Preface

a) Overview

In this preface to the thesis I seek to clarify some of the emergent issues and key terms used so as to provide an academic framework which post hoc engages with the arguments about the issues and the methodology used and therefore contextualises the conclusions drawn. On this assumption I will explore the literature on each of the areas. Views will be compared and contrasted and I will present a synthesis of these views (See Sections b-f). By this means, a conceptual framework for the values that underpin the thesis and the original contribution to knowledge will emerge. For a plan of this preface see Appendix V. The fields that will be examined are as follows:

- Ubuntu, social justice and equal opportunities. These are key issues in the thesis and are identified as values that underpin the partnership and that are included in the original notion of ‘living citizenship’. I recognise that these are contentious issues and in this preface I seek to clarify these values as a means of clarifying my meaning of living citizenship in the course of its emergence in my practice.

- Aid, Development and Citizenship. The arguments concerning the efficacy of aid and the geo-political nature of inequalities are explored as are the issues surrounding the contentious notion of development. Also, contrasting views of citizenship are considered and the notion of ‘living citizenship’ is located in the field.

- Action Research and discourse analysis – Some of the epistemological foundations and the foundational works of these methods are
examined and there is critical engagement with the academic debates surrounding these methodologies.

- A justification of the claim to new knowledge through the emergence of the original and highly significant notion of ‘living citizenship’ as a living standard of judgement.

b) **Critiquing Ubuntu, Social Justice and Equal Opportunities**

These were the three key themes that were taken forward in the thesis. I have identified these themes as the ones that underpin a new pedagogy for citizenship education based on the notion of ‘living citizenship’.

b.1 **Ubuntu**

Ubuntu is identified in the thesis as a key value that underpins the partnership between Sarum Academy and Nqabakazulu School (Section 2.3.2) and later in this preface (See Section g) as a value that underpins my original notion of ‘living citizenship’. However, Ubuntu is a contentious issue that I wish to discuss further in order to clarify its meaning in the context of the research project.

As a term Ubuntu has its origin in the Bantu languages of southern Africa. There are also terms with similar meanings used in the Tswana language in Botswana, “botho”, in Malawi “uMunthu” (Sindima, 1995) and in Zimbabwe “unhu” (Samkange, 1980). Ubuntu is also used in Rwanda-Rundi, the national language of Rwanda and Burundi, to mean humanity and in Kiswahili, spoken in most of Kenya; the word “utu” is used to mean humanness. Each of these
terms refers to values such as, generosity, respect for others as human beings and the importance of the community.

Indeed, it is this emphasis on the community, the collective over and above the individual that is one of the contentious issues of Ubuntu. For some authors Ubuntu recognises the importance of agreement or consensus (Louw, 1998, Teffo, 1994). As Sono (1994) points out however, this desire for agreement can be taken to extreme lengths and can legitimise “totalitarian communalism”. According to Sono (1994) the role of the group in African consciousness could be

...overwhelming, totalistic, even totalitarian. Group psychology, though parochially and narrowly based..., nonetheless pretends universality. This mentality, this psychology is stronger on belief than on reason; on sameness than on difference. Discursive rationality is overwhelmed by emotional identity, by the obsession to identify with and by the longing to conform to. To agree is more important than to disagree; conformity is cherished more than innovation. Tradition is venerated, continuity revered, change feared and difference shunned. Heresies [i.e. the innovative creations of intellectual African individuals, or refusal to participate in communalism] are not tolerated in such communities (p.7)

The Ubuntu desire for consensus can be exploited to enforce group solidarity and it can be used to constrict individuality and to promote conformity. This can lead to a fear of change and of difference and a lack of tolerance of new
ideass. Lack of conformity can lead to punishment (Mbigi and Maree, 1995). This is not the interpretation of Ubuntu that I take forward in my thesis.

Other writers talk of the importance to Ubuntu of recognising the humanity of others in its infinite variety of content and form (Van der Merwe, 1996). This translation of Ubuntu emphasises a respect for particularity and individuality. But in Ubuntu the individual is defined in terms of his/her relationship with others (Shutte, 1993). Being an individual in this sense means “being-with-others” (Louw, 1998). This is not the same as the Western concept of individuality as a solitary aspect of human life, where an individual exists independently from the rest of the community or society. In an Ubuntu sense the individual is not independent of others but is interdependent with others. Khoza (1994) argues that Ubuntu needs to broaden respect for the individual and tackle the negative elements of collectivism. Ndaba (1994) points out that Ubuntu describes how the individual can thrive in a situation where they have on-going contact and interaction with each other. In this sense Ubuntu requires dialogue and this preserves the uniqueness of the other in his/her otherness. Ubuntu in the sense of the thriving individual describes very well the way that the participants have come to behave in engaging in the activities of, say, an international educational partnership. Through dialogue and interaction (See Sections 3.3.3 and 5.3.2) the individual participants in this research project have thrived and been able to identify and live out their values more fully. Thus, this interpretation of Ubuntu which sees the individual participant as interdependent with others is the one that I take forward in my thesis.
A criticism of how Ubuntu has been used politically in South Africa is asserted by Marx (2002) who says that Ubuntu has been appropriated by the political elite in post-apartheid South Africa to sustain a nationalist ideology that glorifies the past. He argues that the pre-occupation with nation-building in an attempt to build a more moral and hopeful future for South Africans has led to cultural conformism and a nationalistic mind-set that is exclusive as it fosters identity-building, and, for Marx, “identity can only be established through difference” (p. 53). He makes reference to the way in which Ubuntu was used in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to support a concept of nation-building that relied on cultural conformism and says that Ubuntu provided the veil for the avoidance of the issue of daily violent atrocities and the lack of analysis of the political structures that sustained apartheid.

Ramose (2002) takes an even more critical stance and argues the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission based on Ubuntu was a unilateral decision of the political leadership, not an expression of the will of the people (p. 487).

This critical view sees Ubuntu as a means of fostering conformist nation-building by the new political elite in South Africa that smacks, in some ways, of similar tactics to the apartheid regime and that deflects criticism of its own means and operations. As Marx notes: “Social problems of the ‘new’ South Africa are, increasingly, viewed through a nationalist lens” and “By deriving its mandate from the concepts of Ubuntu and Africanism, the government is able
to interpret any criticism of its actions as evidence of its critics’ own limitations”, and lack of commitment to the nation-building project, hence an outsider” (p. 54). Ironically, in this sense, and following Marx’s argument, Africanism and Ubuntu are being implemented as cultural nationalist rhetoric to sustain a neoliberal status quo, a bureaucracy attuned to conformist ‘national values’ exempt from critique.

Thus the myth and reverence surrounding Ubuntu was hijacked as it was reconceptualised for various political agendas. While Marx sees the lack of critical interrogation of the apartheid structures as a failing of the Commission, and Ramose sees it as lacking the will of the majority of the people, both because of the take up of Ubuntu and its processes, many others, such as Tutu (1999) and Swanson (2005) believe that it was this very process of take up guided by the philosophy of Ubuntu that was its unique success. For these writers, it was the strength of Ubuntu, not its weakness that set the stage to begin healing a divided society and allows space for forgiveness, healing and transcendence towards a more unified South Africa with a non-racial, non-violent, hopeful and democratic future. Swanson (2005) argues this in the following terms:

“The struggle for Ubuntu, on a local and national scale, served as a philosophy of struggle for people trying to heal the brutality and desperateness of a deeply ruptured society. In heart-felt terms, the struggle for Ubuntu became the struggle for the dignity and soul of South Africa.” (p. 4)
Whilst recognising that Ubuntu may have been appropriated by the political leadership of South Africa as a form of cultural nationalism, it is the notion of Ubuntu as a healing and forgiving principle that I am concerned about in my thesis and that I take forward as an idea to inform the relationships that have developed as a result of the educational partnership between Sarum Academy in the UK and Nqabakazulu School in Durban, South Africa. When the Headteacher of the South African School says: “You did Ubuntu by making them realise their dreams. It was an act of humanity” (p. 226), he is using the word Ubuntu to describe the sense of awareness of others that participants in the partnership have shown in providing financial support for pupils to further their education by attending University.

I have come to an understanding of Ubuntu through participation in the partnership with Nqabakazulu School in South Africa, as an African way of being, that gives primacy to the idea of “I am because we are” (Charles, 2007). It was through my participation in the partnership that Ubuntu provided a vision and framework for me for respectful engagement in my research of the partnership; one that permitted reflexivity, reciprocity, community connectedness, and cross-cultural understanding, through a sense of humanity. It is in this sense that I use the term in the thesis to emphasise it as a principle, concept and value that underpins the relationship between the participants in the partnership and their actions as living citizens. I claim that through my actions in engaging in the partnership I embody the spirit of Ubuntu. Living citizenship carries with it a sense of responsibility towards the
well-being of all and with it a message of hope for humanity. This is consistent with my understanding Ubuntu.

b.2 Social Justice

This term is also contentious and in need of clarification as it is identified as being an underpinning value of the partnership and is included in my notion of ‘living citizenship’. Definitions of social justice vary depending on a variety of factors, such as political orientation, religious background, and political and social philosophy.

The term was first coined by an Italian Jesuit scholar, Luigi Taparelli in 1840 when he wrote about the social problems caused by the industrial revolution. Rosmini expanded on this when he wrote in 1848 about the need for justice in government and society arguing that government should be organised to provide justice for all. The theologian John Ryan (1919) based his vision of social justice in America on equitable wealth distribution and a guaranteed minimum wage and he promoted liberal social reforms that emphasised an active role for the State in promoting social justice, many of which were enacted during Roosevelt’s administration as part of the “New Deal”. Thus the term emanated from theology and became part of Catholic social teaching. The modern and secular notion of social justice emanating from Rawls (1971) sees it as based on the concepts of human rights and equality and involving a greater degree of egalitarianism. Rawls introduces the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle as a component of social justice. This principle states that all positions should be open to any individual, regardless of his or her
social background, ethnicity or sex. Werner (2008) re-states this principle as “any individuals who have the same native talent and the same ambition will have the same prospects of success in competitions that determine who gets positions that generate superior benefits for their occupants” (p. 1). This principle is stronger than ‘Formal Equality of Opportunity’ in that Rawls argues that an individual should not only have the right to opportunities, but should have an effective equal chance as others of similar natural ability. By guaranteeing the worst-off in society a fair deal, Rawls argues that this compensates for naturally-occurring inequalities (talents that one is born with, such as a capacity for sport).

Critics of the notion of social justice argue that there is no such objective standard. Moral relativists such as Westermarck (1906) deny that there is any kind of objective standard for justice in general. Others such as Ayer (1959) deny the epistemic possibility of objective notions of justice. Hayek (1973) rejects the idea of social justice as meaningless and ideological and believes that to realise any degree of social justice is unfeasible, and that the attempt to do so will destroy liberty. The notion of liberty that he is referring to here is liberty as freedom of the individual from constraint on her actions. The concept of liberty can however be reconceptualised as a freedom from injustice and this is a notion of liberty that sits closely with the model of social justice that I am espousing.

One of the difficulties in defining social justice is that there has never been a completely just society, where all people have had an even chance. Even in
socialist nations, there has been and still is poverty and unequal distribution of wealth. A general definition of social justice as a policy is hard to arrive at and even harder to implement in practice.

In the Rawlsian (1971) sense, social justice demands that people have equal rights and opportunities; everyone, from the poorest person on the margins of society to the wealthiest deserves an even playing field. This assertion gives rise to several questions such as, what do the words “just” or “fair” mean, and what defines equal? Who should be responsible for making sure society is a just and fair place? How do you implement policies regarding social justice?

According to those on the left of the political spectrum, the State must legislate to create a just society, and various mechanisms such as the welfare state (Esping-Anderson, 1990 and Rothstein, 1998) need to be put in place in order to transfer monies needed to even out the otherwise naturally occurring inequalities. Beveridge,(1942) proposed a series of measures to aid those who were in need of help, or in poverty and argued that government should provide adequate income to people, adequate health care, adequate education, adequate housing and adequate employment. Equal rights can be defined as equal access to things that make it possible for people in any section of society to be successful. Therefore, leftist philosophy (Roemer, 1998 and Dworkin, 2000) supports measures such as anti-discrimination laws and equal opportunity programmes, and favours progressive taxation to pay for programmes that help provide equality for all. They argue that there are certain basic needs that must be offered to all. Thus there is a need for
policies that promote equal education in all schools and policies that would help all children have the financial opportunity to attend further education.

Those with a more right wing political stance (D'Souza, 2000 and Nozick, 1974) criticise those who make poor choices and feel that while equal opportunity should exist, a government should not legislate for this. In fact they argue that social justice is diminished when governments create programmes to deal with it, especially when these programmes call for greater taxation. Instead, those who have more money should be encouraged to be philanthropic, not by paying higher taxes, which is arguably unjust and an infringement of personal liberty (Nozick, 1974).

From a religious perspective, people all over the political spectrum argue for social justice. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2007) argues that you bring about justice through Christ like actions of mercy, especially those that help people who have been marginalized by society. The Islamic perspective on social justice (Esposito, 1998) is similar; one of the Five Pillars of Islam is that all must give to the poor.

This evidence suggests that social justice is a contentious term and I recognise the importance of clarifying my use of the term in the thesis. I use the term social justice (See Sections 1.2, 2.3.3 and 5.3.1.2) in the sense that Rawls (1971) uses it to mean an increase in egalitarianism and equality of opportunity. This is the meaning of social justice shared by other participants in the partnership as shown by this statement by Siyabonga, the School Pupil
President (Section 5.3.1.2) when commenting on the higher education bursaries: “If two or three learners get successful or achieve their goals that will make a huge difference in their lives and in the life of South Africa, because they will be able to help other pupils” (p.235). This idea of social justice as, engagement by the participants in social acts to increase equity and fairness as part of the social improvement research goals and “social manifesto” (Coombs, 1995 and Coombs & Smith, 2003), is included in the notion of ‘living citizenship’. The pursuit of social justice, along with Ubuntu, becomes another of the underpinning principles that distinguishes my meaning of ‘living citizenship’.

b.3 Equal Opportunity

In the thesis the term equal opportunity is used alongside social justice as a term to describe the values that underpin the partnership. Again, this is a contentious phrase in need of clarification.

For Young (1958) equal opportunity was aligned with the ideology of a meritocracy whereby appointments and responsibilities are objectively assigned to individuals based upon their “merits”, namely intelligence, credentials, and education. This gives people from different backgrounds the opportunity to access positions of responsibility on merit. This view fits with the notion of formal equality of opportunity that all people should be treated similarly, unhampered by artificial barriers or prejudices or preferences. The aim is that important jobs and positions of power and responsibility should go to the most qualified persons, those most likely to perform ably in a given
task, and not to go to persons for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons, such as circumstances of birth, upbringing, friendship ties to whoever is in power, religion, sex, ethnicity, race, or involuntary personal attributes such as disability, age, or sexual preferences. This non-discriminatory notion that only abilities should determine the opportunities open to a person was supported by Friedman (1980). In this formal notion of equality of opportunity the concept is limited to non-discrimination of the selection process.

Substantive or fair equality of opportunity is a broader concept than formal equality of opportunity outlined above. From this viewpoint the situation is unfair before the selection process begins. There is therefore a need to remedy the inequality before participants compete for a position. The idea is to give those from less fortunate backgrounds a better initial chance in life. This argument is summed up by Parekh (2000),

“All citizens should enjoy equal opportunities to acquire the capacities and skills needed to function in society and to pursue their self-chosen goals equally effectively. Equalising measures are justified on grounds of justice as well as social integration and harmony.” (pp. 210-11)

Rawls (1971) principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity was a variant of the substantive version described above. His view that individuals from different backgrounds should have the same prospects of success in life is supported by Marshall (1998) and Krugman (2011).
Gardner (1984) criticises substantive equality of opportunity on the grounds that inequalities will always exist irrespective of any attempts to erase them and even if substantive equality is achieved there will inevitably be future inequalities as an outcome. Kekes (2001) argues against Rawls notion of Fair Equality of Opportunity on the grounds that:

“It requires the equalization of the property of rapists and their victims, welfare cheats and taxpayers, spendthrifts and savers. No reasonable person can believe that we are obliged to treat the moral and immoral, the prudent and imprudent, the law-abiding and the criminal with equal consideration.” (p. 1)

Kekes asserts that other competing principles such as justice and property rights need to be balanced with equality of opportunity and that it is dangerous to promote equality of opportunity above the other principles. In a similar vein, Nozick (1974) argues against equal opportunities legislation as it interferes with an owner’s right to do what he or she wants with their property. This view sees individual property rights, as morally superior to equality of opportunity. Cavanagh (2003) argues against the State getting involved in equalising opportunity on the grounds that helping create a level playing field merely gives everyone an equal chance of becoming unequal. D’Souza (2000) also objects to State intervention to create more equal opportunities on the grounds that it takes away personal responsibility for investment in one’s own development. Epstein (1995) argues that competitive market forces will be more effective in the long run than government intervention in achieving formal equality of opportunity, He asserts that it is in the interests of the
market to promote a cultural atmosphere of tolerance in which the most qualified applicants are appointed because that way firms will lower costs and be able to compete. Thus in his view there is no need for government intervention to achieve equality of opportunity.

Whilst recognising the criticisms levelled at the notion of equal opportunity and that it is controversial as to which form of equal opportunity, if any, is morally acceptable, the way that I use the term in the thesis is in the substantive sense (See Section 2.3.4). Chomsky’s (1976) reference to the need in a decent society to overcome inequality of condition in order to enable individuals to be accorded their intrinsic human rights in the sense of equality of rights echoes the arguments of Rawls (1971) and Parekh (2000). I refer to the participants in the partnership as having a “moral duty” (p. 60) to address the inequality of condition between the pupils at the two schools. When participants provide bursaries for pupils at Nqabakazulu School to attend University there is an attempt to address inequality of condition and create fairer equality of opportunity in the Rawlsian sense, as these pupils would not otherwise have access to the funds to enable them to pay the entry fees. When participants learn about fair trade through the partnership (See Section 5.3.3.3, Example 4) there is a recognition that fair trade can, if the money is spent by the recipients for example on education, lead to less inequality of condition and fairer equality of opportunity. My value of equality of opportunity becomes, alongside Ubuntu and social justice, another standard of judgement applied to the actions of the participants in the partnership and another value that I use to distinguish my meaning of ‘living citizenship’.
c) Aid and Development – A Critical Assessment

In the thesis I argue the case for fundraising to support the partnership between Sarum Academy and Nqabakazulu School (See Sections 2.3.4 and 6.2.6). Whilst I recognise the arguments that critics of fundraising make (British Council 2006, Martin 2007) I also find the arguments for fundraising as a means of addressing inequality of condition (Chomsky, 1976) more compelling. However, I wish to put this issue in to the wider context of debate about the geopolitical nature of inequalities and about the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. To what extent might “doing good” be construed as another kind of colonisation? There is also the question of development. What does it mean and is it desirable?

Slater and Bell (2002) assert that the association of aid with dependence raises issues concerning the desirability, effectiveness and long-term value of aid for the societies of the South. Can aid be a catalyst for development? The World Bank (2000) thinks so. In the World Development Report it is noted that “aid can be highly effective in promoting growth and reducing poverty” (World Bank, 2000, p. 73). In a similar vein Cassen (1994), in his comprehensive review of aid, says that “the great majority of aid succeeds in its developmental objectives” (p. 9) According to Slater and Bell (2002) this positive view argues that developmental assistance has contributed to a fall in child mortality, improved access to clean water, reduced disease, brought better educational provision and generated a more efficient network of infrastructure and utilities.
According to Slater and Bell (2002) the UK’s New Labour’s 1997 and 2000 White Papers constituted a clear statement of moral purpose in respect of the elimination of world poverty (DfID, 1997, 2000). They were of geopolitical significance because they signalled a new design for aid and a new practical reason which was relevant globally and nationally. The White Papers emphasised the moral imperative of tackling poverty. This echoes my own sentiments in the thesis (See Section 6.3.6) where I talk about fundraising as a means of furthering social justice and embedding social change and thus acting as a moral duty. The White Papers emphasised the idea of partnership in the donor-recipient relationship and represented an attempt to move away from previous formulations of the relationship based on hierarchy. However, as Maxwell and Riddell (1998) say potential partners may interpret this idea of partnership to mean:

“We know how best to achieve development…we know how you should alleviate poverty… either you accept the approaches which we think are right for you or you will not qualify for a long-term partnership with us…if you do not accept our view of development, then we will not provide you with aid”. (p. 264)

Furthermore, this authoritarian view of “development” or “progress” is rooted in Western imperialism (Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997 and Nederveen Pieterse, 2000) and can have negative connotations. According to Manji and Coill (2002) the distinction by the US Government and international agencies
between half of the world being developed and the other half being underdeveloped has led to the idea of development as a universal goal. This discourse of development and the labelling of Africans and Asians as ‘underdeveloped’ underpinned the more overt racist discourses of the past. It gave the ‘civilised’ or ‘developed’ European a role in ‘civilising’ or ‘developing’ Africa. The inhabitants of the developing world are described in terms of what they are not instead of what they are. This deficit model leads to a desire amongst Europeans to improve the lot of Africans.

Esteva (1996) argues that development is a term that has been used to extend American hegemony through free market economics and maintains: “The term offers an image of the future that is a mere continuation of the past” (p. 23). Esteva sees development as a conservative myth and makes a plea for people to develop their own ways of living by disengaging from the economic logic of the free market or the economic plan and defining their own needs.

According to Manji and O’Coill (2002) development has failed in many post-colonial countries.

“Real per capita GDP has fallen and welfare gains achieved since independence in areas like food consumption, health and education have been reversed” (p. 568)
At the same time a vast array of development non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) have been involved in providing aid and support to the developing world, e.g. Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) from the UK. Manji and Coill (2002) suggest that they have contributed marginally to the relief of poverty, but significantly to undermining the struggle of African people to emancipate themselves from oppression. The programme of welfare provision by NGO’s is a, “social initiative that can be described as a programme of social control” (Manji and Coill, 2002, p. 578). Given the neo-liberal economic rhetoric of retreat from State provision in many African countries the NGO’s have replaced the State as providers of a ‘safety net’ of social services for the most vulnerable (Edwards and Hulme, 1995).

This critical view of the notion of development and the role of charities and aid brings a new perspective to the work of the partnership between Sarum Academy and Nqabakazulu School and to the thesis as a whole. It forces me to consider how the international educational partnership might be interpreted by participants and by others outside the partnership. Has there been sufficient dialogue and consultation on the development of curriculum projects and on the allocation of any funds raised?

This critical perspective on development and aid allows me to see how misguided my original thinking about partnership activities was, as documented in Section 5.3.3.2. At the start of the partnership in 2002 my view that we should provide technology and equipment for the South African School was based on a perspective of education that saw the Western model
as superior and one to be copied. I can see now how I was influenced by a view of development as a one-way flow whereby the poor have to wait for the benefits of access to Western knowledge and technology as if they have no independent sources of knowledge and relevant ideas. At this point in the partnership there had been limited dialogue between participants and as Slater and Bell (2002) remind us:

“Genuine dialogue clearly implies, if it is to be effective, recognition that there are other sites of enunciation and other agents of knowledge, located in the South, whose vision and priorities might be different from those of the donor community. The recognition of other voices requires political will, but it is also crucially linked to the presence or absence of a genuine belief in partnership and reciprocity.” (p. 353)

However, since then there has been genuine dialogue with Nqabakazulu School and I do think that there is evidence to suggest that the vision and priorities of Nqabakazulu School were different and that they have driven the partnership forward. Two examples of long-term projects show this. First there is the provision of bursaries for pupils to enter higher education (See Section 5.3.3.3, Examples 1 and 2 and Section 6.2.6), a scheme that emerged from dialogue between participants in the first visits to South Africa and to the UK. Secondly, there is the Beautizulu project (Section 5.3.3.3, Example 4) which started at the suggestion of the South African school as a practical fair trade project and continues to flourish. As the partnership goes forward there is a continuing need to consider the geo-political context of the relationship and to
ensure that we do not fall in to the trap of assuming that all development is good. Funds passed on to the South African school should be managed by them to achieve goals set by them to fulfil their own vision of progress and development. There is evidence that this is the case currently as funds are managed by the Committee of External Relations at Nqabakazulu School.

This analysis leads me to a refinement of the notion of ‘living citizenship’ (See Section 6.4). Building on the second feature of living citizenship as outlined in Section 6.4.2, there must also be a commitment to genuine dialogue that values the voice of all of the participants and that gives priority to the South African participants as a means of redressing the imbalance of power relations between north and south. This should happen in such a way that the southern participants are driving the partnership forward to realise their own vision of progress and development. This links to my recommendation of prior negotiation of ‘values’ as the initial phase of any partnership and part of the agenda setting of any new international CPD partnership (Sections 6.2.1 and 6.5.4). Thus, clarifying my understanding of the term ‘development’ as a means of giving power to the less powerful and privileged to determine their own future has helped me to distinguish my meaning of living citizenship. Living citizenship focuses attention on a process of accountability that engages with issues of power and privilege in society.
d) Citizenship

In this section I explore and problematise the meanings and assumptions of the term citizenship in order to clarify my meaning of the idea of ‘living citizenship’.

The republican model of citizenship is embodied in classical institutions and underpins Aristotle’s (Barker, 1958) characterisation of the citizen as one capable of ruling and being ruled in turn. Rousseau (1762) argued that active participation in the processes of deliberation and decision-making was what ensured an individual was a citizen and not a subject. This republican model of citizenship emphasises citizenship as political agency. In contrast, the liberal concept of citizenship, originating in the Roman Empire (Walzer, 1989, p211), means being protected by the law rather than participating in its formulation or execution. Thus, it is a legal status rather than a political agency. Constant (1819) argued that the scale and complexity of modern states precludes the kind of civic engagement required by the republican model. Constant (1819), Walzer (1989) and Ackermann (1988) all however see these as complementary rather than opposing models in that they argue that active political engagement is necessary at times to secure the passive enjoyment of citizenship as a legal status.

Marshall (1950) defined citizenship primarily as a legal status through which an identical set of civil, political and social rights are accorded to all members of society. He argued that this was a means of ensuring the integration of the working class into British society and securing social cohesion. This
universalist model was criticised (Young, 1989 and Williams, 1998) for not considering the needs of minorities and for leading to greater inequality for certain groups, e.g. women and ethnic minorities. Therefore, this model would not be consistent with the idea of social justice as increasing egalitarianism and equal opportunities as espoused in Section b.2 above. Young and Williams proposed an alternative conception of citizenship based on the acknowledgement of the political relevance of difference (cultural, gender, class, race, etc.). This entails recognition of the pluralist nature of society, composed of many different and equally valid perspectives and recognition that equal respect may justify differential treatment especially in the case of minority rights. This model of differentiated citizenship is criticised by Carens (2000) as undermining the conditions that make a sense of common identification and thus mutuality possible.

Habermas (1998) argues from a post nationalist perspective that nationalism should be replaced with a political community that allows different cultural, ethnic and religious forms of life to coexist and interact on equal terms. In his view democratic political practice and the political participation of citizens is key to securing social integration. The post nationalists give greater weight to political practice and to the legal and political institutions that sustain it rather than to the cultural and historical roots of citizenship. Liberal nationalists like Miller (1995) and Kymlicka (1995) on the other hand argue that citizens should share a commitment to the nation and develop a sense of national identity. They emphasise the importance of continuity and argue that the
strength of a political culture is derived from an anchoring in the history and
narrative of a distinct political community.

For most of the twentieth century conceptions of citizenship had in common
the idea that the framework for citizenship is the sovereign, territorial state.
Globalisation has led to the contesting of the relevance and the legitimacy of
the sovereign state and has ramifications for citizenship. Bauböck, (2008)
says that international migration produces a mismatch between citizenship
and the territorial scope of legitimate authority. Song (2009) argues that
political rights should be extended to resident non-citizens and even to non-
resident non-citizens who have fundamental interests that are affected by a
particular State. The possibility of securing a person’s basic rights irrespective
of her residency in a territorial area ties in with the notion that our rights are
recognised not in virtue of our particular citizenship but in virtue of our
universal personhood. Shachar (2009) contests the desirability of this
deterritorialisation of rights arguing that it can lead to a discourse which
implies less collective responsibility for the well-being of others. Supporters of
global democracy, such as Pogge (1992) and Young (2000) argue that
citizenship is ideally exercised at various levels: local, national, regional and
global and that no single level is dominant. This view strips sovereign States
of their centrality to citizenship. They emphasise instead the importance of
local democratic movements where ordinary citizens feel that they can really
make a difference and shape the policies that affect them (Pogge, 1992, p64).
Manin (1997) emphasises the importance of communication between citizens
in enabling them to be capable of political action. He argues that in order for
citizens to be political agents they need to act independently of the authorities and in order to do this they need to regularly act and communicate together. In the international educational partnership between Sarum Academy and Nqabakazulu School there has been regular action and communication between participants. This has been independent of the authorities and thus participants can be said to have acted as political agents in the sense that Manin (1997) uses the term.

There is dispute over how to achieve a proper balance between the recognition of difference and the affirmation of common principles to which all citizens are required to adhere. There is an awareness of the pluralist nature of contemporary societies which leads to emphasis on the role of democratic political practice in securing social integration rather than the traditional emblems of nationality: common history and culture. The difficulty is that the complexity and scale of contemporary liberal societies tend to make this political practice less significant in the lives of most citizens, a fact reflected in declining levels of participation in formal political institutions. Thus, it is not easy to determine how ordinary citizens can act in a meaningful political sense as a global citizen. Most authors agree that global citizenship should not be strictly legal in nature and must have a political dimension.

My thesis shows that international educational partnerships provide an opportunity for participants to engage in meaningful political actions that change the lives of others and thus act as living citizens. The participants have, through dialogue, identified their shared values and through their
actions they have acted as political agents and lived out their values. For them the partnership has offered the opportunity to engage in political practice and it has become a significant part of their lives. Their actions embody the values of Ubuntu, social justice and equal opportunities. This is what I call ‘living citizenship’ and it contributes to the debate on what it means to be an active citizen in a pluralist liberal-democratic community.

e) Discourse Analysis

Harris (1952) started using the terms discourse analysis and text analysis in papers that he published on the structure of language. According to Yatsko (1995) discourse analysis can be distinguished from text analysis in that it focuses on revealing psychological and social characteristics of a person through the analysis of the person's speech. Foucault (1972) analyses the conditions of existence for meaning. In order to show the principles of meaning production in various discursive formations he details how truth claims emerge during various epochs on the basis of what was actually said and written during these periods of time. He strives to avoid all interpretation and dispenses with finding a deeper meaning behind discourse. Fairclough (1989) developed a three-dimensional framework for studying discourse. At the micro-level, the analyst considers the text's syntax, metaphoric structure and certain linguistic devices. The meso-level involved studying the text's production and consumption, focusing on how power relations are enacted. At the macro-level, the analyst is concerned with inter-textual understanding, trying to understand the broad, societal currents that are affecting the text being studied. This approach to discourse analysis is
exemplified in Fairclough’s (2005) research into the ‘information society’ and ‘knowledge-based economy’ as elements of ‘transition’ in Romania. Fairclough’s notion of critical discourse analysis with the focus on the processes of social change is useful and one that I draw upon in my thesis as I explore the language and discourse that underpins the partnership (See Chapter 4 and Section 5.3.1). The idea of critical discourse analysis draws on Habermas’ (1979) view that it has a more empowering role as it seeks to uncover the repressive forces that distort communication, exposing and interrogating the dominant influences that thread through discourses. In my thesis I draw on the work of Goffman (1974) and Snow and Benford (1988) and their ideas of framing, frame alignment and social change (See Section 2.4.4). These ideas link with Fairclough’s and Habermas’ work in that there is recognition that the text has a social context and that discourse has the potential for social change within it. In my thesis I set out to interpret the meaning of the dialogue between participants in the partnership and to develop a vocabulary to explain the participants’ shared values that move the partnership forward. I use discourse analysis in the way that Gardner and Coombs (2010) envisage it, as a means of making sense of evidence obtained from sources and eliciting the assumptions that underpin such evidence (P.68). Similarly, for Coyle, (1995) discourse analysis is a way of constructing meaning from linguistic material. This emphasises the action perspective of discourse analysis. Thus, discourse analysis becomes a tool for enabling researcher-led qualitative research.
Parker (1992) and Potter and Weatherall (1987) say that the researcher can assign codes to the material being studied to enable them to discover patterns and broad areas in the discourse. The researcher can then re-examine the text to discover intentions, functions and consequences of the discourse. By considering alternative interpretations and the similarities and differences in the discourse it is then possible to rule out certain interpretations and arrive at a fair reading of what actually took place in the discourse. This idea of coding the material I found useful and is exactly what I did in Chapter 4 of the thesis where I used a systematic process for analysis of qualitative data that Coombs and I developed building on the work of Coombs (1995). Our model is based on Harri-Augstein and Thomas (1991) ideas of Self-Organised-Learning and Learning Conversations as we have developed a series of tools for making sense of conversational experiences by exploring their assumptions and inner meanings. A “Learning Conversation” is fundamentally a structured reflective conversation that the learner has with herself (Harri-Augstein and Thomas 1991, p. 3), although it prepares them to better converse with others as well. “Learning Conversations enable individuals to experience the processes whereby meaning is created, and hence learn how to learn by systematically reflecting upon, and thus expanding, the terms in which they perceive, think, feel and act” (1991, p. 56-7). Our qualitative analysis tools, as exemplified in Chapter 4, consist of ‘content-free’ templates that provide a sequence of stages for holding a structured reflective learning conversation and this systematic process enables the eliciting of findings from qualitative data (See Chapter 4).
f) **Action Research**

Defining action research can be seen as problematic in that there is “potential incongruity between two of its key aspects – intellectual clarity and developmental orientation” (Altrichter, Kemmis, McTaggart and Zuber-Skerritt, 2002, p.128). In order to maintain this developmental aspect they argue that any definition of action research should be open for on-going consideration and not so narrow as to inhibit conceptual development. Hopkins (1985) and Ebbutt (1985) both regard action research as a systematic study that combines action and reflection with the intention of improving practice. Corey (1953) and Kemmis and McTaggart (1992) emphasise the systematic nature of action research and whilst Corey talks about practitioners studying problems so that they can evaluate and improve practice, Kemmis and McTaggart (p. 10) talk about “planning, acting, observing and reflecting more carefully and more rigorously than one would usually do in everyday life”.

Similarly, McNiff (2002, p.15) says that action research combines diagnosis, action and reflection, focusing on practical issues that have been identified by participants and which are problematic yet capable of being changed. Elliott (1991) along with Stenhouse (1979) suggests that action research should contribute not only to practice but to a theory of education and teaching, which is made public to other teachers. In this sense action research is a form of professional development for teachers (Nixon, 1981; Somekh, 1995). Kemmis and McTaggart (1992) distinguish action research from the everyday actions of teachers arguing that it is a more systematic and collaborative way of collecting evidence on one’s own work and reflecting on it in order to improve practice. Hill and Kerber (1967) emphasise the cooperative, collaborative...
nature of action research, however others (Whitehead, 1985) see this as too restrictive arguing that action research can be an individual activity as well relating action research to the ‘teacher-as researcher’ movement (Stenhouse, 1975).

For Kemmis (1997) this distinction is significant and begins to separate action research in to different camps. On the one hand there are those who emphasise reflective practice with associated notions of the teacher-as-researcher (Stenhouse, 1975) and the reflective practitioner (Schön, 1987). On the other hand there are advocates of ‘critical’ action research, e.g. Carr and Kemmis (1986). Kemmis (1997) suggests that for the reflective practitioners action research is an improvement to professional practice at the local, even classroom level, within the capacities of the practitioner and the situations in which they are working. For the critical theorists (Grundy, 1987; Zuber-Skerrit, 1996) action research is part of a broader agenda of changing education, changing schooling and changing society. Lewin (1946) argued that action research can bring about not only personal, but organisational change. Also, Senge (1990) linked action research to organisational change via individuals’ actions using the notion of the learning organisation and change through enabling active participation and ownership of the learning tasks. Whitehead (2012) brings these two camps together in distinguishing action research in terms of:

“An individual researching his or her own practice, with others, in order to improve the practice, to improve understandings of the process of improving
practice, and to improve the social formation in which the researcher is living and working." (p. 69)

Thus the emphasis is on the individual but at the same time it is about changing social formations and action research can be seen as a methodology underpinning the active agency of living citizenship. My thesis shows how my own personal action research has brought about curricular change in two schools. My work has been cited and used more widely and is informing stakeholders through the websites http://www.capdm.net/bc-dev/login/ and www.global-schools.org. It has also been published as part of the Global Schools Partnership Sustainability Toolkit. This adds to the importance of the original contribution made.

The idea of practitioners questioning the basis of their work and critiquing the living processes and forces that they are embedded in is an essential element to action research (e.g., Carr and Kemmis, 1986; Elliott, 1991; Whitehead, 1993; Zeichner, 1993). Some writers (e.g., Dadds, 1995) highlight subjectivity and practitioner reflection and are explorations of the layers of self in action research. Others, whilst also including the subjective, lived experiences of practitioners, emphasise the personal and professional growth of the teacher as a “means for the principled modification of professional practice” (Wells, 1994, p.25). Fullan (1993) emphasises the importance of the teacher as a change agent. There is some evidence that concepts such as freedom, rationality, justice, democracy, and so forth, play a role in the examination of
personal theories and practices (e.g., McNiff, 1993). In my thesis the concepts of Ubuntu, social justice and equal opportunities played a role in the examination of personal theories and practices and became the basis for questioning and critiquing the living processes in which I am engaged.

A process of self-awareness is vital to identifying the contradictions between one’s espoused theories and one’s practices. In my thesis this is shown in Section 5.3.3.2 when I recognised the contradiction between my espoused notions of social justice and equal opportunities and my actions in conspiring to impose a perspective of education that saw the Western model as superior and one to be copied. However, self-awareness, perhaps because of its focus on individual learning, only begins to address the social basis of personal belief systems. Whilst efforts can further a kind of collective agency (McNiff, 1988), it is a sense of agency built on ideas of society as a collection of autonomous individuals. As such, it seems incapable of addressing social issues in terms of the interconnections between personal identity and the claim of experiential knowledge, as well as power and privilege in society (Noffke, 1991). “The process of personal transformation through the examination of practice and self-reflection may be a necessary part of social change, especially in education; it is however, not sufficient.” (Noffke, 1997, p329)

As an action researcher I have restructured my understanding (Schön, 1995) of international educational partnerships from a tool for learning through projects or curriculum activities to a means of bringing about social change.
The partnership provides opportunities for participants on both sides of the partnership to identify and live out their values more fully, i.e. to undertake actions that empower others to receive an education and to potentially free themselves from poverty. This is evidenced by the UK and South African participants who raise and allocate funds and who learn about fair trade (See Section 5.3.3.3). And yet, I recognise that such actions do not necessarily force the participants to consider the underlying causes of poverty and inequality and address them through the wider political context (See Section 6.7.2). So there is a sense of unfinished business and a need for a new round of reflection and experiment (Schön, 1995). My thesis has brought forth a new problem to be solved in much the same way that Dewey (1916) saw inquiry as emanating from doubt, leading to the resolution of doubt and then the creation of new doubt. A new problem arises and with it a new question to ask myself (Whitehead, 1985) such as: How can I encourage the participants to engage with and tackle the underlying causes of poverty and inequality between the two communities? However, even allowing for solving that problem this may not bring about “sufficiently meaningful social change” (Noffke, 1997, p.329)

**g) Original Contribution to Knowledge**

The most significant and original contribution to knowledge is the new notion of ‘living citizenship’ (See Section 6.4) as a standard of judgement. The notion of living citizenship emerged from the thesis as a synthesis of the research approach adopted and the actions of the participants as global intercultural citizens. It can be defined as a description of the way that participants in international educational partnerships can identify and then live out their
values in a practical way, through their actions. In relation to living citizenship I am accepting Habermas’ point that “The private autonomy of equally entitled citizens can only be secured only insofar as citizens actively exercise their civic autonomy.” (P.264). Participants who are living their values of living citizenship in a practical way are exercising civic autonomy and as a consequence they are securing the private autonomy of equally entitled citizens.

Moreover, living citizenship is a creative act. It can be linked to the values and aspirations of the 5x5x5 = Creativity project (John and Pound, 2011). Living citizenship is about the development of human relationships to unlock participants’ creativity in their response to situations where they see the need to live out their values as citizens more fully. It supports the development of a democratic society in the sense that “a democratic society depends on everyone taking responsibility and contributing what they can, which is possible only when each of us feels we belong and are seen as uniquely creative, capable and self-determining individuals.” (John and Pound, 2011, p.2)

The key ideas that underpin the notion of living citizenship are those that have been discussed in this preface: Ubuntu, social justice, equal opportunities, development and citizenship. By ‘doing Ubuntu’ participants are showing their humaneness and their respect for each other and demonstrating community connectedness, and cross-cultural understanding (See Section 2.1 above). By taking actions to help those that are marginalised by society to have equal
access to education, participants are promoting social justice in the Rawlsian (1971) sense of the creation of a more just or equitable society. Their actions are an attempt to address inequality of condition and create fairer equality of opportunity (See Sections b.2 and b.3 above). The actions must also be as a result of genuine dialogue that values the voice of all of the participants and that gives priority to the southern participants so that they are able to drive the partnership forward to realise their own vision of progress and development (See Section b.4 above and Sections 6.2.1 and 6.5.4 in thesis). My thesis highlights the originality of living citizenship, as a relationally dynamic standard of judgment that includes an appreciation of Ubuntu, social justice, equal opportunity and development.

This notion has epistemological significance for the nature of educational knowledge. The idea of using living citizenship in the creation of one's own living educational theory focuses attention on a process of accountability that engages with issues of power and privilege in society. My thesis can be seen as a response to Ball's and Tyson's (2011) claim that educational researchers have fulfilled the American Educational Research Association (AERA, 2012) mission to advance knowledge about education and to encourage scholarly enquiry related to education, but have only weakly fulfilled the mission to promote research to improve practice and serve the public good. My action research project is grounded in a commitment to both improve practice and to generate knowledge that serves the public good, through the living standard of judgment of living citizenship.
Research into living citizenship enables individuals to create their own living theories that advance knowledge, encourage scholarly inquiry and improves practice for the public good. Clarifying and communicating the meanings of living citizenship as I engage in an international continuing professional development project and create my own living-educational-theory, makes an original and significant contribution to the field of Living-Educational-Theory.

Another key contribution is to the field of citizenship education with the identification of a set of pedagogical protocols for active citizenship education based around an international educational partnership (See Section 6.2 for a detailed outline and Section 6.2.9 for a summary). This set of protocols provides a practical application of Sayers (2002) notion of citizenship education as touching the hearts of participants. They are informing practice through publication on the websites http://www.capdm.net/bc-dev/login/ and www.global-schools.org and through their inclusion in the Global Schools Partnership Sustainability Toolkit. They help to address the concerns of Martin (2007) about international educational partnerships as a means of tackling negative prejudice. The absence of a pedagogy for citizenship education led to the question being posed by Gearon (2003): How do we learn to become good citizens? The set of protocols address this question, as well as the question posed by Zammitt (2008) regarding what a partnership based on equality, mutual respect and understanding would look like. The fact that these questions were posed illustrates the need for pedagogical protocols in citizenship education and in international educational partnerships. The protocols build on the work of Crick (1999) with an emphasis on citizenship
education as a means of exploring and identifying values and developing human relationships. In a wider context the protocols provide a practical example of Sachs (1999) notion of an activist teaching profession concerned with eliminating exploitation, inequality and oppression. Thus, the thesis illustrates the potential value of international educational partnerships in the teaching and embedding of such values within citizenship education and identifies the pedagogical protocols needed to maximise this potential ‘value-add’ to any curriculum (See Section 6.2). The thesis can therefore be said to move the fields of citizenship education and international educational partnerships forward in previously unexplored ways.