal knowledge for this presupposes a culturally unconditioned
consciousness or 'self'. If the
objects of knowledge are culturally differentiated and the knower is the effect
of culture, then individuals are not in a position to construct purely personal
knowledge. What they believe is
always what their culture permits.
Poststructuralism, through its method of deconstruction, dissolves the
binary opposition enshrined in Descartes' Cogito between "the knowing subject in
here and the objects of its knowledge out there" (see Belsey 2000,
pp.72-73).
Foucault in
particular pointed out the implications of this decentered vision of the
subject for the way power operates in society (see 1979a & 1979b). Learning and maintaining the ways of
thinking about the world differentiated by the culture, its theoretical and
normative discourses, involves submission to the authorities responsible for
their transmission and maintenance.
For Foucault all social relations connecting the individual to social institutions
are relations of power. Power is not
a thing some individuals have and others do not, that can be gained or
lost. Rather it defines the
relation between all individuals and their culture, including those authorities
who are responsible for the transmission and maintenance of that culture. The latter exert power in their
relations with others by virtue of their own compliance to the culturally
differentiated meanings circulating within the society. According to Foucault, this relational
conception of power implies the possibility of resistance. Individuals can always refuse to
conform, although usually at a price, and create reverse discourses to maintain their resistance to the
dominant ones operating in the society.
Power relations are a site of struggle and conflict. One might indeed interpret the action
research movement in such Foucaultian terms as a reverse discourse of
resistance to the prevailing discourse of research in the academy; namely one
which privileges theoretical knowledge over practice.
From the
poststructuralist perspective, 'theories' are not a rational foundation for
ordering practical affairs. In
learning to apply them to our practices, we are not grounding those practices
in objective truths about the objects of our experience, but securing their
compliance with culturally differentiated systems of meaning that tell us what
to think about what we are doing.
Theoretical discourses, understood as systems of culturally
differentiated meanings circulating in society, constitute resources for
exerting epistemic sovereignty over our practical thinking. The increasingly policy-driven
'evidence-based practice' movement in the UK (see Hargreaves 1997) that holds
professional practitioners (eg doctors, nurses, social workers and teachers)
accountable for the extent to which they ground their practices in research
evidence, is an attempt by the state to get them to base their practical
judgements and decisions on the generalisable representations of good practice
that are produced by research.
From a poststructuralist point of view this movement can be interpreted
as an indirect and 'soft' attempt to exert a form of epistemic sovereignty over
the practical thinking of practitioners in the guise of fostering rational
practices.
If, in
applying theory to practice, social practitioners such as teachers are managing
their own compliance with culturally determined systems of meaning, how are we
to understand the practices shaped by this process? Descartes' 'Cogito' assumes a sharp division between mind
and body. Whereas the thinking and
reasoning mind is the essence of the self, the body is simply an organism it
possesses (see Belsey 2000 p.66).
When left to respond to its environment on the basis of its own
physiological make-up, the movements of the body are entirely independent of
the reasoning activities of the mind.
However, the thinking and reasoning mind can exert a measure of control
over the physical movements of the body as a means of achieving practical ends
that transcend the survival needs of the organism. From the standpoint of the 'Cogito', the physical movements
of the body (behaviour) are transformed into the practices of a human agent
(actions) by the capacity of the mind to impose some form of rational order on
them. The poststructuralist
challenge to the 'Cogito' nullifies this account of social practices as the
effect of rational human agents on the movements of the body and construes
social practices as reactions on the part of the human organisms to stimuli in
the cultural environment, motivated by their survival needs. Such reactions will involve
consciousness but it will take a different form from consciousness conceived in
terms of an agent having reasons for action. As Macmurray (1957 p.167) points out, conscious reactions to
environmental stimuli stem from motives connected to the organisms survival
needs, rather than reasons for action.
The initiative for such behaviour lies with the stimulus as opposed to a
human agent, whereas the initiative for action lies with an agent who
determines it in the light of their knowledge. From the perspective of poststructuralist theory, social
practices are conceived in terms of adaptive responses on the part of human
organisms to cultural stimuli rather than in terms of self-initiated
actions. Viewed in such terms, the
activity of applying theory to practice depicts not so much the process by
which human agents rationally determine their actions in the world, as the
process by which human organisms consciously adapt their behaviour in response
to cultural stimuli.
The
poststructuralist challenge, as I have argued, acknowledges the possibility of
resistance to the cultural conditioning it depicts. Human beings can inhibit the tendency to adapt to their
cultural environment in the required ways but only at the risk of their
survival. They can transgress and
disrupt hegemonic discourses and even establish reverse discourses . However, might such resistances be simply interpreted as
negative reactions to cultural stimuli - failures on the part of certain human
organisms to adapt appropriately to the prevailing hegemonic discourses within
the cultural environment - rather than forming a basis for free action? I shall return to this question a
little later.
Hannah
Arendt and the philosophy of action
It is interesting
to look at the view of social practice implicit in postmodern deconstructions
of the prevailing discourses in western societies in the light of Hannah
Arendt's account of the The Human Condition (1958). As Canovan (1974 p.54) points out, Arendt focuses her
philosophy on describing and evaluating the various forms of human activity,
rather than focusing, like most western philosophers have done, on evaluating
the products of human thought.
Human activity she claimed had not been sufficiently thought about and
" its modes not clearly articulated" (Canovan p.54). I would argue that such philosophical
neglect also extends to poststructuralist thinkers. Their deconstructions of western enlightenment thought
appear to leave us with a view of social practices as forms of cultural
conditioning, but they are less than clear about the extent to which
alternative modes of activity are possible.
Arendt
distinguishes three basic modes of human activity: Labour, Work and
Action. 'Labour' is activity dictated by what is required to sustain
life. It is basically life lived
under the domination of biological necessity, although Arendt reluctantly
acknowledges that in the modern world what is experienced as necessary to
sustain life has been extended to cover the consumption of material goods that
go beyond the basic necessities of living (see Coulter 2002 p.195). Activities of labour involve endless
repetition. They are not directed
to some end determined by an agent.
They focus on means rather than ends. If labour has an 'end' it is simply the perpetuation of
life, the successful adaptation of human organisms to their environment, in an
endless cycle. The poststructuralist
perspective on social practices in western societies appears to render
them predominantly activities of
'Labour' in the Arendtian sense of this term.
'Work',
according to Arendt, involves the creation of enduring objects or artefacts for
use rather than consumption to satisfy basic needs (see Canovan 1974 p.56 &
Coulter 2002 p.197). Unlike
'Labour' such activities have a beginning and a finite ending consciously
determined by the workers themselves.
Moreover, workers deploy their particular talents and abilities to
create their 'works'. 'Work', in
the Arendtian sense of the term, calls forth the generative capacities of human
beings and, in doing so, as Canavan (1974 p.56) points out, "is
characteristically human as labour is not." From an Arendtian perspective
theories or ideas can be regarded as the products of human work. They form part of a cultural
environment that human beings create for themselves. Once created, cultural artefacts like theories and ideas
stand over against human beings to define their world. Poststructuralist theory only leaves
space for conceiving culture as that which stands over against human
beings. From this point of view
'the self' is an effect rather than an originator of culture. In destroying 'the self' conceived as a
thinking subject passively mirroring an objective world from a contemplative
standpoint, poststructuralist theory has difficulty in conceiving of any
location for 'the self' other than as an effect of culture. By focusing on human activity and its
distinct modes, rather than thinking as such, Arendt is able to explore
alternative locations for 'the self' to those of the purely intellectual
standpoint and that of an organism reacting to an environment that is set over
and against it.
Arendt's
third mode of human activity is that of 'action', a category she deploys to
vindicate her belief in human freedom (see Canovan 1974 p.58, Coulter 2002
pp.198-203). 'Action' involves
initiating change in a social situation to bring about something new in the web
of social relationships that constitute it. The consequences of 'action' for the agent and those
effected by them, where they will lead, cannot be entirely foreseen in
advance. 'Action' therefore
becomes a matter of continuous negotiation with others through the construction
in process of 'transient accounts' as it unfolds in the process. The full story of 'action' can only be
pieced together after the event.
Since for
Arendt 'action' is inextricably linked to communication with others considered
as equals, it occurs in public rather than private space, which she regards as
the realm of freedom. In this
sense it is intrinsically 'political', and is not to be confused with the
political organisations human beings establish for the purpose of perpetuating
their natural biological needs.
The sphere of 'action' transcends the hierarchical or sovereign relation
between governments and their subjects (Canovan 1974 p.68).
In the
activity of 'labour', human beings are bound by biological necessities and
therefore do not engage in them freely.
Even in the activity of 'work' their freedom is restricted by the object
it aims to create. It is only in
'action' - an activity that changes a human situation by initiating something
new - that human beings experience unconstrained freedom. This is because in 'action', in
exercising agency to effect change, human beings reveal their unique
individuality to themselves and others.
This is not 'a self' that they are aware of prior to acting. Human beings learn who they are from
their 'actions' in the human world (see Canovan 1974 p. 59). From an Arendtian perspective 'the
self' is located in its 'actions' and the experience of agency which
accompanies them.
Since for
Arendt 'action' is always carried out in the company of others conceived as
free and equal individuals it possesses the twin qualities of plurality and natality. In 'action' the agent takes into account the unique
points of view that others hold towards the situation in question. This is not the same as acting on the
basis of a negotiated consensus.
In 'action' the agent reveals his or her own distinctive view of the
situation, but it is developed in communication with others and accommodates or
'invoices' (my term) their own distinctive outlooks. It is in this sense that Arendt regards 'action' as plural. The more an agent accommodates the plural voices of others, the more his or
her activity constitutes 'action'.
The concept of natality as a quality of action is used by Arendt to contrast 'action'
with mere role governed behaviour.
In 'action' conditions are created that enable the agent and others to
reveal their individuality and uniqueness by starting something new and, in
doing so, to transcend what is merely required of them in their roles in
life. If 'action' has an aim, it
is to enlarge the space in which human beings can relate to each other as
unique individuals in the situation.
Such an aim is not the intention to produce an outcome or result, but a
value built into the process of action itself.
In
articulating these distinctive modes of human activities Arendt perhaps
achieves what poststructuralist theory fails to; namely, an alternative social
location to the 'Cogito' for the existence of 'the self', other than as a mere
effect of culture. For Arendt 'the
self' only exists in 'action'.
However, one might argue that the possibility of 'action' in her sense
of the term is what Foucault alludes to when he talks about resistance
and the struggle of power, and indeed what Derrida (1995) is attempting to articulate when
exploring the possibility of an ethics of deconstruction
in his later work (see Belsey 2002 p.90). The fact that we live in a culturally differentiated world
does not exonerate us, Derrida argues, from the responsibility to acknowledge
this in the way we live. Such an
acknowledgement may leave no certain foundations for living, but it does leave
what he calls 'messianicity', not the hope of realising some utopean or fixed
vision of the future but of a different future (see Belsey p.91). Within such a postmodern
'acknowledgement' of the possibility of new beginnings for human beings lies the 'seeds' of
an Arendtian view of 'action' and 'the self' as agent.
I am struck
by the parallels between Arendt's account of action and my own account of
'educational action research'.
Interestingly Coulter (2002 pp.189-206), drawing on Arendt's categories,
finds few examples of 'action' research reported in his review of papers
published in the Educational Action Research Journal compared with 'labour' and
'work' research.
I have always
stressed the importance of viewing 'education' as an activity directed by
process values rather than objectives which refer to extrinsic outcomes of the
activity. Also I have attempted to
locate action research in the context of teachers attempts to effect changes in
the conditions governing life in classrooms and schools for themselves and
their students. Again, in
researching educational practice to effect change I have argued that teachers
and their collaborators should gather multiple perspectives on the situation in
question from their colleagues, students and even parents in the form of triangulation
data. Finally, the value Arendt places on
'action' in particular human situations, as the context in which human beings
realise their freedom and dignity, makes her sceptical about the value of
sociological theory couched in the form of generalisable representations of
events. She views such
'representations' as potential devices for social control and centralising
power within the state. I have
argued, consistently with Arendt's position, that action researchers may use
such 'representations' as resources to inform their understanding of particular
aspects of the situation they face as agents of change, but they should not
treat them as 'law-like' generalisations which offer firm prescriptions for
what to do. They need to be
integrated into a more personal holistic understanding of the situation forged
by the agents of change themselves in the course of 'action'. We may refer to such understanding as a
theory of the situation.
It is to the articulation of such a conception of 'theory',
one that is largely hidden from the poststructuralist thinker's gaze, that I
shall now turn in the next section.
In doing so, I will draw heavily on John Macmurray's 'The Self as Agent' (1957). His standpoint on the location of 'the
self' in action is remarkably consistent with Arendt's philosophy of action.
Theorising
from the standpoint of action
In this
section, I will argue that action research need not exclude the development of
a theoretical representation of action, albeit a highly particularised
one. One can provide a meaningful
account of action research as a process of theorising about a practical
situation. This will involve
challenging the assumptions that the term 'theory' exclusively refers to
generalisable representations of events, which can only be produced under
conditions that are dissociated from the intentions of agents to effect change
in practical situations. In
challenging these assumptions, I hope to demonstrate that improving the quality
of action in such situations involves the development of theory. I have elsewhere tended to use the term
'situational understanding' (see Elliott 1993) to demarcate the theoretical
outcomes of action research from theory construed as generalisable
representations of events and occurrences.
My account of
action research includes rather than excludes theoretical activity as an aspect
of the practical. In doing so it
dissolves the dualism between theory and practice. Few have articulated the position I shall argue for better
than Macmurray. I will begin with
the following extract from 'The Self as Agent':
Action--- involves knowledge as its negative
aspect. The carrying out of a
practical intention therefore involves a development of knowledge Ð or if you
will, a continuous modification in the representation of the Other- as its
negative aspect. This indeed is
the primary source of that knowledge which comes unsought with the growth of
experience' (p.179).
Here the use
of the term 'negative' to refer to an aspect of action should not be construed
as an undesirable characteristic to be excluded from action. For Macmurray, 'Practical activity
includes theoretical activity, of necessity in its constitution' (p.180). The latter therefore is secondary to
the primacy of practical activity and derivative from it. It is in this sense that it constitutes
the negative aspect of action.
This in no way implies that knowledge is simply instrumental to action
that can be defined independently of it.
Macmurray defines 'action' as 'a unity of movement and knowledge'
(p.128). Therefore, he argues,
'Knowledge is that in my action which makes it an action and not a blind
activity' (p.129).
Donald
Schon's idea of 'reflection-in-action' echoes Macmurray's account of knowledge
in action, although
his influential book 'The Reflective Practitioner' (1983) makes no reference to
Macmurray's work. However,
Macmurray's account of the growth of 'knowledge-in-action' as depicted above
does not in itself add up to an account of action research. What is missing is any reference to the
intention to seek knowledge of a situation through systematic and
self-conscious inquiry (which bears some resemblances to Schon's idea of
'reflection-on-action'). Since this
intention must be viewed as the negative aspect of a broader practical
intention to change a situation, it would imply that the action undertaken to
effect change was developed systematically and self-consciously. Action research may be viewed as a systematic
form of action in
which the theoretical intention to 'modify the representation of the Other', to
use Macmurray's terms, arises as the negative aspect of a positive intention to
systematically and self-consciously bring about some change in 'the Other',
understood as a practical situation for an agent. From this perspective, it is inappropriate to treat
educational action research as merely a minor sub-discipline within a broader
domain of educational research. It
implies a radical reconceptualisation of the domain itself.
Such a
position would assert the primacy of the practical and embrace the proposition
'I act therefore I am'. This
implies, as Macmurray argues in 'The Self as Agent', that the self exists only
as an agent in a practical situation, who acts with the intention of changing
it in some respect. Can we talk
sensibly about theorising from the standpoint of practice as opposed to the
intellectual standpoint of the 'Cogito'?
Like Macmurray (p.85) I believe we can. Indeed the idea of action research embraces this belief (see
Elliott & Adelman, c 1996).
To reflect
about the world from the purely intellectual standpoint of the 'Cogito'
excludes any reference to the self as an agent in action intent on changing the
world, since this standpoint presumes that the self is the substance of a mind
that thinks about the world independently of any action to change it. Macmurray succinctly summarises the
ideal of this intellectual mode of reflection, one which still shapes our
educational system in the west and what counts as research in the academy.
---a pure
activity of thought which is cool, passionless and completely disinterested,
seeking truth for its own sake, with no eye to the practical advantage for the
seeker or for anyone else (p.192).
It is
impossible for the knowledge produced by this type of reflection to make any
direct link with the experience of those who want to effect change in the
world. Any link to the action
context must be indirectly determined by agents. Macmurray (p.192-193) argues that since the intellectual
mode of reflection suppresses any feelings the observer of a situation may have
towards it, and abstracts features in it which make no reference to the
practical valuations of participants as they seek to effect change in it, the
knowledge produced can have no practical value in itself other than as a means
to an end. From the practical
standpoint the knowledge yielded by the intellectual standpoint can only have
instrumental significance at best.
It is always knowledge of the World-as-means and takes the form of
generalised representations of facts about the world in the form of 'formulae
which express the recurrent patterns of continuance in experience'
(p.198). If Macmurray is
correct, then we cannot argue that the Knowledge generated from the
intellectual standpoint in the academy is useless knowledge if agents can find
a use for it in deciding on the means they will adopt to realise their
intentions. However, if one
accepts the postmodern critique that the intellectual standpoint masks a will
to power and that the 'knowledge' it produces invariably serves the interests
of those who wish to coerce and control the activities of others, then one
might question its usefulness to ethical agents like teachers who wish to
effect change in ways which respect the agency of their students. See for example my analysis of the
control values that shape much of what counts as 'school effectiveness'
research (Elliott 1996).
Macmurray
contrasts the intellectual mode of reflection with the emotional mode. In the latter mode, although reflection
involves a suspension of action it adopts the standpoint of the agent and
proceeds 'as though we were in action'(p.86). In emotional reflection, adopting the practical standpoint
does not exclude the theoretical.
Since it is this mode of theoretical reflection which lies at the heart
of the action research process (see Dadds 1995), let me now summarise
Macmurray's account of it (pp.198-202).
1. When
reflection proceeds as though we were in action it does not abstract from the
agent's feelings about the situation.
Action is motivated by a feeling of dissatisfaction with a situation and
terminated when the agent feels satisfied that the situation has been
improved. Reflection involves
understanding what makes the situation an unsatisfactory one for the agent,
discriminating the possibilities of action in it, and selecting one of these
possibilities for realisation in action.
Valuation is integral to this mode of reflection. There is a unity of understanding the
situation and the valuation of it (see also O'Hanlon 2002). As Macmurray puts it, 'The world is
known primarily as a system of possibilities of action' (p.191). Valuation and Knowledge are the
positive and negative aspects of forming and sustaining an intention to change
a situation from an unsatisfactory to a satisfactory state. Without them action would be
impossible, and in some situations they require a prolonged period when action
is suspended for the sake of reflection about the situation from the standpoint
of the agent.
2. Emotional
reflection seeks to determine a situation as an end in itself. In constructing a representation of a
possibility for realisation in action, it expresses a valuation of what is represented
as something to be enjoyed for its own sake and not for the sake of
accomplishing some further objective.
Such a representation will constitute an image of a particular situation
yet to be realised. Emotional
reflection therefore moves towards a greater particularisation of the
representation of the possibility of action (see, for examples in the context
of teacher-based action research, Elliott & MacDonald 1975). This contrasts with the intellectual
mode of reflection which seeks generalisable representations of the events and
occurrences it selects for attention.
It constructs knowledge scientifically. Emotional reflection constructs knowledge aesthetically. Both are activities of knowing and
forms of research. Within the
intellectual mode of reflection 'theory' refers to generalisable
representations of the world while within the emotional mode it refers to a
representation of a possibility for realisation in action within a particular
situation. However, this does not
rule out the discernment of similarities as well as differences through a
comparison of cases. Such
discernment will take the form of general insights into the problems of
effecting change in relation to a practice such as teaching. Action research does not rule out the
development of overlapping theories that yield shared insights into the
possibilities for action (see, for example, Ebbutt & Elliott 1985).
Concluding
remarks
Action
research resolves the theory-practice problem by theorising from the standpoint
of the agent in a situation s(he) feels to be unsatisfactory. It need not simply involve the agent
who wants to effect the change.
Educational researchers in the academy can collaborate with an
educational agent by adopting his/her practical standpoint as though they were
in the action context. Educational
action research need not be exclusively practitioner research. The fact that it is so often construed
as such by educational researchers, suggests that they are viewing it as a low
level, non-theoretical activity from an intellectual standpoint.
As an
emotional mode of systematic reflection, educational action research
constitutes an art rather than a science and constructs knowledge aesthetically
in unity with the activity of valuation.
However, this does not make it any less theoretical.
So how can
one explain the resistance in the academy to educational action research? I can only conclude that it is a
resistance to educational change effected by teachers. The widespread involvement of teachers
as active agents in changing educational situations would reduce the power
exerted by academic researchers - perhaps on behalf of the centralising power of the state - over what is to count as knowledge
about their practice. This because
theoretical knowledge from the standpoint of educational action is meaningless
and valueless if it cannot be validated in action as knowledge of the aims of
education, conceived as possibilities for action in a particular situation.
In discussing
Arendt's distinction between 'Action' and 'Making', Joseph Dunne (1993 p.89-90)
highlights her concern about the extent to which the products of 'making' in
the sphere of science and technology were increasingly deployed as standards of
technocratic efficiency to shape human behaviour. Through her eyes, he points out, the passive adaptation of
citizens to the products of science and technology leads to an increasing
intolerance of 'action'. This, in
my experience, is precisely what is happening with respect to the teaching
profession. Governments hold
teachers and other public service professionals accountable in terms of
'quality assurance' systems that equate 'standards' with
'value-for-money'. It is the task
of educational researchers to 'make' knowledge, in the form of 'generalisable
representations' that can be deployed as means-ends rules, to maximise the
performativity of teachers in delivering 'value-for-money'. In embracing this
task, with national research assessment exercises providing incentives for
doing so, mainstream educational researchers will tend to be intolerant of too
much 'action' in teaching, and of a form of research which supports it. In this context, action-research
constitutes a reverse discourse that offers teachers an alternative future.
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