'Creating a new discipline of educational enquiry in the context of the politics and economics of educational knowledge'.

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Drawing on two recently published papers (Lomax & Whitehead 1998; Hughes, Denley & Whitehead 1998) and the papers from the BERA 1998 Symposium on Philosophy and Educational Research, I will examine some implications, for the philosophy, politics and economics of educational knowledge, of Richard Winter’s (1998) notion that theory in action research is a form of improvisatory self-realisation, in creating a new discipline of educational enquiry.

In developing the idea of a new discipline of educational enquiry I would like to avoid some of the problems associated with the proliferation of new paradigms of educational research. Donmoyer (1996) has described some of these problems in terms of ‘Balkanisation’ where groups belonging to particular ‘paradigms’ are no longer in dialogue with each other or seeking to understand each others’ perspectives.

I want to avoid such problems by inviting educational researchers and professional educators to respond to the following account of my self-study as I asked, answered and researched questions of the kind, ‘How do I improve what I am doing?’. In other words I am inviting you to criticise a description and explanation of my own educational development in my professional learning as I engage in a self-study of my own life as a professional educator. Let me say something about the context in which I work.

Since 1973 I have worked as a Lecturer in Education at the University of Bath. My field of research is educational theory. I am interested in the creation and testing of educational theories which have the capacity to produce valid explanations for the educational practices and learning of professional educators with their students. I have focused my self-study of my own professional learning on my work as a supervisor of educational research programmes which lead to M.A., M.Phil. and Ph.D. degrees.

I have placed on the Web at http://www.actionresearch.net a number of dissertation and theses of students I have either solely or jointly supervised and who have acknowledged my influence in their educational growth during the course of their research. Each researcher has successfully submitted their work and each has been viewed as making original contributions to knowledge of their subject, education. Because I view my supervision of such researchers as essentially concerned with
helping them to make original contributions to knowledge of their subject, education I want to say something about my view of education.

Like many others I view education as a value-laden practical activity which is essentially concerned with learning. At its heart it is something which individuals do for themselves. I cannot educate you or anyone else, but I do educate myself. As a professional educator I may influence the education of my students, but the essential quality of education is that the individual, as a centre of consciousness, is learning something worth while for themselves.

In studying my work as a professional educator I am immediately acknowledging a social context within which my work takes place. It is paid work. I get paid, partly for the work I do in supervising research students. The University values the contributions being made by researchers as they demonstrate originality of mind and critical judgement in their theses. I think my subject, education, differs from other subjects in that educational research is essentially concerned with understanding and explaining how individuals create their own form of life and learn whilst living and working in particular relationships and contexts.

What I think distinguishes my work as a professional educator from working as an architect, lawyer or doctor is that I relate directly to learners, in my professional relationships, in terms of making sense of their lives in terms of their learning. In engaging in a self-study of my own professional life as an educator I am seeking to show how I am giving a form to my own life through my learning. This is how I relate my understanding of ‘theory’ in action research to Winter’s (1998) notion that it is a form of improvisatory self-realisation. Stressing the improvisatory nature of the theory draws attention to the refusal to pre-specify all the rules which give a form to the ‘disciplined’ enquiry and theory. There is an art in synthesising unique constellations of values, skills and understandings into an explanation for one’s own learning. The creative and critical episodes of thought and action which alternate and interact (Medawar 1969) are both included in the creation of living educational theories.

The kind of questions I am seeking to answer and research has important implications for the account I give of my learning. Consider the question, ‘How do I live a good and productive life?’ I was moved to ask this kind of question by reading Erich Fromm’s work on The Fear of Freedom and Man for Himself, in 1966. Fromm was particularly interested in questions of the kind, ‘How do I live a more loving and productive life?’ and he distinguished what he called the ‘marketing’ personality from the ‘productive’ personality. He described the ‘marketing’ personality in terms of individuals whose lives were dominated by market forces, rather like McTaggart describes economic rationalism in terms of eliminating moral questions from the discourse as questions of human existence become reduced to monetary value.

I liked Fromm’s point about facing a choice between uniting with the world in the spontaneity of love and productive work or of seeking a kind of security which destroys one’s integrity and freedom.
My sense of vocation in relation to education has remained with me over the past 30 years and I now want to share something of my learning, something of my research-based professionalism as I have asked, answered and researched questions of the kind, ‘How do I improve what I am doing?’; ‘How do I help you to improve your learning?’.

I want to begin by focusing on my question, ‘How do I help you to improve your learning?’ and considering what is implied in my question. I want to do this in a very different way to the way I was taught to do by Richard Peters and other Philosophers of Education at the University of London between 1968-1970 where I studied educational theory and the philosophy and psychology of education. I am thinking particularly of the use of a Kantian form of transcendental deduction for exploring the implications for a person seriously asking questions of the kind, ‘What ought I to do?’.

The central assumption in this form of deduction was, ‘Given x, if y can be shown to be implicit in x, then there are good reasons for accepting y’. This form of deduction was used to justify the values of equality, consideration of interests, freedom, respect, worthwhile activities.

I want to distinguish my study of the implications of asking my question, ‘How do I help you to improve your learning?’, from the study of the implications for a person seriously asking themselves a question of the kind, ‘What ought I to do?’. What I have in mind is a difference between my own ‘I’ engaged in exploring the implications and a philosophical discussion where any particular ‘I’ is subsumed under the general concept ‘person’. I want you to be clear that I am restricting my exploration of the implications of seriously asking my question, to myself and those I am influencing in my educative relationships.

The question, ‘How do I help you to improve your learning?’ is a question I ask myself in all my educative relationships with research students. In asking ‘How do I help you...?’, I am conscious of addressing a particular You. In the enquiry below I will be focusing on my educative relationship with Kevin Eames in the process of enabling him to make his own original contribution to educational knowledge. I am also aware of bringing into my ‘I-You’ relationships, my learning from Martin Buber’s spiritual and poetic work I - Thou and from his ideas on the relation in education (Buber 1947).

Without fully understanding why, I am also drawn to Bataille’s statement: ‘I have subordinated all else to the search for a standpoint that brings out the fundamental unity of the human spirit’. (p.8 1987, London; Marion Boyers). In the process of writing this paper I hope to understand more about the importance of bringing out the fundamental unity of the human spirit, as I focus on my commitment to enable each individual, whose research programme I supervise, to develop their own originality of mind and critical judgement in making their own unique contribution to educational knowledge. In this process of writing this paper, as part of my own professional learning, I hope to demonstrate what I am meaning by a new discipline of educational enquiry. What I have in mind is a discipline, whose rules of engagement are the embodied values which the individual uses to give purpose and make meaning of
their life in education. In other words, this new discipline of educational enquiry, is constituted not by linguistically defined rules, but by the meanings of values which are embodied in practice and which, I want to show can constitute a new discipline of educational enquiry.

What I have in mind, might look on the surface as being similar to the ethics of education defined by Richard Peters in the value-words, freedom, respect for persons, worth-while activities, etc.; but I do want to distinguish the approach below which is grounded in dialogical and dialectical forms of understanding from the kind of linguistic analysis favour by linguistic philosophers in clarifying the meanings of concepts. For example, I recall clarifying the meaning of the concept of punishment, with linguistic philosophers in terms of the infliction of punishment, by something in authority on someone who has broken a rule. Now, I don't want to be seen to be denigrating such linguistic clarity where it is appropriate. What I want to be seen to be doing is agreeing with Michael Tanner (p.459, 1997) in his analysis of the language of philosophy where he asked ‘How how such comically solem ineptitude become possible? in a clarification of the concepts analytically presuposed in our use of ‘love’. The particular analysis which provoked his mirth focused on:

(1) A knows B (or at least knows something of B)

(2) A cares (is concerned) about B
A likes B

(3) A respects B
A is attracted to B
A feels affection for B

(4) A is committed to B
A wishes to see B’s welfare promoted

The connection between these relations which we will call ‘love-comprising relations’ or ‘LCRs’ is not, except for ‘knowing about’ and possibly ‘Feels affection for’ as tight as strict entailment.’

I imagine that anyone who has read John Donne’s poem Extasie will understand Tanner’s laughter at the inappropriateness of such a linguistic analysis for communicating the meanings of ‘love’.

Now, what I want to try to do is to contribute to a new discipline of educational enquiry on the ground of the spirits and values of love and productive work. When I say that I love my work, I am meaning that my life-affirming spirit and the sense that I am engaged in a worth-while form of life, are expressed in my educative relationships and help to constitute a new discipline of educational enquiry. Let me see if I can show you what I mean in my educative relationships with Kevin Eames.
Before I explain my educative influence in Kevin’s learning as he constructed his Ph.D. thesis, I want to say something about my understanding of ‘I-You’ relationships (Buber 1947) and something about how the life-affirming energy (Bataille 1987) I think I work at bringing out in my students’ educational enquiries is related to my loving affirmations and ‘exhuberance of life’. (In the quote below I imagine that Bataille is using Man in a way which includes Women!)

Eroticism, it may be said, is assenting to life up to the point of death. Strictly speaking this is not a definition, but I think the formula gives the meaning of eroticism better than any other. If a precise definition were called for, the starting point would certainly have to be sexual reproductive activity, of which eroticism is a special form. Sexual reproductive activity is common to sexual animals and men, but only men appear to have turned their sexual activity into erotic activity. Eroticism, unlike simply sexual activity, is a psychological quest independent of the natural goal: reproduction and the desire for children. From this elementary definition let us now return to the formula I proposed in the first place: eroticism is assenting to life even in death. Indeed, although erotic activity is in the first place an exhuberance of life, the object of this psychological quest, independent as I say of any concern to reproduce life, is not alien to death. (Bataille, p. 11).

I want to show how I am contributing to a new discipline of educational enquiry (Lomax & Whitehead 1998) on the ground of my I-You relationships, my life-affirming exhuberance (my eroticism) and my faith in the learning capacities of others. I want to focus on my educative influence with Kevin Eames as he created his own discipline of educational enquiry within a dialogical and dialectical synthesis of his own unique constellation of values in asking, answering and researching questions of the kind, ‘How do I improve what I am doing?’.

The global interest in Monical Lewinsky’s relationship with Bill Clinton prompts me to make the following point lest I be misunderstood in bringing in the erotic, as an exhuberance of life and assenting to life up to the point of death, into the creation of a discipline of educational enquiry. Bill Clinton’s erection is a matter of record. There appears to be massive interest in whether Bill had or had not sexual relations with Monica. Let me make it clear that in bringing the erotic into my explanation of my educative influence with Kevin, I am not saying that I fancy Kevin sexually! I’m trying to make a different point about the way in which an erotic energy can have a non-genital focus in explaining my educative influence. I want to bring into the discipline of educational enquiry, an exhuberance for life, within which it is possible to express the creative energy of an erotic base without genital activity. Is that clear? Crystal. Smile!

CREATING A DIALOGICAL AND DIALECTICAL FORM OF EDUCATIONAL THEORISING IN MY EDUCATIVE RELATIONS WITH KEVIN EAMES

Kevin Eames is Head of the English Department at Wootton Bassett School in Wiltshire, England. His Ph.D. Thesis on ‘How do I, as a teacher and an educational action-researcher, describe and explain the nature of my professional knowledge?’ is accessible on the web (Eames 1995). In the edited extracts from this thesis below I
participated in the dialogical and dialectical form of his description and explanation of his professional learning as he engaged which the experience of existing as a living contradiction within an educative community. I participated in his experience of existing as a living contradiction during a presentation on dialectics in which he recognises that he is denying something important about dialectics by presenting his ideas solely from within a propositional form. I also carry with me, as an inspiration, Kevin’s awesome commitment to sustained educational enquiry through his M.Phil. (1987) and Ph.D. (1995) degree programmes.

In reducing some 36 pages of Kevin’s text in the extracts below I have lost many of the contributions being made to the conversations by others. I have edited Kevin’s text simply to highlight the evidence it contains of my educative influences in our educative conversations. What I am seeing to do is to provide evidence of a discipline of educational enquiry which is dialogical and dialectical in form and whose constituting values are love, erotic energy and a faith in the meaning making capacities of learners.

In seeking to present evidence of my educative influence I recognise that I am doing something unusual for a university researcher. I am making a claim to have influenced the educational development of another professional educator in the process of my supervision of a research programme. I am offering the extracts below in the spirit of Buber’s I-You relation where he writes of the special humility of the educator:

“If this educator should ever believe that for the sake of education he has to practise selection and arrangement, then he will be guided by another criterion than that of inclination, however legitimate this may be in its own sphere; he will be guided by the recognition of values which is in his glance as an educator. But even then his selection remains suspended, under constant correct by the special humility of the educator for whom the life and particular being of all his pupils is the decisive factor to which his “hierarchic” recognition is subordinated.” (Buber, p.122, 1947)

My intention is to show my educative influence within a dialogical and dialectical form of representation. In Kevin’s description and explanation of his professional learning below I claim that he is also showing my educative influence as a professional educator in his growing insight into dialectical forms of understanding.

Let me say what I am meaning by a dialectical form. I am meaning a process of coming to know and understand through question and answer, where the experience of contradiction, in the sense of holding two mutually exclusive opposites together, creates a tension which stimulates the imagination to propose a form of action which can move the learner forward in the sense of moving towards the positive pole of the dialectic. To give an illustration in terms of the value of freedom. If the researcher values freedom but is experiencing constraint, in my view of dialectics he or she will create an action plan which moves in the direction of greater freedom. You may feel other qualities I wish to express in my educative relationships in the following poem.

Can you love the people and lead them
without imposing your will?
Can you deal with the most vital matters
by letting events take their course?
Can you step back from your own mind and thus understand all things?
Giving birth and nourishing,
having without possessing,
acting with no expectations,
leading and not trying to control,
this is supreme virtue. (Fraser. p. 178, 1997)

In Kevin’s original text I am struck by the importance of how an educative community
can assist in moving an educational enquiry forward. I want to emphasise that the
dialogues below actually took place within an educative community. It should not be
forgotten that in offering the extracts from the dialogues below as evidence of my
influence, then this influence was expressed with the influence of others. The
educative influence I have in mind is in supporting the development of a Kevin’s view
of professional knowledge from the moment he experiences himself as a living
contradiction in communicating his dialectical understanding from within a
propositional form and in participating in a conversation through which an
appreciation developed that propositional forms of theory can be held within a
dialogical and dialectical discipline of educational enquiry.

In the extracts from Kevin’s thesis below I have indicated my editing with the symbols
...... and given bracketed comments in italics where I have removed extracts from the
conversations. Apart from these bracketed comments the words are Kevin’s.

Extracts from Kevin Eames’ Ph.D. Thesis.

On 17.12.91 and 19.12.91, I took part in three conversations (which) changed my
ideas on how I regarded educational knowledge, and on how I saw it as a form of
professional knowledge.

Conversation I
This conversation took place on the afternoon of 17.12.91. Peter Mellett - a research
student who was also interested in the dialectical form of educational knowledge -
and I had been invited to talk to the Values in Education Group at Bath University
about the work we had been doing. Apart from Peter and myself, those present were:
Jack Whitehead, Pat D’Arcy, Mary Tasker, Cyril Selmes, Jenny Brain, Moira Laidlaw,
Deirdre FitzPatrick, Chris Gale, and Gill Woodridge. I am going to try and present the
conversation we had in a form which, I hope, reflects the way the experience affected
my educational development, and, in so doing, provides an example of what I now
understand by educational knowledge. In the course of the extracts, I hope that the
meaning I now hold will be revealed gradually, through the dialogues, just as it was
for me, when I took part in, and reflected upon, the conversations.......
In Hirst's view, educational theory is 'concerned with determining rationally defensible principles for educational practice'. He argues that 'the adequate formulation and defence of these principles (rests) not simply on appeal to the disciplines, but on a complex pragmatic process that uses its own appropriate practical discourse'. Thus, he places 'the practitioner's view' as central, and applauds the recent 'focus on the actual practices of education, and the discourses practitioners use'.

However, although he senses that the logic of educational theory is bound up with 'the practitioner's view', and 'the actual practices of education', he confesses himself 'uncertain' as to 'how best we might give an account of the logic of such discourse and its principles'.

After this, I gave a summary of the opening sections of Chapter Three. I described the definition of dialectics which I had taken from Comey, and listed the questions I applied to my account of the work I did with Stephen, in order to test whether the form of knowledge I was using was dialectical or not. Here is a version of the second OHT, which lists those questions:

* Is there evidence of dialogue?
* Is there evidence of contradiction?
* Is there negation of the negations?
* Is there a role for practice?

And that's as far as I got, for I abandoned the presentation at that point. I'd like to explain why.

As I was giving the presentation, the conviction that there was something wrong grew on me. I became increasingly aware that what I was saying missed the richness of the evidence I had been looking at - Stephen's reviews; the conversation I had enjoyed with him; the discussions I had had with Daniela, Pat and the others; the meetings of the Bassett Action Research Group. The OHTs (like the ones immediately above) were abstract, dessicated, lifeless - the opposite of what I felt (and had stated explicitly in the earlier chapters) that a dialectical process should be. So I stopped. I said:

*The meaning of what I'm trying to sketch out cannot be contained within the propositional form of some guy standing in front of a machine and putting pictures on to a piece of paper. I suppose I was using a propositional form, but I feel that it's a most inadequate account of it so far.*

I then sat down and joined in the discussion which followed.

The discussion was taped, and... I should like to draw on the transcription in this account. I will give substantial extracts of the dialogue between members of the group, and, from time to time, interpose a commentary where I describe the ways in which I believe my understanding was changing. In this commentary, too, I will bring...
out what seem to me the main strands of concern in the conversation. I will give my answers to the issues raised by these strands of concern in the next chapter.

**Extract One.** After the opening presentation, Pat began the conversation, by picking up a point I had made about the appropriateness of the dialectical form - as I understood it then - to be considered as a professional form of knowledge for teachers.

*Pat: From what Kevin was saying, it seems to me that he was saying it is the most appropriate form - not just, how can this form be used alongside many other forms... His intention, as I understand it, is to say that a dialectical form of working towards new perceptions is perhaps the most appropriate.*

*Kevin: Spot on, but I think the next question from that is, 'Why is that an appropriate form for teachers to use?' And, I suppose, 'What does it look like?' is a subsidiary question, because it doesn’t matter a damn what it looks like; it’s what it does.*

*Jack: I’m not sure. It’s the ‘it’ I have a problem with - 'What is it?' - the dialectical form - it - has been developing through the centuries, and we’ve just seen the death of the Marxist dialectic, which was the major step forward after the Hegelian dialectic, and what Marx did, for Hegel, was to put the last criterion in, which was practice. What Marx did was to say that Hegel's dialectic was much too abstract, and it needed to be concretised, to be focused on practice. Now, what you’ve done is taken a list of criteria, and applied them, almost in a traditional Marxist model, so I do think it matters what form we are now giving to that dialectic.*

*Peter: The form does matter... I'm interested in the process that constitutes a dialectical form.*

**Comments**......Jack's intervention was significant. I realise now that he was indicating to me the error in how I was thinking about dialectics. I was reifying 'it', so that it remained a concept 'out there', rather than a form expressed through the process in which I was engaged. As a result, I had been 'applying' my view of 'it' in a mechanistic way to my own practice, and had failed to communicate the meaning of dialectics as I had experienced it.

**Extract Two.** Mary then took up and developed the notion of dialectics as a system or structure:

*Mary: 'Dialectic' has this connotation of 'system'.

*Jack: If you think of dialectic as a process of change, then you can resist the imposition of a system or a structure... We have the chance, through asking questions of the kind, 'How can I improve what I am doing?'...(with) the individual taking some responsibility for what they are doing, we might have the possibility of creating a different kind of dialectic, which has the power to transform practice. But it's cloudy, as you say. It's not well-formed yet.*
...Mary: ...What both of you are doing, is questioning yourselves. You're doing what Socrates said everyone must do all the time... Surely we're all agreed with that? I have to say that the building up into a system seems to be reifying, putting out there into some abstract domain, what we all do, those of us who are reflective and self-critical, as part of our professional job.

Kevin: This reification is something I've been conscious of in trying to define for myself what dialectics is. I think we need to look almost beyond the definition in itself, to think about, 'Why bother? How do we use it?' Now, there's something in there about the relative status of kinds of knowledges... Teachers' knowledge is of lower status than, say, university (academics') knowledge - particularly in the eyes of people who teach in universities... I've got things from the Bassett Research Group, where people say...'What goes on in my classroom isn't going to be of interest to them, is it?' 'I/them' - this kind of terminology suggests the kind of difference -

Pat: It's a question of purpose and audience.... If teachers are setting out to inform other teachers as the main reason for conducting their investigation, ...we have to differentiate between audiences - other teachers or university boards who will award accreditation.

Jack: What about power, though, Pat? Where's the status? ...The knowledge-base is not grounded upon the practice of the teacher, but it's still very much a form of knowledge within universities. And the medical profession, and the legal profession built up their case lore into very high status knowledge, whereas I don't think that we have that.

Comments..... I failed to respond to the full significance of the comments made by Jack, as well as by Mary.

....Jack took up my point about the relative status of different kinds of knowledges, and described the absence of the teacher's perspective in present thinking on educational knowledge. I must address the issue of status - and the power that accompanies status.....

(Another) issue was raised also by Jack, when he suggested to Mary that we should see dialectics as a 'process of change', rather than as 'a system or a structure'. The point he was making is fundamental to my present view of educational knowledge - although I didn't recognise it at the time, because we were all still at various stages, I think, of groping towards something that we perceived dimly - a form of knowledge which has 'the power to transform practice' - but which we were unable to formulate concisely. As Jack said, it was still 'cloudy. It's not well-formed, yet.' In the next chapter, I must try to define the form of educational knowledge which I hold in my present view - to make it less 'cloudy'. In doing so, I will try to bring into an organic whole my present concepts of dialectics, of process, and of practice.
(In extract Three Mary turned the discussion away from dialectics to consider propositional forms of knowledge)

(In extract Four Kevin developed his view of how educational knowledge can be communicated)

(In extract Five Kevin explains how Peter's intervention changed his perspective)

(In extracts 6 and 7 Kevin acknowledges the ways in which the three teacher-researchers present helped to change the direction of his research).

CONVERSATION II

This conversation took place later the same afternoon (17.12.91). Those present were Pat D'Arcy, Moira Laidlaw, Peter Mellett, and Jack Whitehead - participants from the previous group who wanted to continue the earlier conversation. During the second conversation, we returned to earlier themes, and developed them further. I want to illustrate what I learnt by commenting on extracts, showing my growing understanding and outlining any issues which I will have to address.

(In extract one Kevin refers ‘to the understanding which had dawned upon me - that I was saying one thing, and doing another’)

Extract Two. Here, we returned to, and developed further the issues which had been raised in Extracts Two, Three and Four, from Conversation I - the relationship between dialectical and propositional forms of knowledge, and our attempts to define more clearly what a dialectical form of educational knowledge might look like. Jack's final contribution in this extract actually occurred towards the end of Conversation II, but I have included it in this extract, since it related closely to the matters we were discussing.

Jack: All the theories that are produced by traditional forms of research are propositional. They are always given in the form of statements, which have got a truth content to them. People like Karl Popper, who attacked dialectics, on the grounds of contradiction, say that any theory which contains contradiction, is entirely useless as a theory.

Pat: Are they denying the relativity of truth? Is there some sense of the absoluteness of truth, there?

Jack: No, you build up a system of justifiable beliefs about something, so it's not a question of absolute truth. What you've got at the moment is based upon falsifiability. So you've built up that system of justifiable belief, so...the beliefs are actually presented in the form in which you'd talk about your theory. Now, Kevin's point about the 'it' - when he said, 'How do I present it, other than propositional?' - because he said 'it' -
Moira: And he also said, 'Present.'

Jack: He also said, 'Present' - it's then Peter's point. Unless you can actually show from the inside what you are actually doing, you are constrained by the propositional form. Whereas there is an alternative.

Pat: (Yes, but) I think it is unhelpful to polarise propositional and dialectical. They are both necessary, in different ways, depending on the context.

...Kevin: ...There's a sort of dialectical process going on there. My growing understanding is expressed in a propositional form - or is it? It's footprints. I can look back, and see those reified footprints, those things, those 'its', and this is where I've come to. ... I'm about halfway through that MacIntyre book, and that sense that he's putting forward, of dialectical development of craft knowledge within a community. I got to that bit last night.

Jack: Yes. But unless you put it in those terms that Peter was saying, which will actually transform the nature of your text - you've pushed us, within this. First of all there was this aridity, in a way, because you grasped the dialectics within a traditional form. You moved us partially through that in your dialogues with Pat, and Georgina Hendy, and the (others) - yes? And then, today, I think that insight of Peter's on the tape - when Peter brought us up short, Mary interjected, and Chris and Gill took it up - I think you've got, participating within a dialogue of question and answer .......

The crucial thing for me is the dialectical form. Hasn't a transformation occurred between the statements Kevin put on the overhead transparency at the beginning of that last session - now, there is something else which he needs, which will transform the way in which he presents his notion of the form of the dialectic, because ... the quality of the questions and responses being engaged in now - the very points that Pat was raising about a certain kind of openness - where you responded to Peter at the beginning - 'Yes, I see it in a new way' - because of what Peter was saying about experiencing things from the inside, whereas what you were doing in our session before was defining 'it' from the outside. I think you've got, within the form of this conversation, the very criteria you will need to show what you mean by a dialectical form.

Comments. I think there are three elements I'd like to note in this extract. First, there is the relationship between propositional and dialectical knowledge. Pat began by arguing that an element of propositional knowledge is essential, even within a dialectical form, such as an action/reflection cycle ('the planning, the doing, and then the reflecting on how those two are related to each other'). She saw both forms of knowledge as being valuable, in their 'different ways'. I made an attempt to formulate my own view of the relationship between the two forms of knowledge, which drew on what Pat had said, for I felt then, and I still feel, that propositional knowledge is important within a dialectical form.
I was, at the time, struggling with the uncomfortable feeling that, after what I had learnt from my experiences that afternoon, I had wasted my time in writing the previous chapters of my inquiry because, as Jack said, I had 'grasped the dialectics within a traditional form', and there was the 'aridity' which had been demonstrated that afternoon, when I sensed the inadequacy of my presentation, and when the teachers present had felt 'discouraged' and 'alienated' by it. Accordingly, I tried to construct a metaphor which would, I hoped, make a synthesis between dialectical and propositional forms by explaining how the chapters I had written previously, though they expressed my understanding of dialectics, as demonstrated in my own teaching, and in dialogues with other educators, in a traditionally academic, propositional form, were of use since they enabled me to reach the position I was in at that time. At this present time of writing, however, I find the metaphor unsatisfactory, since it brings to my mind an image of solitary footprints across a desert, and, as I now realise from the experience of these conversations, a dialectical form of educational knowledge cannot take place without other people - without a social context. Ironically, while at the time I was searching for a metaphor to describe the synthesis of dialectical and propositional knowledge which I had experienced, I was within the very process of dialogue which would bring my previous propositionally-expressed knowledge to its dialectical fruition.

The second element I'd like to comment on, here, is the way in which the discussion, for the first time, began to explore the nature of the dialectical knowledge that our community was working within. Such a form involved valuing questions to be followed up with an open mind, without necessarily knowing where you're going to end up. You can't 'decide beforehand'. There needs to be an 'openness' to other people, which leads to changed understanding. It's process-based, and organic, and it's the process which is educative. The process is also supportive, without an individual desiring to exercise his or her own power. It's in this extract, too, that I first mentioned Alasdair MacIntyre's 'Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry', which I was in the course of reading, on Jack's recommendation. This book had started to focus for me ideas about the characteristics of a dialogical community, and it will be of importance in a later chapter. However, it's an example, here, of the way in which my dialectical understanding was influenced by a text expressed in a conventional, propositional form. - which illustrates Pat's point earlier in these comments. In fact, these conversations, taken as a whole, not only describe the characteristics of a dialogical community, but are an example of how such a community works.

The operation of a dialogical community raises the third element I'd like to note in this extract. If the conversations as a whole illustrate the characteristics of a dialogical community, and this extract shows how we tried to define it, I should be able to derive a description of the form from the 'transformation' which Jack noted in my own understanding, as a result of my participation in those conversations. However, when I try, later on, to '(present my) notion of the form of the dialectic', I need to avoid the mistake I made earlier, in reifying my understanding in a propositional form, with disastrous consequences for my intentions to communicate with the teachers present earlier that afternoon. I've got to define the form I believe educational knowledge takes 'from within'; as part of my definition, I've got to show it in operation, to
acknowledge the living reality of the dialectical form within which I exist, by showing how my understanding has been shaped by my dialogues with other competent practitioners.

**Extract Three.** This final extract from the second conversation explores further the ideas of dialogues and dialectics.......

**Comments.** Looking now at the way we explored the concepts of dialogues and dialectics, I am struck by the way the extract shows the process in action, as well as bringing to the level of conscious formulation some of the characteristics of the process.....

**CONVERSATION III**

The final conversation I recorded took place on 19.12.91. Those present were: Erica Holley and Andy Larter, from Greendown School, and Jack Whitehead. Erica and Andy have featured in earlier chapters, and they had generously agreed to read the chapters I had written so far, in order to discuss it at this meeting and help me move my thinking forward. In our conversation, we explored further the nature of the dialectical form of educational knowledge I was trying to define. This is what I learnt.

(In extract one Andy confirmed what Kevin had learnt from the two earlier conversations about the problems caused by the form of presentation he was using. However, Andy also gave Kevin a fresh perspective, which I was able to acknowledge, relating my understanding to a paper by Erica which I had just read.)

(In extract two Andy draw’s Kevin’s attention away from the inappropriateness of the form he had been using, and focused Kevin’s thoughts once more on the living quality exhibited in the dialogues which had occurred in the preceding chapters)

(In extract three Kevin shows how Erica made an important contribution in focusing once more on the nature of a dialectical form of educational knowledge, and its relationship with practice)

**Extract Four.** I want to include this final extract, because it shows how I was able, towards the end of the conversation that afternoon, to attempt a definition of how what I mean by educational knowledge comes into being. The extract also provides a demonstration of how such educational knowledge is shaped.

Kevin: I think I see, now. It's something to do with having people who you have known over a long period of time, who can talk through with you, and share with you, ideas in dialogue and, within a kind of reassuring disciplined framework - it's something to do with the idea of community. It's something to do with (indistinct) over a period of time. It's something that will not necessarily reveal itself instantaneously, because I'm just kind of groping towards an understanding. It's the idea of being in this community, carrying out dialogues - it's talking to people about what you do, and listening to what they say back.
Andy: I'd just have to take slight issue with that. You've got to have what we're doing now - to have your ideas challenged within that reassuring framework -

Kevin: I was taking that as read! I feel as if I've come out with - a good kicking - within that framework.

Jack: There's something about that framework, though - the technical term is 'ontological security' - that notion of being accepted by the other, which really does give you that fundamental security in the ground of one's own being. Now, what Andy is talking about is challenging ideas in a way that doesn't really attack the security you feel, then your point, which threw me, was the notion of disciplined framework. I can't see what that means, or even whether it is taking place within a disciplined framework. I'd much sooner look at it as a process of change and transformation, but it's not chaotic. There is some order and discipline there -

Kevin: Rather than disciplined - 'ordered'?

Jack: I don't mind 'disciplined', or 'ordered'. It's the notion of 'framework'. There's something about 'framework' that seems to be limiting -

Kevin: - Constraining -

Jack: - Yes, and doesn't seem to have the openness -

Kevin: - Yes - 'shape of rationality'? There's something about these dialogues which are - by having a dialogue - you're undergoing - experiencing - an educational process -

Jack: For me, even the term 'dialogue' is getting in the way. There's something beneath the notion of dialogue, which was something to do with what Erica was saying about taking risks, about revealing who you feel yourself to be. So remember to be careful about using a term to communicate - which doesn't enable you to communicate, as directly as you can the meaning of the experiences you have had. And if you can take today, and the one on Tuesday, you'd be very close to presenting that process in action... You'd help people to get on the inside of that process of change and development which is educational and constitutes educational knowledge.

Comment. This extract came towards the end of the third conversation, and shows how, as a consequence of what I had learnt over those few days in December, I was able to make a clearer formulation than previously of the way educational knowledge is shaped. It develops over time; it happens through dialogues within a community; there's a tentativeness about it, and an openness to the thoughts of others about what your saying to them. It's not a full definition that I was putting together, of course, but the elements I touched on will need to be considered when I try to draw the threads together in the next chapter.
Significantly, the formulation I advanced was responded to by Andy and Jack, who succeeded, by doing so, in moving my thinking on a stage further, giving a small-scale demonstration of the process at work. Andy refined the idea of a 'reassuring framework'; I had assumed, without making it sufficiently clear, that within such a framework, there would necessarily be challenges to the ideas put forward, although such challenges would take place within a context of, as Jack said, 'being accepted by the other'. That context makes it more likely, I believe now, that the challenges will be listened to, understood, and accepted, since they are offered within dialogue, rather than from a desire to exercise power and gain superiority - Peter's point from Tuesday afternoon.

Jack was right to challenge my use of 'framework'. What I meant was some kind of supporting device, which gives order to the way in which educational knowledge develops, for it is not haphazard or incoherent. However, I accept Jack's point that the notion of a framework is too 'limiting', in that it has a mechanistic quality that doesn't fit with the 'openness' of what I am trying to describe. I am happier with my reformulation - 'shape of rationality' - in that I believe what I am trying to describe is a process with particular qualities. It's not hard-edged, but it has form. It's also not random or chaotic, but is intelligently systematic. It's the way educators understand, communicate and take action.

Jack made the point, also, that I should beware of letting the terms I use get in the way of communicating 'as directly as (I) can the meaning of the experiences (I) have had.' I will bear that in mind, while also trying to cope with what I've learnt on the whole journey I have come. I hope I've shown in this chapter how I've learnt. I now need to make a synthesis of what I've learnt. If that means discussing words like 'dialectical', I've got to do it. I'll be interested to see what happens!

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Here are the points I want to make about my educative influence with Kevin and about what the dialogical and dialectical form of Kevin's learning is showing about my disciplined form of educational enquiry as I ask, answer and research my questions of the form, 'How can I help you to improve your learning?'. I want to offer some implications of the above form of educational theorising for the philosophy, politics and economics of education. In thinking about the implications for the philosophy of education, I want to refer back to the engagement of my philosophies as an educator with some philosophies of education at a symposium on Philosophy and Educational Research at the British Educational Research Association Conference in September 1998.

In developing my ideas on the living philosophies of educators I have focused on university and school teachers' capacities to create their own living theories in the
process of asking, answering and researching questions of the kind, 'How do I improve what I am doing?'. The idea that each individual can create their own living educational theory has attracted other educational researchers (Pinnegar & Russell 1995, Lomax 1998a) and I particularly want to refer to the work of Tom Russell of Queen’s University in researching his own practice collaboratively with his students (Russell and Bullock 1998). This work certainly requires students to have the courage to engage with the fundamentals of teaching. It has a similar dialogical form to Laidlaw’s (1996) presentation of her living theory, within which the values, skills and understandings, which help to constitute the professional knowledge-base of teaching, can be seen to emerge from her educative relationships. In conclusion I want to mention the educational significance of the world wide web for my research.

The action research homepage at [http://www.actionresearch.net](http://www.actionresearch.net) has enabled me to share the above research theses, dissertations and ideas with a much wider audience (some 7640 logins at the time of writing in August 1998 and some 8300 at the time of amending the paper in October 1998 and some 11,300 at the time of writing this paper in March 1999) than would have been possible only a few years ago, when they would only have been available on the University Library shelves of the University of Bath. The recent addition of a ‘Chat Room’ is enabling researchers to share their engagements and appreciations (D’Arcy 1998) of the above works and to communicate directly with the teacher-researchers in taking their ideas forward. In exploring the implications of the creation of living educational theories for the development of the living philosophies of educators I hope that I can contribute to the continuous revivification of the philosophy of education in the minds, practices, feelings and cultures of teachers as we work together to create a research-based profession of education.

In relating my philosophies as an educator to the philosophies of education presented at the BERA Symposium I want to begin with a thank you to John Schostak, whose enthusiasm for the work of Seyla Benhabib (1992, p 6) stimulated my reading of her work on situating the self. Because of John’s presentation I engaged with Benhabib’s ideas and identified with her commitment to enquire into the elements of a postmetaphysical, interactive universalism. I can characterise my living philosophies as an educator in her terms as:

i) the universal pragmatic reformulation of the basis of the validity of truth claims in terms of a discourse theory of justification.

ii) the vision of an embodied and embedded human self whose identity is constituted narratively,

iii) the reformulation of the moral point of view as the contingent achievement of an interactive form of rationality rather than as the timeless standpoint of a legislative reason.

(Benhabib, S., p.6 1992)
In creating my own living educational theories (Whitehead 1989) I identify with the importance of Schostak’s question, ‘How does one make a return to the living in education?’, and I agree with his point about the practice of freedom that:

“The practice of freedom, thus, cannot be subjected to a transsubjectively ordained doctrine, a system of concepts, a symbolic framework however complex. The practice of freedom is a way of life that celebrates a given existing intelligent being in the context of others. Freedom involves the initiation of a series of actions or events which then can either be abandoned or projected forward as a lived condition. It is in this play of possibility that freedom is experienced, not as a simulated exercise, but as living being, who, like all living things, is subject to death.”

In my earlier work on the growth of educational knowledge (Whitehead 1993) I offered an account of my professional learning as an educational researchers in the University of Bath as my meanings of academic freedom emerged through my practice and its workplace context.

In understanding the differences between my living philosophies of an education and the philosophies of education of my co-presentators I was helped by Gert Biesta’s (1998) enquiries, ‘Where Are You? Where am I?’ and his argument that:

“we should shift our attention from a perspective on the subject as a what, as a substance with an identity, to the question of the subject as a singular who. However: because any attempt to give an answer to this question runs the risk of falling back into an articulation of the what of his who, I have suggested that we should take one step further and focus on the place, the location where the subject comes into presence. What, then, is revealed if we follow this path?”

I agree with Gert’s point that ‘ethical space’ suggests that long before we are a doer, a knower, an ego who can willingly take responsibility, we are already identified by the other from the outside. I also agree that the notion of ethical space also much more radically locates the being of someone as a singular being, as “I and no one else”, in the (an-archical) responsibility for the other. As he says, the self, the unique I, is a someone, is a some one, precisely because of its inability to slip away from the assignation which is addressed to him or her and to no one else. I agree that ethical space suggests that the first question about the subject as a singular being, as a who, is not the question, “Where am I?”, as it is the question “Where are you?”. This is true for me in my educative relationships with those teacher-researchers whom I supervise. I accept responsibility for the other in my educative relationships and as I engage in my own self-study of my teacher-education practices, I ask questions of the kind, ‘How do I help you to improve your learning?’. What I have tried to emphasise both in creating my own living educational theories and in helping others to create their own, is the importance of ‘the subject coming into presence within a particular location’. The narratives on the Web, from Ph.D. and other research programmes I have supervised, at http://www.actionresearch.net, focus on the ‘I’ of the teacher-researcher in their workplace contexts as they ask, answer and enquire into questions of the form, ‘How can I help you to improve your learning?’.
As I engage in a self-study of my teacher-educator practices I need to show what I mean by responsibility. I use this value as a standard of judgement for testing the validity of my claims to educational knowledge. James Finnegan and Ben Cunningham drew my attention to the work of Levinas some two years ago and I am drawn to Carl Safstrom’s (1998) point that:

“According to Levinas (1994) a precondition for conceiving the relationship between subjects in terms of communication is to abandon the search for security and self-coinciding and to substitute the idea of an ego identical with itself with a relation to the other in terms of responsibility. The other gives the subject meaning. The meaningful subject, the self, becomes a consequence of the relationship to the other - a relation which does not strive for “the coinciding with oneself” (Levinas 1994, p.118). Otherness becomes constitute for the subject’s being.”

Before I consider how the phrase, ‘testing the validity of my claims to educational knowledge’, carries my epistemology in relation to Bridge’s ideas, I want to address Carl Safstrom’s paper ‘On the way to a postmodern curriculum theory - moving from the question of unity to the question of difference’. Carl begins with a critique of the type of curriculum theory which has its base in ‘the new sociology of education’. From this critique, focused on universal claims, he quickly drops the Habermasian-inspired universalism and embarks on another form of reasoning related to the work of Levinas and discusses ‘difference’ without reduction to the ‘Same’ and suggests a direction for a postmodern curriculum theory with a ‘normative’ focus on knowledge.

I agree with Safstrom that once refutation of universalism has been successfully accomplished it is possible in research to focus on normativity and change in the lived as well as the living experience of humans. I accept what you say about considering how a normative focus for a neopragmatic curriculum theory can be considered as transformative conversations. I hope you will experience the representation of my educative relation above and the educative conversations recorded in the other action research theses on the Web, as such a transformative conversations. In the future I intend to use Safstrom’s idea of a postmodern curriculum theory to show how the creation of living educational theories can be related to the creation of a curriculum by the individuals constructing the theories.

I agree with David Bridges (1998) that, as an educational researcher I am engaged in the articulation of propositions, in relation to my questions, which assert the truth of falsity of what I have to say and that I am operating with identifiable theories of truth. Where I need to extend my understanding is in relation to the appropriate forms of representation of the spiritual, aesthetic and ethical values which help to constitute my educational enquiries, my educative relationships and my truth claims. I also need to deepen my understanding of how knowledge-claims which contain such values can be tested for validity. The importance of such research can be seen in the problems of establishing appropriate standards of judgement for examining practice-based Ph.Ds (Hughes, Denley and Whitehead 1998) and in the problems of testing
the validity of the living educational theories constituted by the autobiographies of learning (Parker 1998).

John Elliott’s (1998) paper draws on the work of the Ford Teaching Project to show how a professional knowledge-base can be constructed through action research as teachers engage in standards-setting. I accept his recommendation that teachers engage in a form of ‘creative compliance’ in relation to external standards setting. He advocates that the teaching profession responds to external requirements by developing the capacity to accommodate and creatively reinterpret the external standards as part of the professions well articulated and publicly defensible standards framework. I view each of the ‘living theory’ accounts, on the Web at the above address, as a contribution to the professional standards of practice and judgement of the teaching profession. In the Symposium John made a point about my paper being understandable from within an Hegelian perspective. While I acknowledge that my understanding owes much to Hegel’s dialectic I hope the main body of the paper embodies my learning from Marx’s dialectic on the importance of grounding contradiction in concrete relations as well as my learning from Ilyenkov’s dialectic on the importance of understanding how to represent the form of life of a ‘living contradiction’. Because of these transformations of the Hegelian dialectic it seems to me to be mistaken to understand my ideas from within this perspective.

Michael Fielding’s (1998) presentation focused on an exploration of the implications of the work of John Macmurray for the present educational context which Michael describes as:

“... a crisis of intellectual and imaginative nerve which currently afflicts policy makers, teachers in schools, and the research community alike. We remain prisoners of an outmoded intellectual framework and a properly zealous political will; taken together they present a well-intentioned, if mistaken symbiosis and as a consequence our demise is likely to deepen rather than disperse. Just as school effectiveness and school improvement articulate the moribund categories of a frightened, unimaginative society so that aspirant hegemony of the technologies of teaching provide a classroom equivalent which will do more damage more quickly and more widely that its institutional predecessor.”

I do agree with Michael’s emphasis on the need to develop an alternative perspective which is focused on the centrality of community in human affairs in general and education in particular. I intend to integrate the distinction he uses between functional and personal forms of human relations in developing my dialectic of the personal within the context of education. I take his point that functional relations characterise those kinds of encounter we have with each other that are instrumental, encounters in which we enter into relations with each other in order to get something done, in order to achieve purposes such as our social, political and economic purposes. I also accept that personal relations of community are expressive of who we are as persons and have no purposes beyond themselves, ‘purposes are expressive of personal relations, not constitutive of them’. As I further develop my philosophies as an educator I intend to integrate your suggestions on the dialectic of the personal in
judging the quality of my educative influence. What I mean by this is that I am open to judgements and tests of validity of my claims to educational knowledge in terms of:

i) The expressive dimension where I will show the deepening and widening of skills.

ii) The transformative bridge from the deployment of skills to the rigour of care.

iii) The responsive dimension in the recognition of interest and expertise.

iv) The bond of mutuality in ‘doing it for yourself and for your teacher’.

v) The dialogic dimension in mutual learning.

vi) Education as transformative community in the development of a shared sense that education is expressive of positive human agency and shared hope in the future.

In Morwenna Griffiths’ presentation my attention was focused on the stated point of her paper which was to help researchers who want justice to argue among themselves in such a way that they are united, in spite of their differences against those who do not see themselves as working for justice, primarily, but rather, say, for efficiency and enhanced economic performance through education.

I agree with Morwenna’s analysis about the importance of attempts to draw on theory and philosophy to help members of the research community to gain in reflexivity and clarity about the possibilities of empowerment and voice, and about the different assumptions about power which underlie them. In the creation and testing of living educational theories I accept the gains in such reflexivity and clarity as part of an individual’s education. In developing my philosophies as an educator I hope to integrate these insights from Griffiths’ philosophical analyses of education within enquiries of the form, ‘How do I live my values more fully in my practice?’ and ‘How do I help you to improve your learning?’ I am thinking of forms of integration which show my practical engagement, as an educator, with power relations in the process of asking, answering and researching such questions. In judging the quality of my educative relations and my claims to educational knowledge I accept the importance of establishing the nature of my educative influence through my students’ voices and sense of empowerment. I hope this has be seen clearly above as I analysed my philosophies as an educator from the ground of my educative relationship with a practitioner-researcher and continued to extend my understanding of the philosophies of education by engaging with the contributions to the Symposium on Philosophy and Educational Research.

I now want to turn to the politics of educational knowledge and relate my ideas on the creation and testing of living educational theories to their legitimisation in the Academy in Ph.D. degrees. I want to focus particularly on the idea of ‘unconscious incompetence’ (Denley, 1998) in relation to examiner’s judgements on those educational action research theses, which are essentially studies of singularity (Bassey, 1995).

In a paper on the legitimising of an educational action research thesis for the award of a Ph.D. degree, Hughes and Denley analyse their experiences of a Ph.D. viva of Hughes’ Ph.D. Hughes draws attention to the examiners’ comments:
“She has undoubtedly learned a lot about her practice through the exercise, but the outside world learns little, because the interventions are specific to a particular context ....... We would learn more by comparing and contrasting aspects of practice in different contexts than from a study of the experience of just one worker”.
(Hughes pp. 434-435).

Given that the study was an educational action research study in the sense that it was a study of the professional learning of one worker in a particular context, the above comments, if the ‘we’ refers to both examiners, demonstrate, that there were genuine academic differences in philosophical approach or paradigms - this is one of the criteria which can be used to request a review of the results of an examination in the regulations of the University of Bath.

In his analysis of the examiners’ recommendations on a resubmission Denley writes:

“The recommendations from the examination almost suggested that Jacqui’s work should be reconceptualised and made to fit into another paradigm, rather than being examined against criteria appropriate to its own”.

In my reading of the recommendations I would omit the ‘almost’.

In writing about the viva Denley writes:

“What I had not expected was that this examiner’s methodological stance would have such a profound bearing on events. The concerns raised indicated a lack of understanding and a questioning of the adequacy of or even a disrespect for action research as an appropriate approach to address the sort of question relating to practice which Jacqui had formulated. I had expected, naively, that the examiner, if not actually sympathetic to the methodology, would at least be open to it....... I experienced a shift from thinking that I was ‘consciously competent’ to realising that I was in fact ‘unconsciously incompetent’ at the time of Jacqui’s first examination through my naivete in failing to appreciate the political dimension in the legitimation of educational knowledge.” (Denley, p. 443, 1998)

I have experienced a similar lack of respect from a colleague who responded to the contents of a paper I had contributed to with the dismissive comment “another piece of unhelpful jargon”:

“To claim that theory and theorizing in the PGCE should mainly (“the central idea”) be about novices creating “their own living educational theories in the descriptions and explanations of their own professional learning (another piece of unhelpful jargon), is to restrict and underplay the potential that theorizing has”.

It is such responses which appear to me to contribute to what Donmoyer writes of as ‘Balkanisation’. Rather than engage with the meanings of the other, this writer simply dismisses ideas which have been formed through years of thought, reflection and action in education, as ‘unhelpful jargon’.
I now want to turn to the economics of education and to focus on the idea of a ‘sophisticated theory of education’ in Halsey et.als ‘Education, the Global Economy and the Labour Market’:

“No sophisticated theory of education can ignore its contribution to economic development” (Halsey, Lauder, Brown and Wells, p. 156. 1997).

Whilst I do acknowledge the importance of economic forces in my own educational theory I do want to acknowledge the existence of sophisticated theories of education which do ignore their contribution to economic development. I have supervised educational researchers whose educational theories have focused on the spiritual, aesthetic and ethical qualities in enquiries of the kind, ‘How do I help you to improve your learning?’ (Laidlaw, Mellett, Cunningham, Finnegan). I can well imagine sophisticated theories of education which help individuals to remain life-affirming in the face of the certainty of their own death, but which ignore their contribution to economic development. In making these points, in relation to the implications of the creation of living educational theories for the economics of education, I want to point out what I see as a serious omission in Halsey et.al’s. analysis of ‘Education, the Global Economy, and the Labour Market’. The omission is any serious engagement with the living educational theories of professional educators as they seek to help their pupils to improve their learning. My anxiety with economists (or other social scientists) who claim to be analysing ‘education’ yet who omit any engagement or appreciation of the living theories of professional educators, is that they are in danger of continuing the reification of ‘education’ through their propositional theories of social scientists. Are they not ‘masking’ the dialogical and dialectical educative processes which give, ‘Education, the Global Economic and the Labour Market’ their life and vitality?

References (Incomplete)


