PART ONE: THEORY

CHAPTER TWO

PROPOSITIONAL FRAMING

In this chapter, I make my theoretical framing explicit and write about the theories that have influenced me. I illustrate what I mean by bringing forward journal entries and examples of practice from later chapters.

I start by linking organisational experiences with feminist post-structuralism, go on to consider my way of learning-in-relation through empathetic responsiveness and then highlight three ways in which I use my writing to develop my inquiry.

In the following section, I refer to the philosophy of Kant and Hegel in relation to the resolution of contradiction and refer to Spinoza's perspective on 'feeling thought'. In a post-modern take on language I begin to develop the ordering principles of language that I use later as a reflective tool in my inquiry .

In an example of reflective writing I show how I use the theory frame and the ordering principles of language to move my inquiry forward.

I go on to contrast religious constructions of self and show how spiritual practices influences learning. I refer to the previous example of reflective writing to show how spiritual practice has influenced my way of learning.

I introduce Bortroft's ideas of holistic consciousness, and his ideas about disclosure, relatedness and coalescence. I compare this with analytic modes of inquiry and Hegel's concept of unity.

Then I discuss theories of Inclusionality (Rayner, 2004), including ideas of the Complex Self, and the dynamical inter-relation of boundaries.

Finally I write about and Bernstein's theories of pedagogic communication Bernstein (2000), the insulation of boundaries and the creation of context. . It was these theories that enabled me to bring my inquiry to a conclusion.

FEMINIST THEORIES

Organisational practices and the poststructural standpoint

In this section I point to the feminist theories that have influenced my thinking, and my practice over the past 25 years. They are important in this inquiry because I think that if I am to act well as an instrument of love, then I must take notice of how power operates in organisations.

My aim is to bring my experience of the transformational nature of love into my organisational practice. I have worked in a leadership role in housing organisations for over 30 years. In that time I have come to appreciate how power operates in organisations, as well as how power influences and can be influenced. This excerpt from an essay I wrote in 1992 gives one example of this dynamic:

> 'This narrative has highlighted two actors upon whom the main task of implementation (of the strategy) rested. Of the four senior managers, there were two women, myself (the Deputy Director), the Director (we shared the responsibility for delivering) and two men, the Finance Director and Housing Services Director…this female axis of power was challenged by the FD and the HSD in two ways. One tactic was a series of late night and early morning discussions that led to a fragmented and informal bargaining outside meetings, and the other was to raise the profile of their respective departments by mutually aiding each other in channelling and influencing discussion in management team meetings. When challenged their actions were denied, and how far these tactics were consciously conceived and carried out is not clear. They were nevertheless significant in their effects, particularly in relation to corporate decision making, departmental and interdepartmental administrative systems and the borrowing of private finance' (Lohr, 1992 p.6)

My experience of leadership both as a Director at WHHA and as a Board member at NHH[1] leads me to consider an Althusserian position on the ideological capacity of leaders to exercise social control by structuring practices that also

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[1] WHHA is the acronym for the housing association that I worked in until 2000 as Deputy Chief Executive. NHH is the acronym for the housing association in which I am currently Chair of the Board.

determine individual perceptions (Althusser, 1985).   An example of this, from Chapter Seven, is replicated here:

> 'Increasingly, the most important aspect of WHHA's culture, noted by more that one systems analyst, was the general aversion to written knowledge, either by reading about how an action should be carried out or by recording the action that had been taken! We relied more on knowledge gained through watching and coaching others, rather then passing written information around.
>
> There were two ways we, as Directors, dealt with this. Firstly we used the authority of the Board members and Sub-committees, who expected regular reporting to create internal management deadlines and secondly we implemented more comprehensive IT systems. Increasing computerisation meant that we could slice the business processes up into smaller and smaller pieces, in order to get more reliable data…' (Chapter Seven, p. 205).

Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses are also reminiscent of Bordieu's 'habitus' (Bordieu, 1977) where habitus is 'a mode of generation of practices' (ibid. p.72) that are the product of the unconscious reproduction of attitudes, language and cultural practices that are considered to be natural and reasonable.

What I emphasise here is the power of social practices in creating social restrictions and disciplining thinking. I seek to recognise this power through a critical reading of my texts[2] in my reflective writing and in my accounts of practice.

My feminist poststructural standpoint does not absolve me of responsibility for, or protect me from the danger of, reproducing existing power relations, but it does allow me the possibility of developing a critical edge. This is an example of what I mean:

> 'I had been biding my time over the issue of ratification of decisions made outside the Board meetings. I had raised this in relation to the behaviour of our Consultants at the time of transfer, and again in relation to the conduct of Board meetings, and yet again when referring to the relationship between the Board and its Sub-Committees.

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[2] I show how I do this through the ordering principles of language later in this Chapter.

I decide that there is a problem about lack of openness that could well not withstand very close scrutiny, but that the decisions that had been made were in line with usual housing association practice. I assume the communication problems are arising partly from ignorance of how housing association Boards are expected to conduct themselves, ignorance of the meaning of Housing Corporation requirements, and an experience of 'cabinet government' and party politics' (Chapter Eight, p. 228).

At this critical edge I am concerned with uncovering ideologically predetermined behaviours that may be restricting our individual capacity (and therefore our organisational capacity) to participate fully, either in the processes of joint decision-making, or in accessing the services provided by housing organisations. I consider one of the tasks of being a leader is to open up options, to create more choice at the critical edge of ideology and allow a range of choices to inform better decision-making. The action account that I give in Chapter Eight shows how I identify a critical edge and wait for an opportunity to influence:

'I … felt very ambivalent about how NHH is supporting tenant Board members. It looks OK on the surface, but actually there are all kinds of difficult ethics at play for tenants, and in addition, they do not have experience of high-level decision making forums like this. …

This incident has come to a close now, but I continue to look for opportunity to raise the issue of tenant board member support when the openings occur. Knowing also that those who took part in these events will weave their different stories' (Chapter Eight, p. 232).

I want to bring the power of love into an organisational context. However, I also realise that love in these circumstances would not necessarily be a transformatory force for good, and that in a dialectical world, any force whether for good or ill is likely to create opposition.

Learning in relation

My question, 'How may I become an instrument of love's purpose', indicates that I need to understand how I learn. I started this thesis by clarifying my experience of love. Earlier I inquired into how love might be received in an organisational context. Now I am thinking about how I might become an instrument, using feminist theory to explain how I learn.

Jordan et.al (Jordan, Kaplan, Baker Miller, Stiver & Surrey 1991) suggest women (in general) learn, not by being separate and independent, but in an emotional relation. This self-in-relation is characterised by emotional dependency and empathetic responsiveness, where learning takes place through mutuality, recognition of similarity and connectedness. Learning is part of a continuum, of 'holding the other as part of the self' (ibid. p. 62). This is how I explain my learning, using as an example the memory of my relationships with other young mothers 35 years ago:

> We nurtured each other, taking it in turns to tell interminable stories, about pregnancy; about whether or not to have more children, about birth trauma, about money, the list is endless. Much of it was complaint. This kind of chat was repeated over and over for hours and hours. In my experience this type of conversation is common amongst women caring for small children.

> We were conscious of growing the next generation of adults and realised the enormity of the task. I wanted to learn how to do it, to have feedback when I thought it was going well, and the unconditional acceptance of others with whom to share the burden when I failed to get it 'right'.

> The writing of researchers and therapists at the Stone Center for research on Women (www.wcwonline.org) highlight emotional differences between boys and girls in the early relationship with the mother, which may help to explain the high level of emotional component in women's conversations.

My experience can be theorised in this way:

'The earliest mental representation of the self, then, is of a self whose core – which is emotional – is attended to by other(s) and in turn begins to attend to the emotions of the other(s). Part of this internal image of oneself includes feeling the other's emotions and *acting on* them as they are in interplay with one's own emotions. This means that the beginnings of the concept of self are not those of a static and lone self being ministered to by another (incidentally this construct has a strong male flavour) but rather of a self inseparable from dynamic interaction. And the central character of that interaction involves attending to each other's mental states and emotions….this early mental representation of the self in girls can be described as a more encompassing sense of self, in contrast with the more boundaried, or limited self, that is encouraged in boys from a very young age' (Jordan et al., 1991 p.14).

This process involves establishing the recognition of the self in the other, which requires a relaxation of the boundaries of the self, but no disintegration of the self. Instead of annihilation there is an enhancement of self through an alignment with the other. This is a mutual and shared connection, which brings both cognitive and emotional aspects of the self into a jointly held space in which learning can take place (ibid. p.82). Creating shared connection is integral to my inquiry. Creating and acting in context is expressed in a variety of ways later in my inquiry, as a lotus flower mandala in Chapter Five, as well as one of my standards of judgement:

- I aim to recontextualise (reframe) what I am, or we are doing now; so that our joint work can become easier and more pleasurable.

I use the concept 'holding the other as part of the self' in many different ways in this thesis. Again, the seeds of this way of learning go back to when I was a young woman. Thinking myself back into those days, I can see how the emotional boundaries between friends was often blurred, and how this helped me to maintain a strong enough sense of identity to enable me to 'mother' effectively enough.

And this is echoed in theory:

'Our definition of relationship implies a sense of knowing oneself and others through a process of mutual relational interaction over time and space…In this model the self gains vitality and enhancement in relationship and is not reduced

or threatened by connections…This sense of continuity is a basic aspect of the mother-child relationship … this experience of continuity – the holding of the other as part of the self – as a component of all real relationships' (Jordan et.al.1991, p.62).

So, my inquiry about how I might become an instrument of love is established firstly around paying attention to my own experiences of love, and then interacting with love over space and time seeing practice through the eye of love. It means that in phrasing my question 'how may I become an instrument of love?' I am deliberately merging the 'I' in order to connect with 'love'. I lose my 'I' in this question, in order to explore how far it might be possible to become love and remain an effective actor in the world.

> 'Experiencing the 'sense of the sublime' connects me to my self, other selves and the world around me, and brings my sense of self into alignment. I do not comprehend a collapse of the emotional into the rational, as Ken Wilbur describes it (see above), but the sense of the sublime that is able to bring together the mental and emotional aspects of the mind into a unity, into coherence. This is not losing my identity but gaining a heightened sense of perception' (Chapter Five, p.139).

'The other' in my inquiry follows Ruddick's (1989) exemplar as she develops loving mothering practices. In her case she takes the child as the 'other' and develops concepts of preservative love and fostering growth. In a similar way, I hold the sense of the divine as part of myself as I inquire into my lived experience and practice. I refer to this as 'holding the sense of "the other" as part of the self in the act of writing'. I follow Ruddick in allowing feeling to influence thought, holding my question about love in organisation as part of my self. This is how I express this in Chapter Eight:

> 'Now I am reflecting on the transformational nature of love by 'thinking through' agape and considering the way that conversation develops relationships and transmits emotion in organisation. Fletcher (Fletcher 2001) maintains that following relational logic, staying within the perspective of that logic, creates a discursive space in which the relational aspect of organisational life is 'allowed to retain its full power as a subversive story' (ibid. p. 84). I think that what Fletcher means is that taking an uncritical subjective position on relationships at work

creates the potential for a different perspective that challenges the cultural hegemony' (Chapter Eight, p.235).

In looking for deeper meanings my inquiry becomes deliberately boundary-less so that the difference between methodology, lived experience, and practice, become arbitrary. However, in presenting my inquiry process and my findings to the reader, I have made the following distinctions between methodology, lived experience and practice:

- My methodology incorporates first person action research methods, spiritual practices and Ruddick's exemplar: holding the sense of the other in loving relation with the self.

- My lived experience covers informal unstructured relationships and embodied knowing.

- My practice refers to my work as a yoga teacher, as a Director in a housing association and as the Chair of the Board of a housing association.

Language

In this section I provide a theoretical perspective on the way I use language. This is important because I deliberately use language to express feeling.

From a Foucaldian post-modern perspective, power is generated through knowledge and the construction of discourse, and it is the language and the construction of the meaning through discourse (rather than an Althusserian distortion of the subject created through institutional practices) from which knowledge emerges and truth is formulated (Foucault, 1984).

However, Saussure's theory of the 'sign' (consisting of the signified as the meaning and the signifier as the sound or written image) suggested that 'chains of signs' derived their meaning from the difference between other chains of signs. This is important to feminists (Weedon, 1987 p. 23) because Saussure considered that the meaning located in signs to be fixed (ibid. p.24). However Derrida developed the idea of 'differance' and deferral where the signified and the signifiers only have meaning in relation to each other, and where the meaning is not only not fixed, but is constantly being deferred. Thus it is only through contextualisation of language that social meanings are produced. As Weedon points out: 'What it *[the signifier]* means at any particular moment depends on the discursive relations within which it is located, and it is open to constant rereading and reinterpretation (Weedon 1987, p. 25 *[my italics]*). These theories have three implications for my inquiry.

Firstly, I am able to judge the difference between my intention and my action by seeing the 'signified' (my meaning) and its outcome as 'signifier' (image) written in my texts. Reflection on my texts identifies discontinuities in the relation of my meaning (the signified) and my writing (the signifier). This is an example taken from Chapter Five:

> I buy a chair, and show it to you, 'Yes', you say 'It is a very nice chair.'

> I like the colour and shape, but you do not. It is likely that if we talk about it, we will both be able to understand why you do not like it and I do.

We take it in turns to sit on the chair. I do not think it is comfortable, you think it is. It is less likely that we will be able to understand each other to the same degree, because the description of discomfort has become more subjective and this probably makes our respective understandings less easily comparable.

In fact I might feel so uncomfortable sitting on the chair that I think 'This isn't a proper chair, I cannot sit on it' and I cease to think of it as a chair.

But I think it is beautiful, which is actually why I bought it, and so I keep it in the corner of my living room.

Every time I walk past this beautiful object I think 'I <u>do</u> like that', but I do not think of it as a chair.

Then I cease to notice it at all – it has become part of my mental furniture.

Occasionally when visitors come round they point to this beautiful object and say, 'That's nice where did you get that from?' And at other times when visitors come round they sit on it, and I think 'Oh! They think it's a chair!'

Some time later, perhaps years later, I am hoovering around it and I get annoyed with how heavy it is to move, and as I pass by I start thinking that perhaps it does not fit into my colour scheme. And then another thought occurs, that the furniture in my living room would work a lot better if that object wasn't there any more.

So, I ask the people who admired it in the past if they would like it. I do not know if they think of it as I do, as an art object or whether they think of it as a chair. It doesn't matter.

However if no friend wants it, I put an advertisement in the local paper saying, 'Chair for Sale!' (Chapter Five, pp.148-149).

Secondly, rereading and reflecting on my journalled accounts I use the descriptions of what I did, take feedback from others and my responses, and then learn from the differences. This is an example of such learning taken from the case example in Chapter Three

'There is a game going on here, she is manipulating us (me), and I want to step aside from the possibility that we are about to play the same game with the same rules for the fourth time. Fuck it. THIS is how I feel; I will play the same game as her, be childish, and blurt out what I am feeling.

I am unable to respond to the victim asking to be made victim again, asking for help and ignoring opportunities (as I see them) to practise differently.

I do not care that I upset her because I am tired of upsetting her. She does not alter what she wants, she keeps asking for the same thing over and over, but not taking it, getting upset, being upsetting to others, she refuses to just take what she wants, and wants to get upset with us for not giving it to her.

I keep asking for what I want, and when it is offered I refuse to take up the opportunity and start feeling stuck. I feel the same way when I think that I see another person getting stuck in their repeating patterns.

I didn't notice my own repeating addictive pattern settling in! (Chapter Three, pp.90-91).

Thirdly, when at the beginning of my inquiry I needed to make new connections between my loving personal intentions and my leadership practice, I found that writing my lived experience provided the poetic images that eventually enabled me to contextualise and locate my practice. By recontextualising my inquiry in this way I create images (signifiers) that encouraged the development of my meanings (signifieds), which eventually resulted in my being able to both theorise (create new signifiers) and to live my values through my practice expressed in a pedagogy of presence. The inquiry process was lengthy; the point I am making here is that the poetic, semiotic language of Chapter Five was a precursor to my eventual findings.

Julia Kristeva (in Weedon 1987) posits that the repressed feminine mode of language, rather then being a product of the female libido and therefore biologically based, is a semiotic mode of signification. The semiotic mode is unstable; it arises in the psychic subjects' pre-symbolic and pre-oedipal phase, and as a result it challenges the symbolic order and the unity of the psyche attained in the post-oedipal stage (ibid. p.70).

Following Kristeva, my use of language reflects this semiotic mode, and I use its capacity to go underneath the logic of the symbolic order to re-order my knowledge. I respond to my accounts of practice by writing reflectively, gathering up ideas, looking through the lens of love, allowing meaning to surface as it emerges, rather than finding meaning within a pre-existing ideological frame.

For example, this is how I come to write my first reflection on agape. Here I interweave embodied knowing, with poetry, with a passing reference to ethics, to Spinoza:

> 'If eros is the inhalation, the breath that seeks the divine, focusing attention on the object of desire with the energy rising upwards from the base of the spine near the sexual organs, all subtle sensibility lost in the drive to fulfil its objective. Then agape is the exhalation, the breath that releases the divine into everyday life. It broadens awareness and acts through the heart, opening, widening and responding, carrying its innate capacity to encompass paradox and dissonance.
>
> I see agape everywhere like the intoxicating perfume of the lotus flower. It enables my embodied awareness and embodied knowing to happen. If my body lives in tune with agape, then it becomes the dance of life.
>
> This aspect of love does not look for goals, purposes or achievement of any kind…. Agape does not distinguish between the good and the bad, or between friends or enemies…
>
> For Spinoza 'God is the origin of all there is before our senses…and is most clearly manifest in living creatures' (Damasio, 2003 p.273) and there is no distinction between thought and feeling rather a determination to bring positive feeling into relationship. So finally with Spinoza there is a deliberate 'colouring' of perception brought about through the reasoning / feeling capacity of the body / mind acting in the moment…'(Chapter Eight, p.233).

As I reflected on my writings, I was looking for the underlying meanings, the discontinuity between my use of language and its social meaning, hoping to notice addictive or habitual patterns of thinking, expressing myself poetically, working semiotically.

MODERN AND POST- MODERN PHILOSOPHY

In this section I consider contradiction in organisation from the point of view of western philosophy. I do this in order to clarify three issues that I address later on within my inquiry in Part Two and Part Three, these are:

(1) how different cultural constructions of self affects the way leaders implement organisational goals. I give an example of the issue I am addressing in my practice, and illustrate what I mean from later Chapters.

(2) the relation of difference to general rules and universal principles,

(3) the relation of cognition with emotion and feeling in western philosophy.

Dialectical logic and modernity

My inquiry is an appreciation of how 'love at work' can operate through my leadership activity in a multi-ethnic organisational culture. It is in this context that I experience opposition and resistance to the implementation of organisational vision.

Kant and Hegel are often referred to as the philosophical architects of the modern world, and much of their work is concerned with reconciling contradiction and paradox. Through the writings of Ilyenkov (Ilyenkov, 1977) and Tarnas (Tarnas, 1991) I traced some of the traditional threads of western thought.

I start with Tarnas' statement that, 'With Hegel's decline there passed from the modern intellectual arena the last culturally powerful metaphysical system claiming the existence of a universal order accessible to human awareness' (Tarnas, 1999 p.383). As I read about Hegel's ideas I compared his philosophical search for unity with the challenges I experience as a leader in implementing shared vision. I write about this in Chapter Seven:

> 'In many urban areas housing organisations employ a wide range of people from diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Many staff do not 'buy in' easily to Western ways of thinking, acting or relating. Additionally, and depending on their

age and lifestyle, staff members may have or make deeper and more satisfying connections outside the work environment. The vision and aims of the organisation (WHHA) was developed within a culture that is a white middle-aged middle class version of secular Christianity and seems a million miles away from the Nigerian administrator who (aggressively) keeps telling everyone that Africa is more that one country and explaining more than once that Nigeria has more than one tribe.

In a multicultural organisation, as WHHA was, the role, ideology and language of organisational leadership is unlikely to be received or understood in predictable ways because there are differing cultural constructions of self' (Chapter Seven, p.200).

I resonate with Hegel's belief in the categories of the human mind as being also 'ontological categories of the universe' (ibid. p. 351), and I feel the erotic power that belief in the transcendent generates. These are my 'feeling thoughts' that are curtailed by the dissonant actions of staff, who clearly do not share the same understanding of the relation of individual action to shared gaols. I need to think this contradiction through in order to understand the 'others' perspective.

For Hegel contradiction did not arise from a mistake in reasoning, but from a misunderstanding about the nature of thought itself. Ilyenkov says that Hegel considered that,

> 'in real affairs man demonstrates the real modes of his thinking more adequately than in his narratives of them. But that being so, man's *actions* … must be considered *manifestations of his thoughts*, as acts objectifying his ideas, thoughts, plans and conscious intentions' (Ibid. p. 175 [*authors italics*]).

What Ilyenkov makes clear is that Hegel considers dialectics as 'the process both of elucidating contradictions and concretely resolving them in the corpus of a higher and more profound stage of rational understanding of the same object' (Ibid. p. 190). In Hegel's critique of Kant, he resists the notion that moral rightness can be proved by a logical process of demonstrating universality, and instead suggested that rightness could be established through the moral principles guiding the reasoning process (in Benhabib, 1992 p. 27).

I agree with Hegel's position partly because he takes a broad view of what constitutes thought and because I agree that there is a universal order that is accessible to human awareness, and this influences my thinking and my actions. Benhabib (1992) makes the point that Hegel also wanted to find the universal in the principles underpinning thought, and again this is a project that I have sympathy with. I agree that human beings appear to share similar capacities for thinking, feeling and acting. I address some of these issues in Chapter Five in relation to social construction:

> 'I think that there are essences of truth in all social constructions, so that the superficial surfaces of what we mean by love or fear or death, and how it is symbolised, are contested and change over time. … So that the duality and plurality of values, emotions and intentions come into and out of fashion, but that the relation between the mind (brain) and the body, the relation of mind (intellect) and matter, taken with an awareness of the way that these relate to each other have always remained essentially the same. So, constructions of self and the relationship between self and others may be many and various in the Western world, but there remains an essential underlying structure of humanness' (Chapter Five, p.143).

Hegel finds new synthesis from paradox, but Kant finds general rules that,

> 'would subordinate the power of thinking…to organise all separate generalisations and judgements of experience into unity' (Ilyenkov 1977, p. 103).

Kant set out to 'create a single system, a single sense of law, a single system of all the main concepts of life' (ibid. p. 114). He develops a universal rational order that could explain difference. He attempts to do this by formulating the concept of antinomy, which is 'a state of logical contradiction' (Ibid. p. 105) which must be eliminated by 'discarding from logic exactly half of its categorical schemes of synthesis' (Ibid. p. 108).

Whilst Hegel develops ideas of shared vision based on moral principles, Kant develops ideas based on a universal system of thought. It is one thing to consider contradiction as creating the possibility of new knowledge, and quite another to consider that contradiction can be resolved through cognitive rationalism within some sort of logical, universal scheme.

Tarnas maintains that on the one hand Kant recognises the importance of scientific thinking, and on the other hand 'he defined direction of modern religious thought. …. Inner personal experience, not objective demonstration or dogmatic belief, was the true ground of religious meaning' (Ibid. p.350). Kant leaves two issues raised by antinomies clarified but not resolved. He clarifies the process of resolution by distinguishing between inner subjective experience and outer objective rationalisations so that the,

> 'task of the philosopher was therefore radically redefined. … Thus philosophy's true task was to investigate the formal structure of the mind, for only there would it find the true origin and foundations for certain knowledge in the world' (Ibid. p. 347).

The successors to Kant went in two directions. One direction towards Idealism and Hegel, and the other towards Materialism and a scientific paradigm (Tarnas 1999 pp. 351-354). Also in Grayeff (Grayeff 1970, p.1).

Benhabib confirms the cognitive focus of the western philosophy when she writes'

> 'A major weakness of cognitive and proceduralist ethical theories since Kant has been their reductionist treatment of the emotional and affective bases of moral judgement and conduct. … I would like to suggest that very often ethical cognitivism has been confused with ethical rationalism, and the neglect of the affective and emotive bases of ethics is a result of the narrow "rationalism" of most neo-Kantian theories' (Benhabib 1992 p. 49).

The western neo-Kantian mind privileges a set of overarching beliefs that hide the emotional and material bases of knowledge and ignores the passionate idealism inherent within the Enlightenment project. Because of this, contradiction and difference become silenced. The dangers and consequences of this hegemony are challenged by Foucault and post-modern philosophy, by feminist theory, and writers like Edward Said writing about colonialism (see Walia 2002) and Jonathan Raban (Raban 2003) and Terry Eagleton (Eagleton 2003) writing about the dangers of religious fundamentalism. Kantian influences have meant that western philosophy has privileged cognitive analysis, avoided passion and ignored silence and absence.

My inquiry into 'love at work' avoids the hegemony of the grand narrative of the Enlightenment, because it actively addresses and inquires into contradiction and paradox. I have deliberately identified incongruity throughout my descriptions of experience and my practice. In seeking to give prominence to 'the affective and emotional bases of ethics' (as Benhabib puts it), I am also challenging the traditional nature of academia.

Spinoza

In the course of my reading about Kant and Hegel, I came across references to Spinoza. Ilyenkov describes him as a thinker who found that, 'There are not two different and originally contrary objects of investigation – body and thought – but only *one single* object, which is the *thinking body* of living real man…' (Ilyenkov 1977 p. 31). Spinoza does not divorce mind from body; instead he considered that,

> 'The activity we call reason or thinking is the capacity of a thinking body to mould its own action actively to the shape of any other body' (Ibid. p. 47).

Spinoza, like Hegel, did not think that thought was a solely cognitive function. He considered reflection as an active and reflexive process. Damasio (2003) says that Spinoza made connections between feeling and reasoned thinking and distinguished between the trigger mechanism of emotion and 'reasoned emotionally competent stimuli capable of producing the more positive feeling states' (ibid. p. 273). Spinoza went on to

> 'describe(d) the experience of the divine as pure feeling, a pleasurable feeling that is a source of completion, meaning and enthusiasm for life' (ibid. p.282).

Here was a western philosopher who allowed feeling to influence his text, where feeling is not necessarily triggered by emotion or desire, but could be cultivated as an adjunct to thought. It was reading about Spinoza's philosophy that enabled me to justify colouring thought with feeling, referred to in Chapter One, and which enabled me to write in Chapter Eight:

> 'For Spinoza 'God is the origin of all there is before our senses…and is most clearly manifest in living creatures' (Damasio, 2003 p.273) and there is no

distinction between thought and feeling rather a determination to bring positive feeling into relationship. So finally with Spinoza there is a deliberate 'colouring' of perception brought about through the reasoning / feeling capacity of the body / mind acting in the moment' (Chapter Eight, p.234).

Models of leadership

Now I consider how these philosophies have influenced models of adult development. Whilst Wilber maintains that it is possible to reach these higher states of consciousness whilst living in ancient traditional societies or in non-Western educated communities, he tends to privilege the logical and integrative capacity of cognitive structures. I express my concern with Wibur's viewpoint in Chapter Five:

> 'whilst the stage model theory remains an abstraction that has no application. However, Wilber (Wilbur 1995 p.361) refers to stages as hierarchies or rankings, which were translated in the Catholic Church from contemplative awareness to political orders of power. … I look at Torbert's leadership development profile (Fisher, Rooke and Torbert 2000) and its application in organisation' (Chapter Five, p.161).

And I go on address this in more detail in Chapter Seven, using my understanding of theory to ground my critique:

> 'There is too much reliance and an implicit assumption that the relations of thinking, feeling, acting and being are, if not in a strict linear relation to each other, at least show a discernible logic that just leads to 'inevitable mutual interdependence'. When these combine with a linear model of adult development within a frame of the organisational mission, which is also necessarily 'top-down', then I begin to understand my resistance to the SCT and the LDF. Living the dynamic of 'mutual interdependence' does not automatically arise as a consequence of cognitive development' (Chapter Seven, p.220).

In general, models of leadership tend to follow Kantian rationality, and are based on developing propositional knowing, taking that knowing into action and focussing on improving skills to achieve a particular outcome.

I had hoped that I might become a more loving leader by developing my leadership skills. With this in mind I turned to the ideas of Torbert (Fisher, Rooke and Torbert, 2000) and Griffin (2002).

Torbert's model of leadership

Torbert's model of leadership (the Leadership Development Framework) delineates seven stages of leadership development based on Kohlberg's model of adult development.

My objections were more 'felt' than 'reasoned' and so I looked further into the theoretical basis, asking 'Is my intuitive feeling theoretically justifiable?' What I found was firstly that Kant's ideas are predicated on creating a grand meta-narrative that seeks to accommodate contradiction, and I knew that the dangers of this hegemony had been highlighted by feminists and postmodernism. Secondly, because of Kant's enormous influence we have 'forgotten' that thought cannot be reduced solely to cognition. Both Kohlberg and Torbert rely heavily on this particular construction of self.

I conclude that the Leadership Development Framework (LDF) is probably appropriate for individuals with certain characteristics; it encourages development of particular skills, but this makes it culturally specific and likely to be more conservative than radical in terms of organisational development. I decided that the LDF might a useful tool for outside consultants working with management team, but it did not sit easily within the remit of my inquiry.

Griffin and the emergence of leadership

Griffin (2002), together with Shaw (2002) and others from the University of Hertfordshire's Complexity Management Centre, take a radical approach based on Complexity Theory. Griffin proposes that effective leaders emerge from within organisational relationships. He maintains that,

'The resolution of paradox in thought as *both* individuals with freedom *and* self organising natural systems has led us to think … of individuals collectively as …subject to the "system's" unfolding of intention. … We also think of individuals as being outside such systems so that they are free and ethically responsible for controlling and changing the system' (Ibid. p.9).

Griffin suggests resolving differences in practice rather with reference to a particular theory, or a system of beliefs, or pre-given predefined values. He rejects any notion of the transcendent, according transcendence to a meta-narrative (that is just another 'system') and makes his case from a Materialist perspective in opposition to Kantian logic.

Therefore, management theories based on Complexity Theory resist *a priori* knowledge, the theoretical elimination of contradiction through reasoning, and insist that paradox must be resolved in practice. Not only is the Kantian notion of 'the whole' as separate from 'the part' rejected, but Complexity Theory also rejects the pre-existence of symbolic values or ideals.

Whilst I particularly like Shaw's (2002) case by case exposition of how Complexity Theory works in practice in organisational consultancy, these authors do not address the key issue of how imagined community influences individual decision-making, and vice versa. Whilst ethical frameworks may be historically and culturally specific, it is this framework that makes it possible, even on a case by case basis, to discriminate between good and bad practice. If there is no value frame I do not see how it is possible to make good judgements.

I decided that I could not agree with either Griffin or Shaw, because it is not possible to ignore foundational values and still know the difference between good and bad. I expressed my decision this way in Chapter Eight:

'Like Shaw, I too dislike the idea of love being used as the 'glue' that binds a workforce together and which implies a certain fundamentalism and an avoidance of the shadow side. However, my proviso is that personal value and belief systems are still enabled and can still influence others within the fluidity of the complexity frame, because otherwise there is no ethical standard that operates except that which arises in conversation. And we increasingly do not have a

public model of what virtues are commendable, and that is important even if it's only purpose is for us to contradict it' (Chapter Eight, p.246).

I decided instead that it is possible to develop, judge and improve a value-laden practice provided it is open to change through active participation in social frameworks.

Language

Lastly, I look at how post-modernism allows the text to disclose its rules, and from this develop the idea of experiencing the underlying meaning of the text by responding to it intuitively. I illustrate what I mean with several examples taken from later Chapters.

In the section on feminist theory, I made the distinction between language as a system of signs and as an expression of a pre-symbolic order. In the post-Kantian post-modern era, language can also perceived as the creator of new meaning.

As I reflect on my journalled accounts I am deconstructing my text in order to find new knowledge. I am doing this not by deconstructing my language but by getting into the feeling that the words evoke, stepping aside from conventional interpretations. I do this in this way at the end of Chapter Eight, where I begin to connect aspects of spiritual practice with aspects of organisational life:

> 'In the first reflective iteration, I develop a sensed connection with agape through the interpretative embodied frame of joyfulness…
>
> In the following iteration, I take Fletcher's (2001) theory of relational practice and consider my leadership practice from this perspective… as I review my actions through the lens of relational practice …I go on to suggest that awareness of the emotional landscape of interaction is an integral aspect of living systemic thinking (Marshall, 2004). … I (then) refer to the complexity of communicating on affective, embodied and cognitive levels, and refer to the potential for misunderstanding and misinterpretation that this carries. …

In the third reflection, I develop my ideas about how relationships can influence organisational structures, suggesting in the first instance that relationship can have a direct impact on structure. … In comparison with eros, which is contained by rules, agape flexes the boundaries of fixed organisational conventions. …

The potential elasticity of agape is covered in the final iteration, where I link love to submission to the 'other'. … The relevant point here is that agape allows us to 'lose' our identity in the action … as demonstrated in the experience of headstand in Chapter Six. … I begin to appreciate the complexity of this loving practice. Through my reflexive writing I learn about the capacity that agape has for challenging established 'habitus', the generative and degenerative power of relationship in organisational culture and structure, the variety of ways with which individuals construe and construct meaning from conversation, and the value of reducing the boundaries of self to become absorbed in action' (Chapter Eight, pp.255-256).

I reflect on text and the values underlying the text. These reflections are not argued, instead I let them find their own logic. This writing is legitimate within the parameters of the post-modern as described by Lyotard.

'A post-modern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by pre-established rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgement, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what the work of art itself is looking for. The artist and the writer, then, are working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what *will have been done'* (Lyotard, 1979 p. 81 *[author's italics]*).

As I read I begin to discern the underlying symbolism, as this process continues I begin to feel the physicality of those symbols. The text becomes fuller, more meaningful. The meaning spills into the experiential, and my thoughts echo the sensations in my body and propositional knowledge begins to develop. I give examples of these processes taken from Chapter Six:

'My knowledge and my learning process arise from the raw material of my sensuous body. Speech arises in response to felt shifts in embodiment. I trust the dissonance and resonance of my sensuous knowing.

Writing is subtle work, work that requires me to notice the relation of the mind and body. Because I want this writing to be 'true' in the sense that it is aligned with the way I live in the world, it is a watching, reflexive process. I make sense by allowing myself to be influenced by my reading, by the ideas of others in 'a collective field of reasoning and imagining'. I pull these ideas together and let them influence my thinking' (Chapter six, pp.172-173).

'It is my phenomenological discernment of movement in the inner body, which enables me to discriminate between the feeling and thinking. ... Realising the interrelatedness of these structures, feeling the resonance and dissonance, shows me the gaps in my knowing. It is in the gaps created by dissonance that my knowledge forms and it is the harmony of resonance that indicates the direction of my actions and thoughts' (Chapter Six, p.177).

As I reflect, I ask, 'What meanings does this text evoke?' In my reflection I am not deconstructing individual words but searching for patterns and shapes created by feeling the qualities of the language. I let the language show me its order, those rules that were invented in the process of writing. It is these rules *'that will have been done'* (ibid. p.81, see above). The rules, the ordered patterns of my language, contain the potential to become instruments of love.

I decide on the value and relevance of a philosophical idea by comparing it with my existing knowledge, which becomes part of a change process through which I develop my propositional knowledge. I do not look for universal meanings, and do not seek to finalise my meaning.

In this thesis I allow my scholarship to develop as an ongoing and unplanned process. I point to the philosophers and theorists that have influenced my thinking, and then frame my writing. Then I discern the patterns of my thinking and reflect on the values lying within the writing.

The basic tenet of social construction (Gergen, 2002b) is that language is central to the power relations of the social order, and that language determines the nature of social relations and the nature of knowledge. Social Constructionists maintain that we can only know what we know as a consequence of participating in conversation (see Shotter, J. 1993) and that the 'fundamental circularity of conceptual systems' (Varela et. al. 1991) can be challenged through joint action and conversation with others. I refer to this in Chapter Five:

'"The process of giving form to feeling" is how Shotter (Shotter, 1993 p.79) refers to the imaginary (half formed) grounding that people act out in their daily lives, and which is given form to the extent that other people "act back upon that background to give it further form" … It is from this that Shotter develops the idea of 'root metaphors' that create particular ways of formulating our relationships with the world. That the ways we think and speak, as well as the words that are used, become part of an unacknowledged pattern which is self-perpetuating' (Chapter Five, p.150).

However, this means that we cannot trust language to provide us with the truth.

George Steiner maintains that language deceives when he writes,

'Language can say, "there was no Auschwitz".… On the most intimate levels of love and of friendship, language betrays and betrays itself. How then can it be entrusted with that supreme "underway" towards the truth.… How then can verbal discourse, the speech act, be a legitimate pointer to that which lies beyond it?' (Steiner, G. 2001, p. 167)

In his book Steiner gives a series of connected inquiries and responses and in so doing elucidates the grammars of creation that are embedded in language, which is itself embedded in the culture and history of the western cannon.

My language becomes a link between my values and my action and I reflect on my texts to develop my understanding of how I might bring love more fully into action.   I use language, and interpret its meanings, taking into account the power of the social order (my leadership role), the underlying symbolism (my ontological awareness), and the feelings the words evoke (my embodied knowing) to create new meaning. I call this recognising 'the ordering principles of language', which arise out of a particular emotional and embodied experience and are formed within a particular cultural frame.

I glimpse these ordering principles through my reflective process, and integrate them into my research method. I do not take these ordering principles as fixed, but as a tool in my developing inquiry.

APPYLING THE ORDERING PRINCIPLES OF LANGUAGE

Below is a piece of reflective writing, written with a sense of longing for love, holding the question, 'What does love at work show me? This example demonstrates how my reflective writing is produced through a theoretical frame, and how I use the ordering principles of language to develop my understanding of the transformational nature of love.

As I write I hold the sensed memory of love in my mind and re-experience aspects of the way that I see love has worked in my life.   What I am doing is remembering in order to reconfigure how I see the world now. Expressing myself in this way, I can see that I have written through a frame of feminist post-structural theory.   I reframe meaning, by glimpsing the direction that love might be taking me and by reflecting on its underlying logic.

The writing has been numbered for ease of reference.

REFLECTIVE WRITING

LOVE'S LOGIC

1. I describe my learning of love's meanings as a series of steps surrounding events. I reflect on what these events tell me about how to improve what I am doing. I describe these events, but it is never enough. Love seems to escape each time.

2. It starts with a lack or a loss of love. Feeling this lack is debilitating and enfeebling, it makes me feel weak, powerless and unable to move.

3. Feminism provides explanations, and in the companionship of others who share similar experiences I start to develop a sense of personhood.

4. Being taught meditation, I have an experience of divine love. My teacher is someone who has never met me before.

5. Now I find that it is not necessary to voice my anger about loss of love and over time my family remark upon it.

6. As a leader I notice the resistance of others to my idealisation of strategic goals. I wonder how they might come to share my vision. I realise that some do not understand because they do not recognise meaning in what I say. I realise that there are many reasons for this.

7. I have been empowered by my leadership position to impose my meaning. I begin to understand the abusive power of eroticism. I think about how I might rephrase my meanings, sometimes this is manipulative and / or coercive. I feel the lack of love in me. No one recognises this lack.

8. As my angry passions fade, I ask 'What makes people co-operate at work?'

9. When someone I do not like very much 'makes up' with a woman who 'did the dirty' on him in an office row I am curious to find out what logic brought him to act in that way. I am privileged and humbled to learn the logic of his magnanimity.

10. I become a chronicler of team and interdepartmental behaviour and begin to think that the first law of thermodynamics applies to emotion in organisation, that emotion can neither be created nor destroyed; it just keeps being recycled around.

11. I decide that the role of the leader is to shift the negative into the positive wherever possible, and then to recognise when the passion needs to run its course.

12. Abuse and cruelty, victimhood and passive aggression, we all suffer from it.

13. Passion becomes compassion. We all suffer. We all lack recognition.

14. What I know and cannot say now compounds my sense of lack. There is no one now who can speak, be a witness to my experience. I do not understand the logic of love any more.

15. The more I notice what is happening, the more dispassionate I become. Am I losing the capacity to love? What is my lesson here? I have lack, dispassion, unpredictability, and learning. It is not fair; I ought to feel happier. Love is not fair. Love does not possess my logic; it has its own quality. I know this with my head, and I do not feel love's presence. It hurts.

16. Cognition ends in silence, how do I reach beyond these words, beyond this yawning sense of loss, how can this emptiness be filled?

17. Love's logic goes beyond words, but still I am not silent. I cannot go beyond love, I cannot deny the power of love, and I cannot win it for myself. Love's logic goes beyond rationality.

Showing the ordering principles of language

This writing is an example of thought being influenced by feeling. It is a potted history of my search to live love more fully. It traces snapshots of my life journey from identity crises in (2) to feelings of dispassion in (15). Following Ruddick's exemplar of 'feeling crying out for thought' I write 'through' love, holding an embodied sense of what love means to me, and letting this sense direct my reminiscences.

I remember a sense of liberation in terms of feminist theory paragraph (3), and refer to the structures of power in organisation in (6) and (7). I write about love as erotic energy, and link this with potential abuse of power in (7).

Feeling thought, the sisterly bonds between women, the capacity of social structures to create subjects and order perception, these three gendered theoretical frames enable me to express what I know in this reflective writing.

Passion subsides as I ask questions about co-operation and relationship in the office (8) and (9). I begin to recognise the powerful effect of emotion in organisation and link this into the responsibilities of leadership (10), (11) and (12) to use organisational power wisely. Love's logic takes me to a new respect for relationship. I notice how another person 'forgives' his office enemy in circumstances where I would have found it impossible (9). And I recognise this as an example of 'love at work'.

I see how passion leads me to universalise experience, and that relationship requires me to 'stand in another's shoes'. I want to learn how I might do this, and begin writing action accounts. I use the text as a signpost, to understand the dynamics of relationship. I am familiar with post-modern theories of language, and I try to discern meaning (and right from wrong) in local, particular, circumstances.

Continuing to think 'through' love, I remain unsatisfied and complain about not getting love to do what I want. Other people's theories do not inform me.

Seeing this, I can point to a logic of love that lies beyond what I know now, that is mysterious, that I cannot put into words, that I must strive to accept.

My reflective writing shows me that love might have helped me to regain my personhood, but now requires me to follow its own logic and not my own, that my task is to develop the art of love.

I turn to 'silence' and spiritual practice for more answers.

RELIGIOUS CONSTRUCTIONS OF SELF

In this section I look at the relation of western philosophy and western religious practice with eastern philosophy and spiritual practice. I consider the differences between Christian, Jewish and Hindu practice, referring to Bernstein's theory (Bernstein,2000) and reflect on how this structures my learning and knowledge production. I do this firstly, to explain more clearly how I come to learn which inevitably influences the way that I inquire, and secondly, to lay the groundwork for a later discussion of Rayner's theory of the Complex Self.

Employing feminist theory, I can see how social practices might structure individual behaviour and meaning making, but how do religious or spiritual practices influence the way I learn?

I distinguish between religious practices, not in order to define or discover a transcendent theology (or universal practice), but to suggest how the relation of theory, practice and experience might structure individual ontology in a similar way that Althusser suggests that social practice influences and creates individual subjects.

Tarnas identifies Kantian theory and the Enlightenment, as the point in history when metaphysics and God were no longer considered the subject of philosophy but of theology (Tarnas, 1991 p. 354). However, Bernstein (Bernstein, 2000 p. 85) suggests there was an earlier moment in history when Christianity began to communicate the good news of Christ through a complete and perfect text, where the language of the text had to be interpreted in order to make God's message understood. It was the text that contained God.

Bernstein contrasts this with Judaism where he maintains that the text is considered to be incomplete and open to revision in the light of experience, because God is not solely in the text but also in action.

He suggests that the consequence of these differently-mediated relations with God is in the nature of inwardness, and that this difference has an effect on the way that the knower relates to the known. In Christianity there is an imperfect society with a complete and perfect text where God is found through analysis of

language. In Judaism there is a perfect society living in the faith of God with an incomplete text.

By making these comparisons, what Bernstein is suggesting is that the relation of language and action mediates the relation of the knower to the known, and therefore that religious practice influences the way we come to know ourselves. In the one case the universalising of the text describes a model of perfection through which the subject is disciplined, and the nature of the divine is understood through language, which he maintains, encourages an outward focus. In the alternative case the subject seeks to understand experientially the 'principles of all things' which encourages an inward focus.

By comparison, in Hinduism inward authority **realises** the text, it does not seek to analyse or complete the text.

The poems of the Upanishads answer questions about the nature of God, about what happens at death, but they do not develop a logic or an argument, they are "something seen" (Easwaran, 1987 p. 14) and the student is expected to 'make their truths an integral part of character, conduct, and consciousness' (ibid. p. 14).   These poems give practical clues about how to develop individual consciousness, clues that must be grasped intuitively, rather than understood and rationalised.

Through the practice of concentration the ancient Hindu sages discovered that, 'they could separate strata of the mind and observe its workings as objectively as a botanist observes a flower (ibid. p. 17). This did not involve thinking or interpreting, but rather discrimination, observation, and seeing. Hindu religious practice is focused on developing the skills of observation and does not give authority to the text. These discriminative practices ultimately focus on union with the divine[3].

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[3] Yoga is a general term that refers to the 'union of body, mind and soul, and with God' (Iyengar, 1993 p. xvii). Patanjali's Eight Limbs of Yoga start with understanding ethics (1st Limb), living the 'right' way (2nd Limb), control of the body through postures (3rd Limb), control of the breath (4th limb), control of desire (5th Limb), the practice of concentration (6th Limb), meditation (7th Limb) and Samadhi or union with the divine (8th Limb). This is covered more fully in Chapter Six.

Summary

I suggest that religious practices structure learning in a variety of ways, and that these learning methods privilege particular ways of coming to know. This is reflected, not only in cultural differences, but also in different ways of 'being' and different cultural constructions of self.

I compare knowledge developed (1) through analysis of text, (2) through a combination of text and experience, and (3) through direct realisation of the text. I suggest that particular religious and spiritual practices shape individual perception by focussing on different aspects of the mind / body relation and that these learning capacities frame our cultural constructions of the world.

When I refer to 'reflecting on my accounts using the ordering principles of language to develop propositional knowledge', I am not only referring to a post-modern textual analysis, I am also referring to my attempt to 'realise' my text. I am asking my text to disclose its direction. This realising process, learned through spiritual practice and applied to my reflective writing, is described in Chapter Six in this way:

> 'The **3rd Limb** is *asana,* learning control of the body through postures. 'Learning control' is a critical phrase. It does not mean the brain instructing the body, verbally saying 'do this, do that' and the body obeying. It means letting the body show me what it can do. … I learned control of the body, to work with the body so that it became free to move into the posture that it 'knew' how to do anyway! I stopped performing headstand from the 'outside' and learned its real meaning from the 'inside'. In this way the body becomes the instrument of the headstand….
>
> This methodology can be applied to the practise of the 4th, 5th and 6th Limbs of yoga and is a metaphor for the way I write about love in organisation. Becoming an instrument of love is like becoming an instrument of the body doing headstand. It is not about taking in information and applying it 'out there', neither is it about performance, it is about letting knowledge of love held 'in here' work in its own way' (Chapter Six, p.173).

This example shows how I privilege my experience of the text in order that it may disclose its knowledge.

This is a turning point in the theoretical framing of my inquiry. My way of learning and being in the world has been shaped over the past 20 years by the experience of meditation and yoga, and this has influenced me in very significant ways. These practices have taught me through a process of absorption. It means that my knowledge is disclosed rather than interpreted. The result is that in my reflective writing often appears to have no theoretical frame, and does not point to specifics. These apparent 'assertions' arise from this learning process.

I develop my scholarship by reliving my experience of practice when I read my journal. The propositional knowledge gained by reflecting on practice is developed throughout my inquiry and eventually becomes my 'living educational theory' (Whitehead, 1988). When I bring my lived experience into alignment with the ideas of others, their theory informs and influences my living theory[4].

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[4] In summary, a living educational theory is 'the living form and content of an educational theory which can generate valid descriptions and explanations for the educational development of individuals' (Whitehead, 1988 p. 42). A full explanation is at the end of this Chapter.

ONTOLOGY AND THE STRUCTURES OF BEING

In this section I distinguish between an analytic mode of inquiry and a holistic mode of inquiry. I expand on the way that I use the ordering principles of language as I reflect on my writing and 'disclose' knowledge holistically. I compare Bortroft's (Bortroft, 1996) 'moment of coalescence' with western ideas of unity. I go on to apply this idea of coalescence between the 'belongingness of things' to the internal reordering that occurs in my spiritual practice. I illustrate this with excerpts taken from later Chapters.

As in the previous section, this theory later contributes to Rayner's theories of Inclusionality (Rayner, 2004) where the boundaries between 'things' become fluid and knowledge develops.

(o)ntology

I write the word (o)ntology to distinguish it from ontology-in-general[5].

I experience three aspects of my inward embodied knowing, the spiritual, the emotional, and the cognitive. All three (the spiritual, affect and thought) intermingle inwardly with each other in a variety of combinations and are experienced by me as I act within, and am influenced by, wider cultural and social practices.

My inquiry is about how divine love might come through my (o)ntology into my social practice, and my concern is the relation of ontology, to practice and to epistemology; the relation of being, to action, to realising how I know.

My knowledge, expressed in language, reflects the mental frames through which I have been socialised. (I provided an example of this earlier in this Chapter.) It means that my writing is not value free, and is culturally specific. I describe (o)ntological experience in theoretical terms that are framed by the western philosophy set out earlier in this Chapter.

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[5] In doing this, I am following Thayer-Bacon's (2003) lead in the way she distinguishes between Epistemology and (e)pistemology.

My methodology is influenced by my mode of learning developed through spiritual practice, and described in the previous section. The inward relation between my words, affect and the divine is distinguishable, but is also multi-layered and variable. These distinctions are made through a process of 'seeing' that is non-verbal. The question 'How may I become an instrument of love?' involves the realisation of the divine, not through words but through 'seeing'. It is this non-verbal experience that is enacted through language in this inquiry.

I have shown how I let myself be guided by my reflective writing, rather than explaining my experience by pointing to it. Part Two and Part Three of this thesis is written in this disclosing manner, from within, not from the outside. In Part Four I evaluate the truth of my claims to know from the 'outside' by taking the 'data' developed in Part Two and Part Three and judging my inquiry against my own standards[6].

I write with feeling following Spinoza (Damasio, 2003), write sensuously following Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), make a case for the universality of human characteristics following Varela, Thompson and Roche (Varela et.al, 1991). I write holistically and reflectively without knowing what new learning will arise. To do this, I deliberately relax the boundaries between self and other, and learn through discrimination rather by analysis. Now I have moved my ideas on from feminist theory of learning through mutuality, and now my perspective is ungendered. I am developing a living theory (and my epistemology) from the facts of my existence, and by allowing these facts[7] to relate (belong) together, waiting to see if a 'moment of coalescence' arises, if I can 'realise' my meaning. When I refer to synasthesia in Chapter Five this is an embodiment of this coalescence, here I wrote:

> 'My mind prevents sensuous knowing by keeping perception on the surface of the skin. If I bypass the mind I can achieve unity through the senses…. Provided that the mind is not directly involved in framing the perception then new sensory experiences may bring the opportunity of freshness to the mind' (Chapter Five, p.131).

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[6] These standards are developed and set out in Chapter Four.
[7] Here I have turned the meaning of the word 'fact' entirely on its head. These facts are not scientifically or rationally verifiable. I am not analysing my experience by making external comparisons, but rather seeing the intensive depth of my ontological experience and disclosing the facts of my being.

And I use a quote from Jim Dodge to illustrate this point again in Chapter Eight:

'Another artistic peak is the mysterious point where you amass enough momentum that you stop telling the story and the story begins telling you. …what the Muses seem to favour for getting out of your mind is a concentration so ferocious and total that you seem to disappear' (Dodge 2004,page 31, quoted in Chapter Eight, p.253).

Bortroft provides a theoretical basis for this, when he writes:

'the act of understanding is not an act of reasoning … Logic is analytical whereas meaning is evidently holistic… We understand meaning in the moment of coalescence when the whole is reflected in the parts so that together they disclose the whole. It is because meaning is encountered in this "circle" of the reciprocal relationship of the whole and the parts that we call it the hermeneutic circle' (Bortroft, 1996, pp.8-9).

It is in the 'moment of coalescence' that I see both myself and the contextual nature of my action. I realise the lotus mandala in this way where the 'whole' becomes disclosed in 'the part'. This 'disclosure' is what I am referring to when I write my critique of staged developmental models of learning in Chapter Five:

'The point is that the metaphor of the many petalled lotus flower and the symbols of the Christian mandala enable another way of coming to know the self. These are not reliant on the integrative capacity of cognition to develop a wider consciousness. Instead this knowledge arises through experiential knowing, which still enables the physical, emotional and mental aspects of self to come to know themselves but through vision-logic rather than intellect' (Chapter Five, p.164).

This moment of coalescence is a moment of synthesis when (o)ntology 'belongs together' with (e)pistemology, where the two are not separate components that have a connection with each other but are experienced simultaneously in what Bortroft refers to as '*dynamical* simultaneity' (ibid. p. 64 *[author's italics]*). This dynamical relationship is not the resolution of the final stage of dialectical reasoning following Hegel, but a realisation that the inherent qualities of beingness are dynamically related to the inherent qualities of knowingness. What Bortroft calls, 'unity without unification' (ibid. p. 60) in his discussion of

Goethe's scientific consciousness. This is how I come to understand 'wholeness' as discussed in Bortroft and also in Bohm's discussion of the implicate and explicate order (Bohm, 1996).

Here I see a relation between the Hegelian search for unity and the phenomenologists' search for wholeness. And I see a relation between Griffin's rejection of Kantian ethics, which is analytical, and his privileging joint- action-in the moment. The former is a product of analysis; the latter is the result of the disclosure of experience. I see that these have a relation in the (e)pistemological and (o)ntological[8] of what it means to be human.

In my meaning making I bring the 'belonging' relatedness of (o)ntology and (e)pistemology together with the organising principles of language when I reflect on my free fall writing and my accounts of action.

I think that there is no special reason why language should structure perception because it is the ontological structures of being in a dynamical relation with each other that also determine how I make sense of what I see.

The dynamical inner relation and consciousness

Bortroft suggests that there are two different modes of consciousness underpinning relational processes. He maintains that the analytic mode of consciousness 'transfer(s) attention from the sensory experience to the mental abstraction', whereas the holistic mode of consciousness withdraws attention from thought and from the psychological structures that organise experience, reinvests attention in sensory experience and reverses the normal learning sequence (Bortroft, 1996, p.65).

Modes of consciousness are also referred to in Bernstein's typology (Bernstein, 2000) as the modality of the pedagogic code through which the pedagogic device

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[8] I refer to epistemology in the terms favoured by Barbara J. Thayer-Bacon (Thayer-Bacon, 2003) to indicate that I do not refer to modernist or postmodernist readings of ontology, that I am not seeking to universalise my understanding of either ontology or epistemology.

is contextualised.   Consciousness[9] is the field within which this pedagogy is produced, reproduced and changed.

I use the word 'consciousness' in the Hindu sense, meaning that which is in the belongingness of things.   I am not referring to consciousness in the phenomenological sense quoted, in Ladkin as being, 'always directed, … always consciousness *of'* (Ladkin, 2005 p.111 *[author's italics]*).

When I refer to modes of consciousness I am writing about the stuff of relating, the stuff of belongingness of phenomena, not an analysis of what one phenomenon means to another.   So it is my mode of consciousness that disciplines and determines my perception and I learn about this in spiritual practice.

Because my experience tells me that love is the mode that opens up belongingness, I aim to bring this into my professional practice by deliberately changing my mode of consciousness from analytic to holistic mode when I reflect upon my work in Part Three.

The relation between thought, affect and the divine is distinguishable, multi-layered and variable.   I suggest that these distinctions are made through a process of 'seeing' that is non-verbal.'   Words, affect and the divine are the 'facts' of my (o)ntology and my mode of consciousness brings these 'facts' into a discriminating relation with each other.   I refer to this process in Chapter Five:

> 'The relation between thinking and feeling becomes clearer to me as I meditate. In meditation I say the *mantra*.   This is a Sanskrit word whose meaning is irrelevant, but whose resonance is chosen by the *guru* to awaken the soul within. It is a sacred word that the student is asked never to repeat to anyone.   This is because it in such close alignment with the soul within. The *mantra* is the anchor

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[9] In the London Review of Books, 18 August 2005 pp. 19-21, Ian Hacking's review of Stephen Rose's latest book on the brain makes distinctions between a Lockean perspective of consciousness formulated as an alternative to Decarte's cognito in defining personal identity, 'being conscious' as in David Lodge's novel as being aware of who one is, one's past and hopes for the future, and Damasio's feeling as a consciousness that is capable of modifying the brain. Bernstein also uses the word consciousness to denote 'that which is noticed' in relation to the social activity. I am distinguishing here between consciousness of – the direction of attention, and being conscious - as in being aware of, encompassing some sense of feeling and/or movement. I want to acknowledge the difference between the analytic and disclosing modes of consciousness, which are not seen as either incompatible or separate in an inclusional approach.

around which I watch the action of my mind as it generates thoughts and feelings. I discover that if I repeat the *mantra* with desire, perhaps hunger, then thoughts of food arise. On the other hand if I repeat the *mantra* lovingly then peace may arise' (Chapter Five, p.137).

I can 'see' how thought and emotion *belong* together, how divine love and emotional loves, *belong* together, how sensation in the body *belongs* with thought. This realising of the relation of emotion, thought and action is one of the processes   that   occurs   in   meditation.

INCLUSIONAL SPACE AND THE COMPLEX SELF

Inclusional space

In Bortroft's 'moment of coalescence' there is a fusion of being and knowing that produces the gestalt, the 'Aha, now I see' realising experience. Some-thing appears where there had been a 'nothingness'. When we see the part and seek to see the as yet undisclosed this is an 'active absence' (Bortroft 1996, p.15). Bernstein identifies no-thing as a gap between the known and the unknown, and calls it a 'potential discursive gap' (Bernstein, 2000 p.30). The space between knowing and not- knowing, like the gap between thinking and doing, is an absence of spatial relation between either mental or physical objects, and where a relation is sought.

I first refer to a gap between knowing and not-knowing in Chapter Five, between feeling and thinking:

> 'As a child, I lived in a world where emotions were often dishonestly ascribed and I created coherence by looking for the gap between word and feeling. I had an awareness that meanings and words were constantly changing, and that my words must represent that which had already occurred inside me' (Chapter Five, p.128).

Mathematics always assumes a spatial dimension, that neither wholeness nor nothing is actually attainable. Inclusionality maintains that because this mathematical convention does not mirror our sensuous experience of movement or communication it encourages an overlay of impositional logic on experience.

An inclusional mathematical formulation is ternary, where numbers cease to be fixed single points but are expressed in triplets so that '3' is expressed as '2,3,4' and the number system becomes fluid and reciprocal when '3' is represented by the relation of '2' and '4' (Rayner 2004). Combining this fluid number system with Mandelbrot's series of complex numbers that occur between points within complex boundaries, inclusionality thinks of objects or entities, as never fixed and being constantly revised by the flow of the space between them. For this dynamic movement to occur the boundaries between points, and the boundaries between entities, must also constantly change. These dissolving and dynamic

boundaries form, and are reformed, in such a way that both entities and the space between them become infused with the others qualities.

Rayner (2004b) puts it this way, '..the conventional abstract mathematical representation of such complexity *begins* prescriptively with an explicit or implicit *definition* of content and container that replaces their *simultaneous* reciprocal relationship with *sequential* 'feedback', the natural might be said to *originate* in *indefinition* – a realm of endless possibility' (ibid. p. 14). Rayner sees the movement of the boundaries between entities influencing the entities and the boundaries in an indeterminate free-flow form, which is a process of 'contextual transformation'.

This concept of boundary has echoes of Bernstein's descriptions of pedagogic communication, where he highlights the importance of the thickness (or the insulation) of linguistically defined boundaries. For example the boundaries between teaching French and German defines the discourse of language teaching in schools, and we come to understand the teaching of Arts subjects in relation to the teaching of Science subjects (Bernstein 2000, p.6). Bernstein sees the preservation of the insulation of boundaries as the action of power, which is disguised, cloaked by silence and preserved because the boundaries are classified as 'natural'.

In an inclusional, more experiential reading, of boundary, Rayner suggests that not only the outer, but also the inner, layers of the insulation exert influence on space. This introduces a multi-dimensional reading of the 'dynamic of mutuality' (Macy, 1991) where points / objects / entities become complex but distinct spaces bounded by flow, 'communicating between reciprocally coupled *insides* and *outsides* through *intermediary* spatial domains' (Rayner 2004b).

This is the logic of inclusionality, where points / objects / entities are 'distinct places' influencing, and being influenced by, contextual space or flow in a reciprocal dynamic. The way in which the boundaries and movement (or the belongingness) between 'distinct places' and 'contextual space' are perceived is the critical aspect of inclusional logic and differentiates it from other theories.

Rayner (2004b) suggests that 'with "zero" representing "absence" and "infinity" representing "limitless amount", it would make sense contextually to regard zero

as "inner-outer balance" [a] (stationary boundary condition) and infinity as inner outer spatial possibility… all under one another's mutual influence. … So by focussing on boundary properties at a particular scale it may be possible to gain insight into processes operating simultaneously at any larger or smaller scale. In this way the microcosm expresses the macrocosm and *vice versa* – the small picture can reflect the big picture ' (ibid. p. 12).

Bernstein suggests that 'attempts to change degrees of insulation reveal the power relations' (Bernstein 2000, p. 7). Taking this into inclusional logic, I suggest that the degree of influence of 'distinct places' and 'contextual space' is determined by the degree of insulation of the perceived boundaries between them. Where I write about my personal experience, I am reducing the insulation between my inner boundaries:

> 'Changing the self is analogous to the body becoming like a mountain or the synaesthesia of making music or dissolving into the sense of the sublime. From that space I am in love with the whole world and the world loves me. I am the world' (Chapter Eight, p.252).

In Chapter One, where I write about clarifying meanings of love I am acknowledging the changing social construction of love.

In Chapter Ten I give an example of Scharmer's 'presencing' influencing a conversation in organisation, and conclude that this form of communication breaks down the insulating thickness of conventional boundaries:

> '"Presencing" the future is enabled through shifting the locus of listening through four different perspectives, and understanding the nature of language through a similar number of frames, which are: talking from politeness, through debate, through inquiry, and on to flow. These listening conversations recontextualise organisational discourse through a pedagogic transmission that deliberately employs sense-making and ethical modalities, outside the usual conventions and organisational norms' (Chapter Ten, page…)

In microcosm in my (o)ntology, I see Rayner's stationary boundary condition internally as an absence of movement akin to silence. In macrocosm, in relations with others, I see potential in relationship as the place of possibility, belonging

together within contextual space, at the same time influencing the flow of both inner as well as outer domains.

At the interface of content (distinct places) where it has been dislocated from context (contextual space) the inner / outer boundary, using impositional logic, becomes a site of change (and power) through which the dynamic relation can be perceived and sensed.

Rayner goes on to say that if change is seen as the transformation of space, either as a distinct space or as contextual space, then there will be a '*simultaneous* alteration in both content and context in their reciprocal relationship. And this reciprocal alteration, where content and context co-creatively shape one another can be thought of as *attunement* or *resonance,* rather than adaptation' (Rayner 2004b p. 19).

Bringing my experience into propositional knowledge I describe the movement across boundaries (whether these are the inner boundaries of my (o)ntology or the outward boundaries between people or ideas) using the language and reasoning of inclusionality. I sense the dynamic movement within and between boundaries through resonance and dissonance. The more insulation there is, the less resonance, the less attunement, the less influence is possible. In this situation, the more capacity that the contextual field has to pick up and echo these 'local resonances', the more fluid the inclusional dynamic is likely to be.

Now, I make further connections between inclusionality and Bernstein's theories of pedagogy.

Bernstein has formulated recontextualising rules which 'regulate the formation of pedagogic discourse' (Bernstein 2000, p. 114). He says 'The recontextualising principle selectively appropriates, relocates, refocuses and relates other discourses to constitute its own order… Formally, we move from a recontextualising principle to a recontextualising field with agents with practising ideologies (ibid. p. 33). Bernstein places the recontextualising field between the production of new knowledge and the transformation of pedagogic discourse in schools. Recontextualising involves the de-location of part of a discourse and its relocation in the field of production (ibid. p. 113).

However, I am using 'recontextualise' as an inclusional term. To recontextualise means locating a discourse of love, and bringing the resonances of love into the inclusional flow, not as a way of imposing a power relation, but as a way of infusing the inclusional space with loving resonances.

I am suggesting that this loving resonance can be recognised by a felt sense of wholeness. This sense is transitory, a moment of coalescence arising from the 'dynamical simultaneity' of the boundaries.

The Complex Self

Rayner describes the Complex Self also as a 'distinct place', as a malleable local identity. The 'self' is 'a complex, dynamic coming together of inner and outer through intermediary aspects… Each aspect simultaneously shapes the other' (Rayner 2004c)

Inclusional space is the ground from which the belongingness of my (o)ntology and my (e)pistemology arise. These are not fixed entities. They are intimately and dynamically related in the formation of my self, and they contribute to and are shaped by my mode of consciousness. Within this inclusional frame it becomes obvious that changing the shape of the body changes the shape of the mind, and that inhalation and exhalation are intimately connected to my sensed memory of eros and agape.

Silence is the 'stationary boundary position', an active absence, and it reorders my primary experience. Here the (o)ntological structures of self shape, and are shaped by, the fluidity of the inclusional space. This is the space in which the relational belonging of words / affect / divine are realised.

This silence is not the absolute of God in the text, or God in practice, or the God of principles. It is itself, I believe, a universal human capacity, in which it is possible to realise my individual and unique experience of God's loving presence.

BERNSTEIN'S THEORIES OF PEDAGOGY

Basil Bernstein (Bernstein, 2000) developed a very comprehensive (and complex) theory of pedagogic communication over a period of 40 years. Much of his early work was controversial because of the claims he made about the difference that language skills made in the education of working class and middle class children, and this may have limited his influence in the field of education. He ended his career as Emeritus Professor of the Sociology of Education at the University of London.

My interest is in the work he did on symbolic control and psychic ordering, although he was as much concerned with institutional power and control.

Defining pedagogy

He defines pedagogy as: 'a sustained process whereby somebody(s) acquires new forms or develops existing forms of conduct, knowledge, practice and criteria from somebody(s) or something deemed to be an appropriate provider or evaluator' (ibid. p. 78).

He goes on to distinguish between institutional pedagogy, that will have accredited providers – like a school or church – and segmental pedagogy which happens in everyday practice and is informal – like learning life skills in a parent / child relationship (ibid. p. 78).

And he defines three types of pedagogic relation: explicit, implicit and tacit. 'Explicit and implicit refer to progressive in time pedagogic relation where there is a purposeful intention to initiate, modify, develop or change knowledge, conduct or practice' (ibid. p. 199). 'In the case of explicit pedagogy the intention is highly visible, whereas in the case of implicit pedagogy the intention from the point of view of the acquirer is invisible. The tacit is a pedagogic relation where initiation, modification, development or change of knowledge or practice occurs, where neither of the members may be aware of it. Here the meanings are non-linguistic, condensed and context dependant' (ibid. p. 200).

Pedagogic relations shaping pedagogic communications.

Bernstein describes the transmission of **pedagogic communication** using the following diagram:

Interactional Practice

Interactional context

Power

Classification

Recognition Rule

Control

Framing

Realisation Rule

Text

The transmission context: (Bernstein, 2000 p. 16)

- Power is the relation between boundaries and between categories.
- Classification is the degree of insulation between boundaries. If the degree of insulation between boundaries changes then the classification changes.
- The Recognition Rule regulates meanings that are relevant (ibid. p.18), is regulated by the classificatory principle and refers to power relations (ibid. p.17)
- Control carries the boundaries between categories
- Framing controls the means of acquiring the legitimate message, how meanings are put together (ibid. p.12) and regulates relations within a context.
- The Realisation Rule determines how we put meanings together and how we make them public
- A legitimate text is anything that attracts evaluation, which can be no more than a slight movement (ibid. p.18)
- Interaction: the selection, organisation sequencing criteria and pacing of communication (oral, visual and written) together with position, posture and dress of communicants (ibid. p.190). (Definition given in relation to framing and locus of control).

Changes in classification and framing will produce different modalities of elaborated codes. Elaborated codes are codes of transmission that that construct ideology, a way of making relations (ibid. p.15).

Now I turn to Bernstein's theory, and transpose some of his concepts to describe the rhizomatic nature of love.

- Power: the relation of boundaries within the inclusional flow. I refer to power in two ways. Firstly, referring to the inner boundaries of lived experience that provides experience of personal empowerment, and secondly referring to social categories and their relation to the social context that is the more conventional reading of power that Bernstein also uses.

- Classification: the thickness or degree of insulation of the boundary between entities and distinct places, which will lead to changes in joint understanding.

- The Recognition Rule: regulates relevant meanings. Leaders with hierarchical power have formal opportunities to regulate meaning through the conduct of meetings and production of written material.

- Control: the inclusional flow underlying formally recognised organisational stratification.

- Framing: the qualities and modes of relating between people sharing joint tasks.

- The Realisation Rule: The effect of the inclusional flow on relations between people, akin to organisational culture. I want to see love integrated within the Realisation Rule, as a determiner of how we put meanings together, as an implicit ingredient of Interactional Practice.

- Legitimate text: A practice, behaviour or writing that can be judged in terms of social convention or aspiration. This includes social rules that are articulated, such as organisation policies and prescribed methods of teaching yoga

- Interactional Practice: the relationship of a person to other persons or to identifiable practices. In inclusional terms, it is the relation of 'distinct places' to other 'distinct places'.

- Interactional context: The inclusional flow, which takes into account the entire practical, symbolic and tacit aspects of internal organisational vision and behaviours, and including inter-organisational influences.

In a tacit pedagogic relation, the parties in relation are not explicitly aware of pedagogic transmission. Although this may be materialised later through joint action in what Bernstein calls the pedagogic device.

The pedagogic device is the term Bernstein uses to refer to the materialisation of symbolic control which regulates pedagogic communication and 'acts selectively on meaning potential' (ibid. p. 28). This is particularly relevant in my later discussions of tacit pedagogy.

Gaps in meaning

Bernstein suggests that meaning making takes place within a context, but that if the meaning is fully embedded then it is 'unthinkable knowledge'. In other words, there needs to be differentiation and an 'indirect relation between meanings and a specific material base'. He goes on to say, 'that (if) meanings (that) are context bound (they) cannot unite with anything other than themselves. They lack the power of relation outside a context because they are totally consumed by that context' (ibid. p. 30).

Meaning-making therefore must include the potential of a gap, which he calls 'the potential discursive gap'. He emphasises, 'It is not a dislocation of meaning, it is a gap.' (ibid. p. 30). It is in this gap that different relations and different meanings arise.

This 'gap' is critical to my inquiry. I develop this concept later in the thesis and refer to it as the 'inclusional space'. In Bernstein's typology, the gap is two-dimensional whereas in Rayner (2004b) not only does the gap exist between two or more meanings and their material base, but is itself influenced by meaning and materiality in a multi-dimensional state of dynamism.

The recontextualising field

The pedagogic discourse is a principle for the circulation and reordering of discourses. Bernstein's recontextualising principle 'selectively appropriates, relocates, refocuses and relates other discourses to constitute its own order'

(Bernstein, 2000 p.33). This then creates recontextualising fields, which then creates agents with recontextualising functions.

A multi-dimensional dynamic is critical to the concept of recontextualising. In a similar way that language only has meaning within context, as discussed earlier in this Chapter, so recontextualisation occurs through the dynamic inter-relation of boundaries. Taking Rayner's inclusional processes with Bernstein's theory of recontextualisation, at the end of Chapter Nine I begin to draw out my findings:

> 'My methodology has enabled me to develop the relation between the 'I' that acts in the world; and the 'eye' of consciousness, the observer of the inner world. My mind looks both ways, there is the self that has been constructed by living in a participative world and the self whose soul feels almost as old as the hills.
>
> My inquiry brings my knowledge of love into the academy through propositional knowing and into my practice through the dynamical boundaries between self and other. The boundary between 'me and we' is the pivotal place where resonances and dissonances are both felt and dispersed into the relational flow. If I feel and act with love, this understanding leaks through the boundary of the self into the inclusional flow, and is returned to me. In the resonance of the return, my understanding of love is clarified.
>
> Here, in the pivotal place between boundaries, I see eros thickening the insulation of the boundary and exercising power in the way that structures organisational culture, and I see agape reducing the insulation of the boundary' (Chapter Nine, page 259)

Then as I begin to consider the criteria against which to judge my inquiry, I bring Rayner's and Bernstein's concept into the first standard that I use to measure the value of my inquiry and my practice, which is:

- my capacity to reframe or recontextualise what I am, or we are doing now

FROM PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE TO LIVING EDUCATIONAL THEORY

Whitehead argues 'that the propositional form is masking the living form and content of an educational theory which can generate valid descriptions and explanations for the educational development of individuals' (Whitehead, 1988).

In this chapter I have shown how theory informs my writing. I have demonstrated this with an example, which shows the relation of theory to my expression of love through reflective writing. By writing with love through the frame of theory I develop connections between theory and practice.   By the end of my inquiry this has become my living educational theory.