Title: British State Policy and the Globalisation of Ummah

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Abstract

The central purpose of this dissertation is to assess the successfulness of British state policy's interaction with conflicting conceptions of a globalised *Ummah.* It is argued that, in respect to *Ummah* as a transnational religious identity, the British model of 'Multiculturalism' suffers from theoretical, structural and perhaps most significantly, cultural boundaries. Similarly, in regard to *Ummah* as a rationale for the *universalisation of Islamism,* it is shown that, in relation to the domestic threat from terrorism, British policy makers both suffer from structural restraints, and have failed to exhibit a sufficient understanding of *Ummah* as a multi-faceted dynamic, rather than a single monolithic entity. In relation to the international terrorist threat from Foreign Fighters, it is further argued that current state policy is justified and proportionate, however, impeding action is necessary in order to ensure long-term national security.

Contents

Introduction

Notions of human togetherness, solidarity and brotherhood are paramount to the continued existence of all religious practice. Islam refers to one such community, namely the community of the believers- *Ummah.* I note that contemporary interpretations of this conception of a universal people bound together by a shared faith has, contrary to its purpose, created a socio-political division, which in turn, has seen conflicting factions within the evolutionary force of Islam adopt distinct directions (Mandaville 2014). On the one hand, there exist individuals who perceive *Ummah* to constitute an 'imagined community' (Hasan 2011). In this sense, Muslims who prescribe to this understanding of *Ummah* share the view that it holds no jurisdictional precedence within the political spectrum of the 21st Century. Instead, for these individuals, *Ummah* refers to a sense of transnational religious identification amongst Muslims worldwide. This sentiment of universal solidarity has become increasingly prevalent due to the continued mobilisation of Muslims across the Western Sphere (Mandaville 2009).

On the other hand, however, there exists a socio-political movement which promotes the *universalisation of Islamism.* At the crux of this particular discourse is an immovable faith in *din wa-dawla*- Islam as a manifestation of religion *and* state (Trip 2009). Followers of this ideal claim membership to a conflicting 're-imagined community'- constituted in a conception of *Ummah*

that demands “global hegemony for its values” (Tibbi 2007 pg.1). Accordingly, this *Ummatic* consideration has been associated with the transnational *Jihadist* movement and its fundamentalist understanding of Islam.

In tandem with the process itself, the transformational capabilities of *Globalisation* are intertwined within this discussion as I explore the effects that this new-age phenomenon has on both the above conceptions of *Ummah,* and British state policy for interacting with the *Ummah*. I understand globalisation itself to manifest an interconnected synthesis of definitions put forward by Mandaville (2014) and Clark (1997). In this respect, it is a vehicle of structural interdependence- one that promotes transnational people-mobilisation and the utilisation of contemporary media technologies (Mandaville 2014). And, it is a movement:

> “Relat(ing) ideas of integration, interdependence, multilateralism, openness and interpenetration; it points to the geographical spread of these tendencies and is cognate with globalism, spatial compression, universalization (sic), and homogeneity” (Clark 1997 pg.1).

Conceptual Framework

Before I begin my disposition, it is important to justify the structural framework of this study, situate it within the existing body of literature and to analyse its limitations. I have chosen to allocate one chapter to the conception of *Ummah* as a transnational source of religious identification, and two chapters to the

conception of *Ummah* that advocates the *universalisation of Islamism*. Indeed, this is primarily due to the lack of international presence and engagement associated with the former *Ummatic* discourse. Whilst I acknowledge that some British Muslims of the former *Ummatic* consideration actively participate in global socio-political movements- for example, by membership of international NGO's such as *Muslim Aid or Muslim Hands* (Petersen 2011)- this has no significant impact on British state policy and is largely conducted outside of its jurisdiction. In contrast, the latter conception of *Ummah* is party to the global the *Jihadist* movement, and from an international perspective, it is associated with Foreign Fighter mobilisation. In this respect, it is inextricably linked to current British state policy procedure and this is duly reflected within its prioritisation in this discussion.

However, an analysis of British state policy and the Foreign Fighter initiative does not come without its limitations. The volatile nature of ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq renders comprehensive data regarding combatant mobilisation difficult to determine. Moreover, swift developments in the movements of international *Jihadist* organisations means that the current body of applicable academic literature is far from extensive. As a result, part of my analysis on the Foreign Fighter phenomenon acts as a means of identifying policy recommendations that British state actors are yet to pursue.

An examination of Britain's state policy and the globalisation of *Ummah* is necessary due to its prevalence in the modern history of British political discourse. Indeed, as illustrated through research conducted by Klausen

(2005) and Manning (2011), the treatment of Muslims in Britain has proven to be a sensitive and problematic issue. Accordingly, I borrow knowledge from Werbner (2000) and Shahid & van Koningsfeld (1996) in order to develop two sub-categories within the consideration of *Ummah* as a transnational source of religious identification. Throughout this dissertation they are referred to as *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of *Ummah.* I follow Vasta's (2007) model of a 'two-way process of adaptation' and research specified by Statham et al (2005) in order to contextualise the foundations that current multicultural state policy are built upon.

Existing literature encompassing the successfulness of such policy in interacting with Muslims who align themselves with the *Ummah* as *Pragmatic* or *Utopian* is broadly focused upon efforts to integrate, and to accommodate. Collectively, Joppke (2009) and Gooby & Waite (2014) argue that British state policy for integrating the Muslim diaspora suffers from limitations in its integration policy due to its fundamental incompatibility with a liberal state structure. Conversely, Manning (2011) and Modood & Ahmed (2007) respectively put forward that efforts to accommodate the Muslim minority are undermined by a tendency to overlook the cultural values of the white British populace, and by a misguided impetus upon highlighting indifference, rather than celebrating commonality. My own argument internalises the sentiments of the above scholars to arrive at a distinct, un-explored state of 'accommodative integration,' which I consider to be descriptive of, and disruptive to effective multi-cultural harmony

Moving towards the conception of *Ummah* that is associated with the *universalisation of Islamism,* Mandaville (2009) and McNeal (2007) introduce the notion of a globalisation-induced 'virtual *Ummah*.*'* I follow McDonald (2012) and refer to *Jihadist* scholarship from Nasar (2004) in order to illustrate that extremist ideology is most prominently filtered through this virtual spectrum. Current literature assessing the interplay between British state policy and the globalisation of *Jihad* is divided. Pantazis & Pemberton (2009, 2011) and Heath-Kelly (2013), amongst others, suggest that current British counter-terrorism policy unjustifiably frames the collective Muslim *Ummah* as 'suspect.' Accordingly, I enrich their arguments with additional empirical data from Hickman et al (2011) and Choudhury & Fenwick (2011). I further utilise reasoning from this school of thought to undermine the counter-narrative from Greer (2010), which attempts to relay the sentiment that the Pantazis & Pembertonian definition of 'suspect' suffers from structural deficiencies.

In respect to the interactivity between British state policy and the second discourse of *Ummah* as a rationale for the *universalisation of Islamism:* The Foreign Fighter phenomenon, I propose a two-pronged argument from short-term and long-term perspectives. Through an amalgam of empirical evidence and theoretical discourse, Zuijdewin (2014) and Byman & Shapiro (2014) posit that the historical threat posed by Foreign Fighters is statistically less than being depicted by incumbent governing administrations. I allow myself to accept this fact and justify the current heavy-handedness associated with British state policy for combating the Foreign Fighter threat, by aligning my resonance with the sentiments of Stuart (2014), Simcox et al (2011) and

Neumann (2015) that today's threat from Syria exceeds that of previous typologies. From a long-term outlook, I internalise the policy recommendations offered, amongst many, by Briggs & Silverman (2015) and Bakker et al (2013) to outline a two-step procedure which British policy makers have failed to pursue in order to strengthen underlying foundations of state security.

The challenge set for this dissertation is to incorporate the above contentions into one cohesive line of reasoning that suitably addresses the question: How successfully has British state policy interacted with the different conceptions of a globalised *Ummah*? *Chapter One* of this discussion concerns itself with the unsuccessfulness of British state policy to accommodate, and integrate its Muslims under the paradigm of 'multiculturalism'. It will be argued that this failure has lead Britain down a path of cultural fragmentation, rather then multi-cultural harmony. *Chapter Two* analyses the effectiveness of British counter-terrorism policy in combatting *Jihadist* narrative within the *virtual Ummah*. It will be argued that initial measures suffer from structural limitations, and that the resulting imposition of a counter-narrative unwittingly implicates the *Ummah* as a whole, leading to a sense of unwarranted victimisation amongst the wider, moderate Muslim community. Finally, *Chapter Three* examines measures put in place to neutralise the threat from Foreign Fighter mobilisation. It will be accepted that emergency legislature has succeeded in safeguarding the short-term security of the state. However, it will further argue that British policy makers are yet to implement an effective long-term strategy to improve the infrastructural framework of national security

Integrating and Accommodating a Globalised Islam into British Society: The Globalisation of Ummah as a Transnational Identity

> "Our country is stronger by far when each of us, whatever our background, has the chance to contribute" (Home Office 2012 pg.2).

Inclusion and multiculturalism are deep-rooted into British domestic state policy. Institutionally, Britain has arguably set more foundations for integration than any other European country. However, public opinion on the issue of Muslim immigration highlights a somewhat perplexing juncture: a significant proportion British Muslims, particularly that of second and third generations (Ali 2008), feel marginalised and disillusioned in a state seemingly set-up for multiculturalism. Furthermore, and perhaps more alarmingly, research demonstrates that at a local level, this lack of cultural synthesis is creating an underlying sense of negativity amongst existing British citizens, towards their Muslim counterparts. The ensuing chapter explores the ramifications of such a state of events, through an analytical critique of Britain's infrastructure for integrating and accommodating the globalised *Ummah*. I find that whilst extensive measures have been taken in order to ensure a state of multicultural harmony, these measures are undermined by fundamental flaws regarding; an incompatibility of Britain's stance on multiculturalism and its liberal state structure, a disproportionate focus on indifference, and a tendency to overlook the societal values held by the existing populace.

In framing my argument, I refer to British state policy and its attempts to 'integrate' and 'accommodate'. Conceptually, I follow Kuran (2003) by considering cultural accommodation as a system for "preserving the multiplicity of existing cultures" (Kuran 2003 pg.1). On the other hand, I define cultural integration as a platform for interaction between stigmas of religion, nationality, identity and race. Accordingly, I find the British model of 'multiculturalism' to internalise the ideals of both- leading to a distinct state of 'accommodative integration.' Indeed, this theme will be contextualised, analysed and explained throughout this opening chapter.

As suggested by Reed (2005) "the UK's history of multicultural politics has not rendered her immune to emerging concerns about integration." Reed continues to identify two events, which have ensured that this particular issue is now at the forefront of British policy procedure. Firstly, the sustained rioting across the North of England during the summer of 2001 was fuelled by racial violence and divisive hatred amongst local British communities. Subsequent study into the underlying motivations behind these acts of violence uncovered both a severe lack of cultural coherence, and a disturbing extent of division between the existing religious communities (Bagguley & Hussein 2003). Secondly, Reed identifies the London bombings of 2005 as a catalytic reference point, which undermines the purported successfulness (Heath 2012) of British multicultural policy. For, the perpetrators of the attacks were not foreign nationals. Instead, they were educated, middle-class British citizens, born and raised in London. In this respect, these individuals were

naturalised into British society, but became disaffected with Western values of living.

This sentiment of cultural fragmentation is reflected within a 2013 study titled 'Attitudes to Integration.' Here, 1931 British citizens were asked whether, generally speaking, they thought migrants from Muslim countries had 'integrated well' into British society (YouGov 2013). Consequently, 71% of individuals asked, responded with a 'No.' Indeed, the above dissatisfaction with the continued influx of Islam is reflected within both a local, and a European context.

In *The Islamic Challenge,* Jytte Klausen (2005) provides a comprehensive examination of the integration trends of the European Muslim diaspora. In general, Klausen's study shows that leading figures within the European Islamic community both welcome multiculturalism, and recognise the need for Muslims to permeate their cultural boundaries in line with certain Western Values. In this sense, "they have little time for left-wing ideas about global citizenship and transnational identities (Klausen 2005 pg. 19). However, Britain exists as an anomaly to this advocacy of compatibility amongst its senior Muslim figures. According to Klausen, these individuals possess a distinct sense of "disgruntled unhappiness" (Klausen 2005 pg.63) towards current policies to accommodate and integrate.

In addition, within a 2015 poll conducted by the thinktank comRes, half of the British Muslims interviewed identified with the premise that 'Prejudice against

Islam makes it very difficult being a Muslim in this country.' Similarly, half of those asked agreed that 'Britain is becoming less tolerant of Muslims.' (comRes 2015). However, and perhaps surprisingly given the above context, 95% of interviewees demonstrated that they felt a fierce loyalty towards being British.

Indeed, as previously touched upon, this creation of Muslim 'Britishness' must be formed alongside a recognition of the different conceptions of *Ummah.* For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus upon Britain's attempts to integrate and accommodate both the *Pragmatic*, and the *Utopian* approaches of the Muslim commitment to *Ummah* (Shahid & van Koningsfeld 1996). By 'Pragmatic approach', I refer to an *Ummatic* concept, which defends the right of Muslims to maintain their religious autonomy within the democratic structures of the West, while at the same time recognising the importance of Muslim immigrants naturalising themselves into contemporary Western society. In the case of Britain, this can be achieved by an active involvement in the political sphere, and an unequivocal adherence to Britain's inherent secular laws (Shahid & van Koningsfeld 1996). Alternatively, the 'Utopian approach,' as advocated by the *Muslim Parliament of Great Britain* (Asghar 2008), presents itself as a more potent threat to integration possibilities. This particular view, calls for the establishment of a consolidated, legally independent Muslim Diaspora in the West, represented as part of a globalised Islamic *Ummah.* Similar to that of the pragmatic approach, Muslims are also required to act within British law, so long as this does not restrict their ability to freely practise Islam (Shahid & van Koningsfeld 1996). However, the *Utopian*

approach differs in the sense that it commits Muslims in Britain to "communally self-regulate Muslim personal Law" (Werbner 2000 pg. 313). Indeed, the presence of this obligation has seen European Islamic bodies institutionalised into central positions of authority, which can then make voluntary recommendations in regard to preserving Islamic law within a Western context.

What policies then, have Britain implemented in order to accommodate, and integrate these conflicting, yet ultimately related conceptions of *Ummah?* And what part has globalisation played in contributing to the political resonance of this issue? Indeed, I consider the processes of globalisation to be fundamental to policy implications arising from the issues of minority accommodation, and minority integration. For, all socially inclusive nations benefit from a populace consisting of a plethora of different languages and cultures. As a result, policy implementation must be conducive to diversification and be accommodating for the continued influx of religious minorities. According to Pew (2015) estimates, Muslims are expected to constitute 8% of Europe's population by the year 2030. In this respect, the transnational people flow induced by globalisation "reinforces the need for a universal recognition of multicultural policies" (Richmond 2002 pg.719).

British policy makers have undoubtedly internalised this sentiment that; the improved interconnectivity of globalisation demands inclusive tools for integration, and indeed, accommodation. In a 2005 policy document titled

Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society, the Home Office relays the importance for:

> "All citizens to have a sense of inclusive British identity. This does not mean that people need to choose between Britishness and other cultural identities, nor should they sacrifice their particular lifestyles, customs and beliefs" (Home Office 2005 pg. 45).

From this, one can justifiably draw a comparison between Shahid and van Koningsfeld's *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of the *Ummah*, and Britain's strategy for accommodative integration. In practice, this policy framework is referred to as a "two-way process of adaptation" (Vasta 2007 pg. 5), part of which involves immigrants being encouraged to internalise particular societal aspects of the nation they are naturalising themselves into. In the case of Britain, this has been achieved most prominently through a fulfilment of 'Citizenship Requirements.' Here, migrant individuals seeking to gain UK citizenship are required to both exhibit a satisfactory ability to converse in English, and demonstrate adequate knowledge of British history, culture and custom (Saggar & Somerville 2012). Moreover, Government policy also dictates that such individuals must participate in 'Citizenship Ceremonies,' which involve a sworn allegiance to the Queen, and a commitment to preserving Britain's institutional rights of freedom and liberty (Gallis et al 2005).

Inevitably, Vasta's model of a 'two-way process of adaptation' must also involve an acceptance from existing members of the community that, long-standing social norms and cultural patterns, may be subject to change as a result of immigration (Vasta 2007). In *Resilient or Adaptable Islam,* Statham et al (2005) examine the 'group demands' made by the migrant Muslim diaspora. Of these, over half refer to the means by which the state interacts with the Muslim community. More specifically, they refer to demands regarding anti-discrimination strategy, the development of Islamic schools, religious practice in state-run schools and political involvement (Statham et al 2005). For the most part, British policy makers have expanded the existing state structure in order to ensure *Respect and Recognition* for Islam (Joppke 2009). Indeed, 1998 saw the Blair administration authorise the establishment of two Independent Muslim schools. Moreover, a 2001 report on faith in education commissioned an increase in aid to faith-schools across the United Kingdom. After much media scrutiny, British legislative authorities also approved the wearing of the *hijab* in state-funded schools- agreeing on a compromise, which permitted girls to attend class with headscarves that coordinated with the colour regulations of the school's uniform (Fetzer, Soper 2003). Here, it is noteworthy to highlight these broadenings of state structures as examples of a clear, focused and explicit strategy to accommodate for the *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of *Ummah*- those Ummatic discourses that encourage Muslims to practise their faith within the norms of Western democracy.

This trend is continued when one examines changes to British legislature regarding anti-discrimination law. Before the implementation of the 2010

Equality Act, many Muslims, quite rightly, expressed concern with the fact that the previously limited 1976 Race Relations Act only prohibited discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or race (Gallis et al 2005). However, British policy makers have acknowledged these claims and, in response, one of the last acts of the New Labour administration was to stylise legislation ensuring the outlaw of discrimination from a religious standpoint (Hepple 2010).

Within a European context, such efforts to accommodate, and indeed integrate the Muslim community become less about multiculturalism, and more about assimilation (Fetzer, Soper 2004). Take France, for example. To many, their staunch faith in implementing a “one size fits all” (Joppke 2009 pg. 467) apparatus in regard to its Muslim diaspora represents a failure of the state to cater for the needs of all its citizens (Heine 2009). Indeed, since the 2004 ban on the *Burqa,* French public debate regarding appropriate use of religious clothing is now centred around the comparably insouciant headscarf. In stark contrast, as previously established, the headscarf in Britain is, at least institutionally, accepted as a symbol of religious liberty and freedom of expression (Byng 2010).

Undeterred by this perceived disparity between the accommodating structures of British libertarianism, and the assimilating tendencies of French Republicanism, public opinion regarding the relationship between Muslims and the state indicates that tolerance and accommodation does not necessarily entail multicultural harmony. In a 2006 study conducted by global attitude surveyors Pew, naturalised European Muslim respondents were

asked whether they thought there existed a “conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a Modern, Western democracy” (Pew 2006 pg.1). In response, only 28% of French Muslims considered there to be a barrier between practising Islam and fulfilling their duties as French citizens. However, half of British Muslims responded ‘Yes’ to the question in hand.



Figure 1: Economic Activity of Britain’s Major Religious Groups (%) (ONS 2011)

Furthermore, the presence of this conflict is felt within the socio-economic (in)activity of the British Muslim diaspora. As shown by *Figure 1* (ONS 2011), the Muslim community suffers from higher rates of economic inactivity than any other major religious group. Here, economic inactivity includes individuals who are above the age of 16 and are actively seeking work without being employed (Ali 2015). Moreover, the 2011 Census shows that there are a disproportionately high number of Muslims imprisoned within British penitentiaries. While over 2 million Muslims constitute 4.8% of the entire

population, 13% of the total prison population is made up of Muslims. Indeed, this trend of social deprivation is continued when one considers that 48% of the Muslim community reside within constituencies that rank in the top 10% most deprived local authorities in Britain (Ali 2015).

Why then, does this socio-economic inequality prevail? And more specifically, why has British policy for integration, and indeed accommodation, been unsuccessful in constructing a state of multiculturalism that allows for the *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of *Ummah* to flourish? I argue that these questions become increasingly relevant due to the fact that 73% of the British Muslim population choose to define themselves as 'British,' rather than adopt a shared identity of, for example, 'British Pakistani' or 'British Iraqi' (Ali 2015). Thus, multiculturalism in Britain has succeeded in developing a sense of national identity amongst the Muslim minority; however, issues surrounding the compatibility of the Muslim community and the existing state structure still remain.

Manning, in an attempt to explain this somewhat perplexing paradox, posits that the British model of Islamic accommodation does not place enough impetus upon garnering the support of the existing White British populace (Manning 2011). A 2007 citizenship survey found that only 58% of White Britons, who live in an area where less than half of individuals share their ethnicity, feel a 'sense of belonging to their local area' (Home Office 2007). Moreover, a central aspect of multiculturalism is that all individuals are to be treated with equal respect. With that in mind, the study uncovers a sentiment

that; relative to other cultural groups, a significant proportion of the White British population believe that they are treated worse by Government Public Services. And of these, only 69% possess a ‘fair, or very strong feeling that they belong to the local area’ (Manning 2011). Indeed, Manning suggests that factions of the existing White British population feel that they are “neglected and discriminated against” (Manning 2011 pg. 34). In light of these findings, I accept that there is truth in the premise that British policy for cultural incorporation has somewhat foregone the long-standing cultural values of the existing British community. Indeed, this lack of recognition has allowed for the infiltration of an anti-integration sentiment, which in turn presents itself as a barrier to effective accommodation for the relevant conceptions of *Ummah*. Again, this is well reflected within the above research sample, which also indicates that one-third of White British respondents disagree with the notion that ‘one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate religious or cultural identity’ (Home Office 2007).

Furthermore, In their comprehensive study outlining British Muslim perspectives on multiculturalism, Modood & Ahmed (2007) uncover an underlying sentiment that the British model of accommodating the *Ummah*, places too much impetus on highlighting indifference, rather than “celebrating commonality” (Modood & Ahmed 2007 pg. 199). Indeed, this misguided focus on implementing policy that seeks to consolidate differences between Western societal norms, and Islamic cultural practice has created a breeding ground for a ‘minority discourse’ that undermines the complete naturalisation of British Muslim Citizens (Ramadan in Modood & Ahmed 2007). An example

of the presence of this dynamic in practice is the concept of *Islamophobia*. I argue that although combating these mistaken views of Islam is imperative to successful multiculturalism, *Islamophobia* has received a disproportionate level of attention within British state policy for successful integration (Malik 2005). Incumbent administrations, both Labour and Conservative, have authorised the circulation of Runneymede Trust reports titled: *Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All* (1997) and *Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action* (2004). Indeed, at the launch of the 1997 edition, Jack Straw, then Home Office minister, explicitly put forward that taking measures to eradicate Islamophobia is Britain's primary means of recognising it's Muslim community (Joppke 2009). Again, whilst this is undoubtedly important, it should not place itself at the centre of policy for multiculturalism. Instead, British policy makers should also seek to "celebrate the shared commonality across cultures" (Malik in Modood & Ahmed 2007 pg.199).

Alternatively, some scholars question the fundamental applicability of British multicultural policy (Gooby, Waite 2014): "the British case suggests that the state which has gone further than others in bestowing *Respect and Recognition* on its Muslim minority has hit a limit" (Joppke 2009 pg. 467). This argument from recognition highlights the incompatibility of a model of integration, which assumes a liberalist state structure, but maintains a pursuit of firm multiculturalism. For, liberalist ideology dictates that personal identity is developed from the perspective of the individual, independent of social norms and values (Hansen 2006). Individuals are then given the choice to form social groups of their own. In this respect, multiculturalism is seemingly

counter-productive as it limits this choice by pre-supposing that personal identities are formed by cultural values, rather then an individual's intuition (Gooby, Waite 2014). From a liberal point of view, this represents a failure of the state in acknowledging the true nature of a person's cultural identity. Thus, state policy should not, to the extent that it does, allow for the undermining of liberalism, by multiculturalism; for, the latter allows for the recognition that the former withholds, resulting in:

> "Ever-more radical acts of claims-making on the part of minorities, until a limit is reached that is currently experienced as a crisis of multiculturalism." (Joppke 2009 pg. 469 in Gooby, Waite 2014).

Indeed, this sentiment is most prominently reflected within the 'Danish Cartoon Affair.' Here, an outspoken faction of the European Islamic community voiced their displeasure at the publication of a magazine, which insultingly depicted the Prophet Mohammad. To many, these illustrations were in an "entirely different league of offence" (Modood 2006 pg. 4). Consequently, senior Islamic clerics in both France and Denmark filed lawsuits against *Charlie Hebdo* and *Jyllands-Posten,* for including the images within their publications (Bleich 2012). In Britain, the effects of this response were felt within perhaps the most unprecedented act of 'self-censorship' in recent history; all prominent British newspapers refrained from including the cartoons within their articles (Joppke 2009). For Hansen (2006), this restriction of freedom is illustrative of Britain's failure to "accommodate Muslims within the norms and principles that underpin the liberal constitutional

state" (Hansen 2006 pg. 8). Referring back to Joppke (2009), this decision by British media organisations to not include the cartoons within their newspapers, thereby limiting their own free speech, presents itself as a significant marker of *Respect and Recognition* towards the Muslim community. And it is one that does not align itself with the inherent values of the British liberal state structure. Whilst it cannot be said that the decision to not publish the cartoons was due to explicit state policy, the incumbent Prime Minister Tony Blair publicly called for the drawings not to be printed (Hansen 2006). Thus, in this sense, political pressure did exist.

With that in mind, I argue that the *Respect and Recognition* strategy of accommodating for the *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of the *Ummah,* is fundamentally flawed. For, a central aspect of these *Ummatic* considerations is that Muslims are required to "abide by the law of the land" and "accept prevailing secular rules" (Werbner 2000 pg. 313). Although it is imperative that the beliefs of practising Muslims are to be considered, and indeed respected, British policy makers and its media outlets have gone further by attempting to accommodate these beliefs outside the societal principles that supply the foundations for its own liberal state structure (O'Leary 2006). Referring back to the empirical study undertaken by Manning (2011), I strongly believe that it is the presence of this dynamic that has caused the existing British populace to feel a sense of neglect, and that their societal values have been overlooked. Indeed, while this is somewhat overshadowed by the, previously established, worrying statistic that one third of White Britons feel that 'one cannot belong to Britain and maintain a separate religious/cultural identity'

(Home Office 2007), the reality is that this sentiment both exists, and continues to provide a barrier to successful multicultural harmony. The inability of British state actors to consider that; a primary contributor to this conflict in values is the incompatibility of their stance on multiculturalism and their democratic structure is, for me, leading Britain down a path of fragmentation rather than accommodative integration. As put forward by Conservative backbencher Gavin Barwell:

> “We need to promote difference, but need to have something that binds us together into British society. This is where we have gone wrong.” (Gooby, Waite 2014 pg. 280).

The Virtual *Ummah* as a Platform for the *Universalisation of Islamism*: British State Policy to Combat the *Virtual Ummah*

A consequence of Britain's failure to properly integrate, and accommodate its Muslim population is realised by a potentially damaging faction of its citizens joining the global *Jihadist* movement. In keeping with the theme of globalisation, I argue that this process of radicalisation is reliant upon the development of a 'reimagined *Ummah*' (Mandaville 2009). For, Radical Islamic fundamentalism acts as a by-product and as a device of globalisation. Its very nature operates on the same wavelength as globalisation in the sense that it promotes a reconstituted identity rooted within notions of deterritorialisation and the breaking down of socio-cultural barriers (Roy 2011). Indeed, this dynamic is also manifested within the development of the *virtual Ummah.* Today, the *Ummah* does not constitute a given people in a given territory; this idea- brought to prominence by Olivier Roy- posits that the contemporary representation of the *Ummah* is reimagined in that it supersedes national boundaries, ethnicity and culture to formulate one transnational community. Senior actors within the radical Islamic movement have utilised this to their advantage by means of relaying their message of global victimisation through the *Ummah's* virtual spectrum (McNeal 2007).

Moving away from *Pragmatic, Utopian* considerations of *Ummah*, *Part One* of this chapter will focus on the conception of *Ummah* that calls for the *universalisation of Islamism*. This particular *Ummatic* discourse does not pledge its allegiance to any one nation-state. Instead, this movement

prescribes the notion of one, infallible interpretation of the religion, which in turn demands the reconstruction of the *Ummah* as a universal Muslim community, bound by the political control of the caliphate (Roy 2004). Indeed, this conception of *Ummah* as a political entity has been affiliated with fundamentalist, radicalised movements represented in the form of globalised *Jihad* (Tibbi 2007). *Part Two* will focus on British state policy to combat *Jihadist* narrative within the virtual *Ummah*. It will be argued that the universal imposition of counter-terrorist measures has inadvertently implicated the Muslim *Ummah* as a whole, thereby creating a discourse of unwarranted 'suspicion.'

Part One: The *Virtual Ummah* as a Platform for the *Universalisation of Islamism*

In January 2005, *Jihadi* advocate Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar, published his most prominent work- *Call to Global Islamic Resistance.* Since its publication, this piece of literature has been widely regarded as the most complete new-media strategy available to the global *Jihadist* campaign (Zackie 2013). One chapter of Nasar's 1600 page discourse is titled '*The Theory of Media and Incitement in the Call to Global Islamic Resistance.'* In structuring his 'Theory of Media', Nasar puts forward a four-pronged strategy encompassing: target audience, expression of message, content of message and delivery method of message (Rogan 2007). Based on these four principles, Nasar outlines a series of propositions for the recruitment strategy of today's *Jihadist* movement. First and foremost, Nasar suggests that

radicalisation efforts must implicate the *universalisation* of *Ummah* in its transnational wholeness, making sure to involve non Arab-speaking individuals. Secondly, Nasar posits that it is imperative for the theme of the message to relay a sentiment that throughout centuries, the *Ummah* has been subject to un-rivalled, discriminatory injustice, and rectifying this social inequality by means of *Jihad* or martyrdom is not merely an act of vengeance- it is an obligation of all Muslims. These calls to act must also maintain their religious consistency, by sourcing official fatwa's and substantiated Quranic text (Nasar 2004). Finally, the distribution of *Jihadist* messages must integrate modern communication technologies, such as the Internet, in order to ensure that the message reaches the masses.

What effect then, have online radicalisation efforts had upon the British Muslim community? In *Seen and Not Heard: Voices of Young British Muslims,* Ahmed (2009) situates the identity crisis posed upon the young British Muslims of today. Her research identifies an underlying impression of tension amongst the minority of young Muslims who both lack a sense of belonging, and seek to find their own personal identity. Indeed, the presence of this inherent fragmentation creates a breeding ground for the threat of radicalisation to materialise. Accordingly, this is reflected within British Muslim attitudes towards terrorism and global *Jihad.* A 2007 study conducted by global attitude surveyors Pew indicates that 12% of British Muslims believe that 'suicide bombing and alternative forms of violence against civilian targets in order to defend Islam is 'sometimes justifiable' (Pew 2007). Indeed, It is this stark minority of *Jihadist* sympathisers that the global *Jihadist* movement

endeavours to capitalise upon, I argue that this takes place most successfully through the infiltration of their ideology into the virtual *Ummah.* McDonald (2012) further explores this premise by positing that contemporary communication technology propels violent media of Western warmongering into the 'personal space' of individuals in Britain (McDonald 2012). Thereby instilling a sense of empathetic victimisation amongst the group of young British Muslims who are yet to develop a sense of belonging within their own community.

Referring back to Nasar's *Call to Global Islamic Resistance,* the reasons for his emphasis upon reiterating the importance of preserving the *universalisation* of *Ummah* now become clear. For, if *Jihadi* media strategists were to deliver a message of global oppression and unjust victimisation against Muslim 'brothers and sisters' worldwide, there then exists the possibility of socially marginalised Muslims in Britain experiencing an emotive sense of duty towards rectifying the current system of discriminatory inequality, which in this particular context, may be appropriated by a discourse of violent fundamentalism. Indeed, this state of events can be found within the assertions of 7/7 suicide bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan, who accused Western-Style democratic governments of "perpet(uating) atrocities against '*my people* all over the world" (ibid 2012 pg.125). This sentiment illustrates the sense of identification with global anti-Islamic oppression that the *Jihadist* movement is strategically attempting to relay (ibid 2012). Again, their successfulness in doing so is fuelled by their calculated use of new media technologies

Similarly, an analysis of violent Islamist attacks upon British soil further highlights the centrality of the online recruitment drive. Michael Adebolago, one perpetrator of the murder of Lee Rigby, cited Anwar al-Awkali's- a leading al-Qaeda preacher- Internet lectures on waging *Jihad* as an inspiration for his act of terrorism (Whitehead 2013). In addition, Hussein Osman, a naturalised British citizen found guilty of placing explosives during the failed 21st July 2005 London attack, made it clear to investigators that he and his affiliates both routinely watched online videos perpetrating the violence inflicted upon civil Iraqi nationals by the West, and utilised the Internet in order to gather a personal understanding of *Jihad* (Awan 2007). Furthermore, a report conducted by the Home Office on the 7/7 attacks highlighted the Internet as an indispensible platform for terrorist organisations, in their efforts to both recruit and radicalise (Home Office 2006 in Awan 2007).

Part Two: British State Policy to Combat *Jihadist* Narrative Within the *Virtual Ummah*

What measures then, have Britain's policy makers implemented in order to nullify the globalisation of *Jihad*, its violent conception of *Ummah,* and its continued utilisation of the *virtual Ummah*? Over the last decade, Britain's framework for policing the threat of online radicalisation through the *virtual Ummah,* has grown from a mere reliance on public information, to a complex strategy of counter-terrorism. In 2010, the Home Office initiated a *Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit* (Home Office 2012). This existed as a

platform where individuals could report online communications that they deemed to be fostering extremist ideology. Indeed, as of 2012, the Home Office had received 2025 counts of referral, of which 225 were successfully processed and taken off the Internet (Home Office 2012). However, such efforts to curtail the effects of online radicalisation are ultimately limited in the sense that the Internet is, by nature, dynamic, deep, and for the most part anonymous- each minute 300 hours worth of video content is uploaded onto YouTube (Rogan 2007). As admitted by the Home Office itself, countering online *Jihadism* through a system of referral is a "pebble thrown into the World Wide Web ocean" (Home Office 2012 pg.23)

With that in mind, British policy makers have internalised Neumann's (2009) sentiment that effective countering of cyber-j*ihad* requires persecutors to be identified and 'strategically prosecuted' (Neumann 2009). Accordingly, the *Data Retention and Investigative Powers Act* (DRIP) was introduced, in July 2014 as a means of targeting, locating and nullifying the threat posed by the spread of online *Jihadist* propaganda. In practice, DRIP allows for British telecommunication companies to intercept and withhold certain information shared on its network. DRIP also ensures that, when requested, these companies are required to share such information with the relevant government services. Indeed, it explicitly includes information shared on the Internet within its jurisdiction (Home Office 2014), as well as: the content of telephone conversations, where the calls were made from, the identities of the individuals involved, and the nature of the call itself (Rosemary 2014).

Since the introduction of DRIP, the volume of online *Jihadist* material removed by British authorities has dramatically increased. Indeed, by the end of 2014, 46,000 webpages promoting extremism were successfully taken off the Internet (Home Office 2014). However, in spite of these perceived improvements, concerns remain in regard to both the intrusiveness of this particular strategy, and its continued, yet inevitable, failure to comprehensively regulate the *virtual Ummah* (Kiss 2014). To many, DRIP represents an incapability of the government to effectively retain communication data in a proportionate and privacy-respecting manner (Powles 2014). Indeed, the means by which DRIP can legitimately operate on a basis of "blanket, universal data retention" (ibid 2014 pg. 1) has lead Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, to label the Act as "a huge encroachment on the freedoms of all British Citizens." (Watt et al 2015 pg.2).

The presence of this dynamic, coupled with the structural impossibility of effectively policing the Internet, has forced British policy makers to re-focus their strategy for neutralising the globalisation of *Jihad* through the *virtual Ummah.* As put forward by Karmani (2012), "if you ban one site, ten others emerge. Thus you have got to provide an equally effective counter narrative" (Karmani 2012 pg. 25). STREET (Strategy to Reach, Empower and Educate Teenagers) is a state-funded programme implemented specifically to deconstruct the plethora of extreme Islamist material on the Internet. The underlying objective is to: (1) identify the messages that *Jihadists* attempt to relay within their online radicalisation efforts, and (2) provide an authentic

counter-narrative, using Qur'anic sources to devalue the justifications offered by the authors of the material in question (STREET 2008).

STREET is manifested into British counter-terrorism procedure through the wider context of CONTEST. Since its initial application in 2003, CONTEST has grown to its current four-pronged strategy of neutralising the terrorist threat: *Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare* (Home Office 2014). Indeed, the *Prevent* strand of this anti-terrorist framework is the model most relevant to this discussion as it "works to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and extremism" (Home Office 2014 pg.9).

In practice, *Prevent* seeks to rebut radical ideology and marginalise extremist thought through an interaction between government actors and local communities (Home Office 2014). Birt (2009) understands this 'politics of engagement' as an attempt to frame fundamental extremism as the result of Islam gone awry due to societal fragmentation amongst mislead young British Muslims. Thus, any attempts for engagement must aim to develop a "contextualised British Islam at home with modernity" (Birt 2009 pg. 53). Here, an example is the 'Citizenship Foundation', which co-operates with Islamic foundations in order to encourage young British Muslims to contribute towards democratic life as equal members of society (Citizenship Foundation 2015). From this evidence, one can justifiably suggest that British policy makers are seeking to re-connect misguided Muslims to the *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of *Ummah* that are most conducive to effective multiculturalism.

However, it is important to note that if they are to garner the support of their local authorities, would-be Islamic organisations, charitable foundations, and indeed communities, are required to operate within the *Prevent* paradigm (Murray 2010). Here, there seems to exist a continued effort by government services to "engineer their own brand of moderate Islam" (Home Office 2010 pg.1). For, any group who fails to align their objectives within the *Prevent* mechanism are deemed to both fall outside the spectrum of political engagement, and pose a threat to state security (McTernan 2010).

The presence of this dynamic has lead some scholars to suggest that; whilst Britain's community-based *Prevent* strategy has succeeded in instilling an anti-*Jihadist* discourse amongst senior actors within the Muslim community, it has failed in gaining the trust of the general Muslim population (Klausen 2009, Birt 2009, Heath-Kelly 2013). This sentiment was relayed in a 2010 Home Office report, which outlined fears that *Prevent* is "contentious and unlikely ever to be fully accepted by those it is most important to engage" (Home Office 2010 pg. 3).

According to Klausen (2009), this is primarily due to the fact that community-based initiatives for counter-terrorism operate under the assumption that terrorism is a community-bred problem (Klausen 2009). In this sense, government strategy for policing the terrorist threat has not evolved alongside the changing perception that terrorism is no longer an issue fostered within British borders. Take, for example, the July 2007 London attacks. Despite initial government reports indicating that the involvement of Al-Qaeda was

'unclear' (Home Office 2006), it has since become apparent that much of the terrorists' motivations stemmed from their experiences outside of the United Kingdom. For, not only was the publicly aired suicide statement of Mohammad Sidique Khan littered with quintessential Al-Qaeda rhetoric (Malik 2007), it also included Ayman Al-Zahari, who at the time held the position of Al-Qaeda's second in command (Klausen 2009). Indeed, Al-Zahari proceeded to confirm that Khan had attended operating Al-Qaeda training camps in order to learn the technique of building explosives (Laville 2006). In this respect, it seems plausible to suggest that the origins of the terrorist threat posed against Britain are founded within international terrorist organisations, thus- for Klausen; why target innocuous Muslim communities in Bradford when schemes to strike the capital are made in the mountainous regions of Pakistan?

In response, I highlight the case of Hussain Osman, who, as previously mentioned, failed in his attempts to replicate the July 7/7 attacks on London. During his interrogation, Osman revealed that he had no affiliation with any international terrorist organisations, and that his motivations stemmed from his own grievances with the 'War on Terror' (Eccleston 2005). Here, there exists evidence of 'home-grown' terrorism and its potentially damaging repercussions (Awan 2007)- thereby undermining Klausen's argument that terrorist activity is no longer a community-based problem.

Alternatively, one school of thought attributes the failure of *Prevent* to the framing of the Muslim community as 'suspect' (Kundani 2009). Hillyard's

(1993) study in regard to the consequences felt by the Irish community as a result of the *1974 Terrorism Prevention Act* provides a useful point of comparison. His research posited that the contemporary Irish diaspora were subject to a disproportionate level of counter-terrorism legislation. More specifically:

> "Individuals were targeted, not necessarily as a result of suspected wrong doing, but simply because of their presumed membership to that community" (Hillyard 1993 in Pantazis, Pemberton 2009 pg. 649)

Heath Kelly (2013) and, particularly, Pantazis & Pemberton (2009) build upon this premise by adding:

> "Race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, language, accent, dress, political ideology or any combination of these factors may serve to delineate the suspect community" (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009 pg. 649)

Indeed, in their comprehensive study examining the representations of 'suspect' communities in multi-ethnic Britain, Hickman et al (2011) explore the socio-political framing of the British Muslim diaspora. Rather tellingly, the study uncovered an underlying sentiment that counter-terrorism measures placed the entirety of the *Ummah* under unwarranted surveillance- 33% of respondents claimed to have been subject to frequent 'stop and search' police intervention. Moreover, research conducted by Pantazis & Pemberton (2009), illustrates that spanning the period 2001/02-2006/07, instances of 'stop and search' upon Asian Britons increased from 29.7 individuals per 100,000 of

population, to 179.7 individuals per 100,000 of population. Whilst it is noted that this data only records individuals by their ethnicity (Delsol & Shiner 2006), I refer to Ameli et al (2007) in arguing that British Muslims are demonised within mass media representations like no other Asian British community. In this respect, it is this focused suspicion upon the Muslim contingent that has resulted in the unparalleled rise in 'stop and search' occurrences amongst the Asian populace as a whole. Accordingly, this is echoed by sentiments expressed by young British Muslims in Choudhury & Fenwick (2011):

> 'These stop and search, all of them have been Muslims, it means when you see a police officer you don't feel safe, you feel endangered by that now.' (Muslim, male, Leicester. In ibid 2011)

Furthermore, an integral part of the Government's strategy involves the utilisation of a quantitative framework that measures a given communities resilience to the threat of radicalisation (Home Office 2010). This risk indicator, referred to as 'N.I.35,' has caused grievances amongst certain factions of the Muslim community due to the fact that it stigmatises a whole faith population as 'suspect' (McTernan 2010). Heath-Kelly, adopts this line of reasoning by positing that N.I.35 has the "paradoxical effect of securitising" (Heath-Kelly 2013 pg. 405) British policies for Muslim integration and social cohesion. For, under the *Prevent* mechanism, Muslim communities that are deemed to be 'at risk' to Islamic fundamentalism are subject to *Prevent* programmes for their own purported wellbeing. However, such programmes are only put in place due to the acts of others and the effects that these acts *might* have on a given Muslim community. This stigmatising method of

‘assuming riskiness’ (Heath-Kelly 2013) “fuses counter-terrorism with community cohesion” (Birt 2009 pg.55) and goes some way in marginalising a Muslim community already distrusting of government policy.

For example, a council of British Imam’s recently voiced their displeasure at the fact Government officials had presented them with leaflets promoting the *Channel* programme (Casciani 2014). In practice, the Channel project provides a policing platform for government services and the local community to:

> “Identify individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism; assess the nature and extent of that risk; and develop the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned” (Home Office 2012 pg. 4).

Whilst Channel has witnessed a marked success, as of March 2013 five hundred individuals had been ‘deradicalised’ by government services (BBC 2013), concerns remain in regard to the means by which the programme is universally imposed upon moderate British Muslim communities (Kundani 2009). For, this blanket approach to identifying potential terrorists also implicates those British Muslims who align themselves with *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of *Ummah*, thereby resulting in further alienation amongst its agents (Pantazis, Pemberton 2009).

Choudhury (2012) and Mythen et al (2009) collectively put forward that this treatment of the Muslim community as a ‘risky other’ has “crystallised

underlying anti-Islamic sentiments" (Mythen et al 2009 pg.739) amongst other cultural groups within the British populace. The representation of British Muslims as 'suspect' has inadvertently connected the entirety of the *Ummah* to discourses of radicalisation around the terrorist threat (Richardson 2004). More particularly, this socio-political stigmatisation has unjustifiably increased public uncertainty towards members of the Muslim community who align themselves with *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of *Ummah.* Indeed, this is reflected within the continued mass media depictions of young British Muslims as "unruly, risky aliens within" (Mythen et al 2009 pg. 739). As presented in Hickman et al (2011), spanning the period 1974-2007, the two most common terms used in the headlines of Muslim-related articles were 'police' and 'terror.' (Hickman et al 2011)

Greer (2010) offers a notable, but ultimately flawed counter narrative to the above notion that the *Prevent* paradigm unwittingly frames British Muslims as 'suspect'. Greer puts forward his argument on the basis that Pantazis & Pemberton (2009) are "over inclusive" (Greer 2010 pg. 1177) in their attempts to define what can constitute a community as suspect. He utilises an example similar to the following: 'A group of young Muslim men originating from Bradford with linkages to Pakistan are placed under police suspicion due to credible intelligence indicating their association with ISIS. Here, under the premises of Pantazis & Pemberton's understanding of a 'suspect community', the sheer number of such 'suspect communities' would be impractically extensive. Namely: 'young males,' 'young males from Bradford,' young males with linkages to Pakistan,' 'young Muslim males' and so on.' However,

according to Greer, the only *true* suspect community here would be the one that implicates all the relevant suspect criteria- in other words- the original example. With that in mind, Greer offers his own definition of what should constitute a suspect community:

> "A 'community' can be considered to be under official suspicion if, and only if, a substantial majority of those who share its identity are under official suspicion, and/or if this identity is, in and of itself, sufficient to arouse systematic official suspicion." (Greer 2010 pg.1178)

In responding to this claim, I first move to deconstruct Greer's argument by highlighting his misguided reliance upon quantifying the issue at hand. By referring to a 'substantial majority,' Greer is seemingly postulating that for British Muslims to be deemed a 'suspect community,' the vast majority of its 2.7 Million members (ONS 2011) must be placed under 'official suspicion.' First and foremost, this approach is erroneous due to his understanding of 'official suspicion.' For Greer, this vague term predicates the utilisation of authoritative police jurisdiction, resulting in an individual becoming a formal suspect. Indeed, under this principle, for the British Muslim community to be considered suspect, the large majority of its body would have to be subject to some variation of policing. With a populace of 2.7 million, this is structurally not feasible (Pantazis & Pemberton 2011).

Moreover, in his attempts to frame the British Muslim *Ummah* as not suspect, Greer offers no indication as to what can be considered a 'substantial majority.' Whilst seemingly attempting to quantify the socio-political suspicion

of a given community, Greer, fails to provide any empirical justification for pursing this numerical means of situating the 'suspiciousness' of a community. In contrast, I argue that any attempt to understand what constitutes suspicion must distance itself from an 'official' perspective of a "legal construction based on rules of evidence" (Pantazis & Pemberton pg. 1056), and instead lean towards the intricate correspondence between state policy and its ramifications upon the socio-political framing of a specific community- as illustrated by the above research samples from Hickman et al (2011), Pantazis & Pemberton (2009) and Choudhury & Fenwick (2011), which I believe collectively situates how British policy for counter-terrorism has implicated entirety of the wider Muslim *Ummah*.

The Foreign Fighter: British State Policy to Combat the Globalisation of *Ummah* as a Transnational Call to Arms

A further product of the *Ummah's* interaction with the *universalisation of Islamism* is the Foreign Fighter initiative. Within the Western media sphere, the rise in European Foreign Fighter mobilisation is perhaps the most documented aspect of the *Jihadi* movement's attempt to 'go global'. Before I critique the underlying motivations behind the radicalisation of young Muslims in Europe, it is imperative to analyse the empirical data, which documents the rise in Foreign Fighter mobilisation that has accompanied the transformational phenomenon that is globalisation. In defining the term 'Foreign Fighter,' I share Hegghammer's understanding of the concept as an individual who (1) has been externally recruited into the territory of a conflict, (2) does not possess citizenship of the conflict territory in question, (3) does not possess an association with, or membership of an official military group, and (4) is a volunteer without benefitting from financial reimbursement. (Hegghammer 2011).

In assessing the relevance of shifts in Islamic foreign fighter mobilisation, I will begin by examining the period associated with the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. I have identified this conflict as a focal point in which a transformational product of Islamism began to gather pace. Whilst it cannot be said that this was the first instance of Muslims fighting in other countries, this conflict presents itself as the first time Islamic foreign fighters waged a war of Jihad in the name of protecting the *Ummah.* Moreover, I argue that this

coincided with the emergence of a newly globalised, interconnected *Ummah.* For, in the decade leading up to the invasion, a form of 'populist pan-Islamism' arose within the Hijaz region of Saudi Arabia (Hegghammer 2011), this movement of political identification was fuelled by the motivations of previously disparaged Islamic elites to re-establish their political importance. As a result, these activists of a transnational *Ummah* propagated an anti-Western discourse, thereby reiterating the outside threat posed upon the Muslim nation. In addition, they funded the creation of international Islamic organisations and a charitable system for transnational Muslim aid.

Islamic activists throughout the 1980's Soviet-Afghan conflict then capitalised upon these interconnective provisions, in order to recruit and mobilise foreign fighters from the surrounding Arab region. Indeed, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, the man responsible for the creation of the Afghan Services- Maktab al-Khadamat (MAK), based his recruitment efforts upon the premise that the *Ummah* is transnational in nature, and that defending the collective Islamic community by way of defensive *jihad* is an obligation demanded of all Muslims (Zuijdewin 2014). In his second publication, *Join the Caravan,* Azzam relays this sentiment by positing that:

> "The jurists have documented that the lands of the Muslims are like a single land, so that whichever region of the Muslims' territory is exposed to danger, it is necessary that the whole body of the Islamic Ummah rally together to protect this organ which is exposed to the onslaught of the microbe." (Azzam 1987 pg. 1).

Whilst British-Muslim foreign fighters played no significant role in the outcome of this particular conflict, due partly to the lack of globalisation-induced interconnective provisions that today's Foreign Fighters benefit from, the means by which senior actors within the radical Islamic movement internalised the universality of the *Ummah,* into their efforts to globalise the sentiment of defensive *jihad*, provides a starting point indicating the beginnings of globalisation's influence upon this fundamentalist offshoot of Islamism.

Country	Estimate	Per Capita*
Belgium	440	40
France	1,200	18
Germany	500-600	7.5
Netherlands	200-250	14.5
United Kingdom	500-600	9.5

* Up to; per million of population

Figure 2: Comparison of Europe's Five Largest Contributors to Syrian/Iraqian Foreign Fighter Mobilisation (ICSR 2015)

Indeed, framing the *Ummah* as being 'existentially threatened' (Zuijdewin 2014), has proven to be a successful tactic for senior recruiters within the global *Jihadist* movement. A 2015 study conducted by ICSR, examining the Syrian mobilisation of Western European Foreign Fighters, demonstrates an upsurge in the number of British Muslims joining forces with Islamic militant groups in Syria and Iraq. As shown by *Figure 2* (ICSR 2015), the data accumulated is presented through an *estimate*. Indeed, this method of estimation is vulnerable to empirical limitations in the sense that the numbers shown represent an overall average, not subject to the variability of factors such as: insurgent deaths, insurgent arrest and the possibility of the insurgent returning home. As a result, they do not illustrate the amount of British foreign fighters that currently play an active role within the conflict. However, I still consider this database, comprising over 1500 open sources (ICSR 2015) including official government documents and communications from *Jihadist* groups, to be valuable when assessing the general rise in British foreign fighter mobilisation; particularly when one considers the statistics alongside official 2014 United Nations estimates, which document that over 500 British citizens have travelled and taken up arms in the region, since 2011.

Having situated the transnational threat posed by the Foreign Fighter phenomenon, I will now proceed to analyse the British state response to combating this particular product of the *universalisation* of *Islamism*. *The 2015 Counter-Terrorism And Security Act* was introduced in response to the 2014 increase in the terrorist threat level to 'severe' (Home Office 2015). Accordingly, the nature of this legislation is reflective of the state of

'emergency' that British policy makers couple with the continued mobilisation of British Foreign Fighters. Adding to existing powers, the act includes the following measures (Home Office 2015 pg.13):

(1) **Temporary Passport Seizure**- Individuals suspected of terrorist-related activity may be subject to the removal of their passport at border control for a maximum of 30 days

(2) **Temporary Exclusion Order-** Providing the police with the power to delay the return of a British Citizen suspected of terrorist-related activity abroad

(3) **Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM)-** The legal threshold for imposing a TPIM has been increased to the 'balance of probabilities.' Police are now permitted to: "relocate a subject, restrict a subject's travel outside the area where they reside, require a subject not to meet with organisations or other persons specified and prohibits them from acquiring/holding a firearms license, offensive weapons or explosives. The maximum sentence for breaching a TPIM travel measure has been increased from five to ten years."

Within this context, it follows to suggest that a primary concern for the British counter-terrorism agenda is the threat of 'blowback'- this being the fear that Foreign Fighters waging *Jihad* abroad may return to the country with the intention of devising a terrorist attack upon British soil (Kraehenmann 2014).

In spite of the perceived danger surrounding the threat of blowback, Zuijdewin (2014), Byman & Shapiro (2014) and Qurashi (2014) posit that the threat posed by returnee European *Jihadists* is significantly lower than being portrayed, and that the state response in policing this threat is somewhat out of proportion. In an attempt to devalue the threat of blowback, Qurashi (2014) puts forward that;

> "In almost every case of individuals having fought abroad, there is little to suggest that such training or fighting had resulted directly in the decision to carry out an act of political violence in the UK" (Ibid 2014 pg. 13).

He further substantiates this claim by highlighting that, of all 66 individuals involved in the 13 post-9/11 terrorist plots, 58 have never been trained or fought outside of Britain. Indeed, he points to the fact that 65 of the 66 implicated individuals attribute the motivations for their plotted attacks on the UK to British military involvement within Muslim territories, rather then any linkage to overseas training or fighting. Here, the underlying sentiment is that blowback is 'statistically unlikely' and the above Government policy to counter this potentially damaging product of the Foreign Fighter phenomenon is disproportionate and over-securitised (ibid 2014).

In response, I argue that although Qurashi brings light to a valid claim that British foreign policy arrangements are a primary contributor to political violence in the UK, his disposition is ultimately misguided in the sense that he

fails to grasp the severity of the issue at hand. As put forward by senior counter-terrorism agent Charles Farr, the Syrian conflict is:

> "Different from any other counter-terrorism challenge we have faced- because of the size and scale of terrorist groups now engaged in the fighting, the number of people from this country who are joining them, ease of travel, availability of weapons, and the intensity of the conflict" (Stuart 2014 pg. 6);

With that in mind, I argue that, in the short-term, the perceived heavy-handiness associated with current British State Policy to neutralise the threat of 'blowback' is both expected, and indeed warranted. For, it is feared that approximately 250 individuals affiliated with international terrorist groups in Iraq/Syria have already returned to Britain (Oppenheimer 2014). Moreover, if one were to include pre-9/11 Islamist terrorism offences in Britain dating back to 1999, the number of convicted individuals who also possessed overseas fighting experience/ attended foreign terrorist training initiatives rises to 19% (Simcox et al 2011). Adding to the very real potency of this threat is the fact that Foreign Fighter returnees don't necessarily need experience on the 'front line' if they are to contribute towards mounting an attack on British soil, the extensive training they receive, alongside their engagement in military exercises provides them with an operational knowledge in terrorist competencies that could prove vital (Briggs & Silverman 2014). Thus, while Qurashi may point to the 'statistical unlikelihood' of blowback, I maintain that the possibility of a returning foreign fighter conducting an attack on British soil

prevails nonetheless. The presence of this possibility, considered alongside the fact that the current threat from returning Foreign Fighters exceeds that of previous typologies (Kraehenmann 2014), renders current British policy procedure- in the current state of emergency- both proportionate, and indeed necessary.

Indeed, the framing of today's threat from Foreign Fighters as comparably more ominous is not merely due to the sheer number of its agents. For, the motivations of British Foreign Fighters taking up arms alongside terrorist groups such as ISIS have become intrinsically more sinister (Neumann 2015). Dissimilar to previous conflicts, travelling British Foreign Fighters are no longer solely motivated by the "romantic desire" (Byman & Shapiro 2014 pg. 12) to protect the *Ummah* against the threat of Western Homogeny. Instead of defending Afghanistan from the Soviet's, or defending Iraq from the USA, the ISIS ideal is being sold as an opportunity to establish universal Islamism in the form of a caliphate (Neumann 2015). Consequently, this image of control and powerfulness is reflected within their acts of merciless savagery. The recent capture and burning of a Jordanian pilot sent shockwaves throughout global media spheres and was even denounced by senior clerics within al-Qaeda (Philip 2015). The presence of such pure and unrivalled evil results in the heightened threat from Foreign Fighters today.

In appealing to the nature of the current threat from blowback as comparably more potent, I allow myself to support the hard-line approach adopted by British policy makers in regard to returnee Foreign Fighters, while at the same

time resonate with Zuijidewin's (2014) and Byman & Shapiro's (2014) analysis that Muslim Foreign Fighters emanating from the West rarely play a direct involvement in *Jihadist* terrorist plots. Accordingly, Zuijidewin (2014) provides an alternative calculation to Hegghammer (2011) and Simcox et al (2011) in that she chooses not to include individuals who had merely received overseas *Jihadist* training within her definition of a Foreign Fighter. Her findings, comprising 123 convicted individuals of 26 plots, posit that only 9% of perpetrators can be truly defined as a 'Western Foreign Fighter' possessing real, first-hand combat experience (Zuijidewin 2014). However, these scholars differ from Qurashi (2014), and indeed provide the basis for my own line of reasoning, in the sense that they acknowledge, as illustrated by; Richard Reid's failed shoe-bombing attack, and Dhiren Barot's foiled plot to Bomb the New York Stock exchange, that terrorism is a game of small numbers (Zuijidewin 2014). It only takes the actions of one crazed fanatic to potentially cause the death of tens, if not hundreds (Byman & Shapiro 2014). With that in mind, I maintain that in today's climate of socio-political turmoil the possibility of blowback is not to be taken lightly- and this is well reflected within recent developments in British counter-terrorism legislation.

As previously stated, *The 2015 Counter-Terrorism And Security Act* was implemented in response to the increase in terrorist level threat to 'severe'. In this respect, it exists very much as a short-term solution to the current state of emergency that Britain finds itself in today. In light of this sentiment, I also put forward that; whilst it is imperative that the perpetrators of the heinous crimes committed by terrorist organisations such as ISIS are convicted and held

accounted for, more must be done to improve the infrastructural framework for long-term national security as a whole (Kraehenmann 2014).

In order to achieve this, Briggs & Silverman (2014) suggest the introduction of an ‘Exit’ strategy, similar to the Channel programme referred to in Chapter Two of this discussion, aimed specifically at de-radicalising returning Foreign Fighters who have become disillusioned with life in Syria or other conflict states. This proposed method of rehabilitation would seek to “help returnees to change their ideas and behaviours” (Briggs & Silverman pg. 46) in regard to radical Islamism, thereby reducing the threat that they pose to themselves and others. Moreover, after a rigorous risk assessment and screening procedure, such an Exit strategy would provide a support structure for willing returnee Foreign Fighters to re-engage with societal norms. The benefits of such a system are not limited to the returning individual, for they can also offer the state an unrivalled source of intelligence on the internal structure of international terrorist organisations (GCTF 2014), (Bakker et al 2013). Too add, the counter-narrative offered by re-integrated former extremists may prove pivotal in persuading individuals to refrain from joining the global *jihadist* movement (GCTF 2014). Indeed, in December 2014, ISIS executed 100 Foreign Fighters for attempting to flee Syria (Winsor 2014), and in the same month, a British Foreign Fighter made contact with the *International Centre For the Study of Radicalisation* (ICSR) to report that he knew of 50 British Foreign Fighters who wanted to return home (Maher & Neumann 2014). In this respect, there undoubtedly exist tens, if not hundreds of disenchanted British Foreign Fighters. Thus, as a long-term strategy to improve the

foundations of national security, a programme for re-engaging, assessing and monitoring Foreign Fighter returnees may yet prove fruitful.

One issue with the implementation of such a strategy lies in the fact that, inevitably, those returning Foreign Fighters, who are guilty of committing crimes, must be processed and subsequently prosecuted for their actions. How then, do Government services differentiate between an individual who was involved in barbaric acts associated with ISIS, and an individual who took up arms against the Assad regime in defence of the *Ummah*? For, not all Foreign Fighters are deserving of the label 'terrorist.' In response to this predicament, British security forces can either; internalise the sentiment echoed by Boris Johnson that anyone attempting to return to the UK from Syria/Iraq "without good reason" (Dearden 2014 pg. 1) should be deemed a potential threat to state security, or, they can follow Mahrez & Neumann's (2014) line of reasoning that the Government needs to offer disenchanted Foreign Fighters a viable way out. To these thinkers, "it is not about being soft; it's about being smart" (Mahrez & Neumann 2014 pg.1). It's about utilising the experiences of disillusioned Foreign Fighters to the advantage of the state. Having assessed both options, I maintain my argument that in the short-term, while the Government gauges the threat posed from returnee Foreign Fighters, state policy should, as it currently does, reflect the potential severity of the issue at hand. However, I also put forward that, once Government services develop a means of gaining a greater understanding of the threat posed by returnee Foreign Fighters, British policy makers should stylise and implement a Foreign Fighter-effective branch of the existing

'Channel' programme. One that caters to the needs of returning Foreign Fighters who wish to re-integrate into society, and places them under extensive monitoring and surveillance in order to ensure the security of the state (Mahrez & Neumann 2014) and (Stuart 2014).

Furthermore, in order to strengthen the infrastructural framework of national security, British policy makers must move to regulate the relative ease of travel that today's European Foreign Fighters currently benefit from. For, the *universalisation* of *Islamism* does not only benefit from the infiltration of its ideology into the virtual *Ummah*- there are other aspects of globalisation at play here- namely, the improved interconnectivity of worldwide travel structures (Stuart 2014). Modern modes of transport dictate that today, individuals willing to participate in *Jihad* can fly to their proposed destination at the click of a button. Perhaps more alarming is the fact that Foreign Fighters who posses European citizenship hold the right to travel freely within the Schengen area. Thus any attempts to fly to a conflict zone can be made from a breadth of outward destinations (Zuijdewijn 2014). Moreover, the ease of travel that such individuals may benefit from is further appropriated by the presence of operational agreements made between senior actors within conflict states, and leaders of fundamental Islamic groups (Simcox 2013). For example, al-Qaeda and Iran operate under an 'agreement of convenience', in which al-Qaeda benefits from a freedom to travel and to conduct their administrative activities within the national boundaries of Iran. In return, al-Qaeda must refrain from both actively recruiting Iranian citizens, and carrying out terrorist operations within its territorial boundaries (Simcox 2013). This

operational network, facilitated by Abdel Azez Khalil- a leading figure within al-Qaeda- has also been known to allow for the safe passing of funding, weapons and fighters from Iran to South Asia (U.S Treasury 2012).

In reference to the current heightened threat from Syria, the most common route to overseas *Jihadism* is made through Turkey (Cardash et al 2013). Here, Would-be British Foreign Fighters can pose as tourists and comfortably self-fund their journey to Kobane, via the 800 Kilometre-long Turkish border (Zelin 2015). Given the admission by the Turkish Prime Minister that; it is structurally impossible to comprehensively monitor a border of this size (Cockburn 2015), British policy makers must take note of the recommendations made by the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (2014), and focus on improving air travel security measures, including; refining existing protocol in regard to inter-state sharing of passenger travel data, and identifying the most-travelled routes utilised by Foreign Fighter passengers (GCTF 2014).

For, in February 2015, three British fifteen-year old girls travelled from Gatwick to Istanbul, with the sole intention of crossing the border into Syria and taking up arms with ISIS (Topping 2015). According to the Turkish Ambassador, Government services in Britain only received communications about the girls leaving the country, from the British embassy in Turkey, six days after their initial departure (Home Office 2015). Thus ruling out any possibility of locating the children before they were lost to ISIS. Considering that the current terrorist threat level is ‘severe’ (Home Office 2015), this failure

to effectively communicate with international Government agencies and travel services represents an inexcusable shortcoming of the state. Accordingly, it is imperative that British policy makers establish intelligence partnerships with Turkish authorities, in order to ensure long-term national security (Byman & Shapiro 2014). Indeed, improved inter-state cooperation is essential in preventing *Jihadists* from benefiting from the ease of travel that globalisation entails (Bakker et al 2011).

Conclusion

The research topic posed at the beginning of this discussion reads: How successfully has British state policy interacted with the different conceptions of a globalised *Ummah*? In answering this question, I began by situating the interconnective impact of globalisation- it was posited that today's trend of transnational people mobilisation, fuelled by the interconnectedness of globalisation, renders British state policy for accommodating, and integrating its minorities all the more necessary. I then moved to assess the paradox that; although the British model of multiculturalism has done comparably more than any other European nation in catering for the continued influx of a Muslim diaspora, research data and public opinion samples show that British Muslims have fared less well then their European counterparts in naturalising themselves into existing society. Accordingly, It has been found that efforts to *accommodatively integrate* those who adhere to *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of *Ummah* suffer from a multitude of conflicting boundaries.

Firstly, and perhaps most significantly, the extent to which senior policy makers have bestowed a *Respect and Recognition* formula for multi-cultural harmony is detrimental to its own liberal state structure. For, whilst initial measures to promote and ensure equality are central to the continuation of any democracy, the extensive undermining of liberalism by multiculturalism can only result in a state of societal fragmentation. Accordingly, I have shown this to be the case by bringing to light the worrying presence of an anti-Muslim/ anti-immigration sentiment amongst a significant faction of the

existing White British body. It has been argued that Britain has arrived at this fractured state of multiculturalism due to a tendency by policy makers to overlook the long-standing cultural values of the existing British populace, creating an atmosphere of neglect and a feeling of disproportional treatment. Moreover, it has also been shown that, whilst undoubtedly important, the centrality of eradicating *Islamophobia* within policy procedure has inadvertently allowed for the influx of a 'minority discourse,' which in itself provides a structural blockade for minority groups to entirely confer socio-political citizenship upon a given nation. Collectively, I have internalised the above sentiments to postulate that; whilst multiculturalism has succeeded in instilling a sense of national identity amongst the Muslim population, it has failed to integrate, and accommodate Muslims who adhere to *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of *Ummah.*

This study then moved to assess the effectiveness of British state policy in neutralising the threat posed by the *Ummatic* consideration that calls for the *universalisation of Islamism*. Again, it was contended that globalisation adds to the dynamism of this juncture by allowing for the construction of a *virtual Ummah.* I further argued that the global *Jihadist* movement benefits from an explicit, stylised online strategy, which has included the successful infiltration of its extremist ideology, via the Internet, into the virtual *Ummah.*

Having situated the threat posed by the *globalisation of Jihad*, this paper set out to determine whether British state policy has effectively dealt with its continued presence. Consequently, it has been found that initial attempts to

combat the threat of online *Jihadism* suffer from fundamental limitations, in the sense that the Internet is, by nature, an uncontrollable force. Moreover, although the resulting effort to develop and execute an equally effective counter-narrative is seemingly a sound approach, the means by which the *Prevent* paradigm is universally imposed upon the entire British Muslim community undermines its own success. Whilst I acknowledge that extensive measures are necessary in order to counter the unrivalled threat from terrorism- The 7/7 attacks in London, the murder of Lee Rigby and the fact that, each year, police intercept attacks as damaging as the July 2005 bombings offer a glaring reminder of the damaging repercussions of terrorist activity (BBC 2013)- British counter-terrorism policy has failed to exhibit a sufficient understanding of the diversity of *Ummah.* Which in turn has generated a sense of unwarranted victimisation amongst the individuals that both adhere to *Pragmatic, Utopian* conceptions of *Ummah,* and want to be treated as equal members of society, rather then a suspect community at 'risk' of violent extremism.

The final chapter of this dissertation focused on a further product of the *Ummah* as a rationale for the *universalisation of Islamism*: The Foreign Fighter phenomenon. I have integrated the transformational processes of globalisation into this particular discussion by arguing that today's British Foreign Fighters benefit from an unprecedented ease of travel, as a result of the improved interconnectedness of worldwide travel structures.

In assessing the successfulness of British state policy in neutralising the threat from Foreign Fighter mobilisation, I separated my argument into short-term, and long-term considerations. Indeed, British counter-terrorism policy for combatting returnee Foreign Fighters is stern and resolute. Accordingly, I have shown that, from a short-term, reactionary perspective, the extensive powers available under the 2015 *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act* are justified. For, although this investigation has shown that, statistically, the current threat from *blowback* is comparably less than being portrayed, the nature of today's danger from Foreign Fighter mobilisation is more potent then previous typologies. It has been argued that this is due to the increasingly ominous motivations of individuals associated with international terrorist organisations such as ISIS, the ease of travel that such individuals benefit from, and the size and scale of returnee members of terrorist groups now engaged in conflict.

However, this investigation also shows that British policy makers must implement a long-term strategy to improve the infrastructural foundations of national security. As of now, there does not exist a framework for rehabilitating disenchanted Foreign Fighters who have become disillusioned with overseas regimes. It has been argued that, once government actors gauge the threat posed by returnee Foreign Fighters; rigorously assessed, screened and monitored combatants can offer the state a potentially critical insight into the internal makeup of international terrorist organisations. Moreover, re-institutionalised combatants could provide an unparalleled counter-narrative to persuade would-be Foreign Fighters to withhold any

attempts to join the global Foreign Fighter initiative. Again, it is imperative I reiterate my stance that such a framework should only be implemented in the long-term, once the immediate threat from blowback has been quantified. Moreover, it is put forward that British government actors must strengthen their intelligence ties with overseas administrations. For, ameliorated inter-state cooperation is central in combatting the globalisation-fuelled ease of travel that today's Foreign Fighters benefit from.

As this study has illustrated, the *Ummah* is by nature, an incredibly diverse and intricate entity. Accordingly, future British state policy must recognise its dynamism and stylise individual measures to effectively interact with its conflicting conceptions.

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